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Malaysian Politics, 1968-1970: Crisis and Response

By

Jerome Ronald Bass

A.B. (City College of the City University of New York) 1961

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Malaysian Politics, 1968-1970:
Crisis and Response

Abstract

Jerome R. Bass

This dissertation is an analytical history of Malaysian politics from the 1968 election campaign until the accession of Tun Abdul Razak to the Prime Ministership in 1970. These were crucial years for Malaysia, as symbolized by the two key words of the title: "crisis" and "response."

The crisis began with the unexpected electoral setback of the ruling Alliance party. It was augmented, in rapid succession, by the Malaysian Chinese Association's semiwithdrawal from the government, serious racial clashes in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur, minor incidents elsewhere in West Malaysia, a proclamation of emergency leading, inter alia, to the suspension of parliament, and the climax of the simmering conflict within the United Malays National Organization between (what is termed in the study) the party's ultra and establishment factions. Each of these developments is described, its historical roots identified, its sociological dimensions analyzed, its implications gauged, and its consequences assessed.

The response to the crisis encompasses considera-

tion of the structure and functions of the new institutions established by the government and the content and connotations of the policies promulgated. The focus is on aspects of continuity and change. Included is an evaluation of how the opposition adapted (or failed to adapt) to the changed environment generated by the measures taken by the government during the period reviewed.

The primary concern of the dissertation is to understand the factors that enabled the Alliance, not only to ride out the crisis but to emerge with its strength perhaps at an all-time high. Why, in more general terms, did the basic parameters of the system remain unaltered? A number of the historical and sociocultural factors contributing to this outcome are delineated throughout the study. Seven are made explicit and elaborated in the final chapter. In simple, declarative form, these are enumerated below.

- (1) The declaration of emergency, suspension of parliament, and general concentration of power in Alliance hands prevented the political uncertainty latent in the 1969 election result from coming to full fruition.
- (2) The May 13 violent outburst in Kuala Lumpur (while the most severe episode of its type in modern Malaysian history) was, in retrospect, rather

easily managed, with law and order promptly restored. (3) Malaysia possessed the most professional and best articulated civil service in Southeast Asia. (4) The military made no effort to seize power from civilian leadership. (5) The crisis and attendant unaccustomed fluidity in the immediate aftermath of the election did not engage external, particularly great power, intervention. (6) No opposition party or combination of parties had the willingness or wherewithal to challenge effectively the Alliance's assumption of virtually complete power. (7) The Alliance did not use its monopoly of effective power to take serious or systematic repressive measures against opponents; on the contrary, the new Razak government demonstrated considerable flexibility and openness both in policy and political terms.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an analytical history of West Malaysian national politics from the 1968 election campaign until the accession of Tun Abdul Razak to the Prime Ministership, a less than three year period which witnessed, in addition to a new Prime Minister, the worst episode of racial violence in Malaysia's history, a proclamation of emergency, the suspension of parliament, a panoply of new institutions and policies, and, with all, the sense that little had really altered, coupled with the nagging feeling that everything should have and, indeed, at any moment might. The study seeks to describe the political process in relation to the foregoing crises and events, and to understand why the essential character of the system (at least until the time of writing) remained unchanged.*

Chapter 1 focuses on the issues raised and the tactics adopted by the contending political parties during the 1968-69 election campaign. The second chapter analyses the outcome of the election and its major implications. The subsequent racial violence is the subject of Chapter 3. The primary purpose is

*The author completed fieldwork in June 1970; the writing, in June 1973.

not to provide an account of what happened on May 13 but to investigate why it happened and the attendant policy implications. In addition to an assessment of the May 13 incident, earlier outbreaks of communal violence are discussed in terms of ascertaining what generalizations might be hazarded about the morphology and prevention of racial violence in Malaysia.

Chapters 4 through 7 describe the reactions to the election outcome and subsequent violence. Chapters 4 and 5 are cast in terms of the institutions and policies established or implemented by the government. Chapter 6 primarily considers the effects of the state of emergency on the opposition. The crux of Chapter 7 is an analysis of the divisions within UMNO (United Malays National Organization),^{1**} which reached a zenith following the election. Chapter 8 begins with an assessment of the forces shaping the character of the Razak government. This leads, in turn, to consideration of the major factors allowing the Alliance Party² to come through trying times not only unscathed but strengthened, and to some speculation on Malaysia's future.

The study draws on four sources of information,

^{**}Footnotes, divided by chapters, are located at the end of the study.

in addition to readily available secondary materials.

(1) A reading of the English and Malay (rumi or roman script) press since 1967. Access was had to the Straits Times' voluminous clipping files in Kuala Lumpur, a valuable source for materials in English, mostly, but not exclusively, from the Straits Times Press, Ltd. publications. (2) Daily translations from Malay (jawi or arabic script), Chinese, and Tamil newspapers, published in the Mirror of Opinion produced by the Singapore Ministry of Culture or the Daily Press Digest compiled by the Malaysian government, provided a sense of non-English educated (press) sentiment.

(3) Interviews conducted with members of the West Malaysian political stratum from September 1969 until June 1970. The expression political stratum, used throughout the study, encompasses both individuals in political roles (for example, members of parliament or political secretaries to Ministers) and those with an indirect or peripheral involvement or interest in the political process such as journalists, trade union officials, academics, and civil servants. The desire to obtain a cross section of opinion (although not in a rigorous sampling sense) was the major criterion in selecting interviewees. This objective

was, in the author's opinion, achieved insofar as discussions were held with individuals representing every shade of opinion on the Malaysian political spectrum. Eighty-five people were formally interviewed; most once; several, two or three times; and a handful became regular informants. Interviews were conducted in every West Malaysian state except the smallest, Perlis. They ranged from a half hour to eight hours in duration, and were of a non-directive sort. A 'typical' interview began with a question of interest to the author and ended with the respondent talking about matters of concern to him. The author did as little talking as possible while his questions sought to elucidate the informant's "inside" view of unfolding events, whether as a direct participant or a knowledgeable observer.

None of the respondents are named. Confidential comments naturally occurred during interviews, and a number of interviewees stated that they wished not to be quoted. To be sure, most of the information and opinions obtained in interviews were neither confidential nor discomfiting to anyone. Yet a single statement of either sort would be sufficient justification not to cite sources, lest the reader, accurately or not, make his own attributions. Anyone

familiar with Malaysia will, of course, readily guess a good proportion of the "sample." That is unavoidable. But the reader gets, as it were, no help from the author. A similar caveat also obtains with respect to the fourth source of information. (4) Access was gained to several unpublished documents of varying confidentiality. Although these surely improved the objectivity and accuracy of the account in the following pages, none are explicitly cited.

Throughout this study, unless otherwise clear by usage or context, Malaysia refers to the ten states of the former Federation of Malaya, now known as West Malaysia. Developments in Sabah and Sarawak (East Malaysia) are only discussed when these impinged on events in West Malaysia. It strikes the author as a misguided effort at completeness simply to tack on a chapter on East Malaysia. Not only because events there had, by and large, little effect on developments in West Malaysia, but because never having visited either East Malaysian state, the author has absolutely no "feel" for them. Certainly their very different histories and ethnic compositions precludes treating them simply as extensions of West Malaysia.³ To do so would be a vacuous species of geopolitical

determinism -- better cases could be made for relating Johore to Singapore, Negri Sembilan to Eastern Sumatra, or Kedah to southern Thailand.

CHAPTER 1

THE CAMPAIGN

Introduction

The Alliance Party has dominated modern Malaysian politics: it spearheaded the bloodless independence movement; won fifty-one of the fifty-two elective seats in the new Legislative Council in 1955; formed independent Malaya's first government in 1957; was returned to power by comfortable margins in subsequent elections; presided over Malaysia's formation in 1963 and Singapore's separation two years afterward; saw the country through confrontation with Indonesia and the squabble over Sabah with the Philippines; and, during the period considered in the present study, rode out the 1969 racial violence in Kuala Lumpur to emerge a stronger force than ever.¹

Of immediate interest here is the Alliance's undisputed control of the Dewan Rakyat, the lower house of the Malaysian Parliament. That had allowed the party's leadership, inter alia, to decide when elections would be held,² thus assuring that their timing would itself become issues of contention. The 1969 election was no exception in this regard. Opposition politicians began expressing concern about a

"snap" election almost two years before Parliament's required dissolution.³ But their fears -- sincere or not -- proved unfounded. Opposition parties had ample time to prepare for the election. The nomination and polling dates were announced at virtually the last possible moment and, as in prior general elections, with more than a month between them.⁴

The Timing of the Election

The Malaysian political stratum ascribed the conduct of the election to the Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman. They believed that the Tengku invariably had his way when he felt strongly enough about an issue. This was not meant to suggest that he often found it necessary to browbeat colleagues who disagreed with him. The communal-cum-patronage basis of the Alliance and the socioeconomic homogeneity of its leading figures militated against ideological or programmatic cleavages.⁵

In the absence of strong ideological or policy preferences, the primary concern of most Alliance leaders was to retain their positions. On that basis, they had no occasion to challenge the Tengku's authority because when decisions on the timing of the election, the duration of the campaign, the content

of the platform, and the like were made, their effects on the Alliance's fortunes could not be gauged. Then, too, the fate of past challengers taught that opposition to the Tengku could jeopardize one's career.⁶ In the Malay community, indeed, the superstition existed that those who opposed the Tengku would fall on evil days.⁷

There was sentiment among some Alliance leaders for a shorter campaign and less advance notice than provided. Thus in early 1968, when the chairman of the Alliance election committee, Mohd. Khir Johari, dropped a "bombshell"⁸ by refusing to deny the possibility of an election during the year, he probably expressed a personal predilection, although the remark also served to keep the opposition in a state of uncertainty. However, the Tengku "totally dispelled the suspense" by assuring the opposition that it need not fear a snap election.⁹ In his judgment, the most serious problem before the country, Britain's intended military withdrawal, did not require the government to seek a renewed mandate. The Tengku added in a television interview that an early election might cause the people undue alarm, a risk he saw no reason to take since the Alliance retained the confidence of a majority of Malaysians, and the ability to manage any problem which might arise.¹⁰

At least one opposition party was not about to accept the Tengku's pledge at face value. Consonant with the feisty style of its Singapore progenitor (the People's Action Party), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) seized on the nascent discussion of the election to rally its supporters. The DAP's organizing secretary, Lim Kit Siang, asserted that the Alliance planned to hold the election before the end of 1968 despite the Tengku's insistence to the contrary.¹¹ It was in the Alliance interest to fix an early date for the election, according to Lim, because its leaders realized that the Alliance was losing popular confidence while the opposition daily grew stronger.

Implicit in the DAP's outlook was the assumption that the Alliance's decisions with respect to the holding of the election reflected prospective political advantage. This obvious point bears making because a similar interpretation was proffered by Mohd. bin Mahathir, the paramount leader of the anti-Tengku forces within UMNO.¹² In Mahathir's analysis the Alliance's concentration on short-term political objectives contributed substantially to the violent outbreak following the election.¹³ He argued, a supposition shared -- privately -- by many opposition leaders, that a majority of Malaysians

acknowledged that only the Alliance could or should govern, although "the need to give it absolute power was questioned."¹⁴ The Alliance decided on a protracted campaign, according to Mahathir, because of its judgment "that the strength of the Alliance Party lies in its wealth and its subsequent ability to conduct a prolonged campaign using not only party officials and ministers, but also a huge army of paid workers."¹⁵ However, the long campaign "permitted the racial grievances which had been building up over the years of Alliance rule to come to the boil."¹⁶

Another explanation for the protracted election campaign stressed the Tengku's democratic inclinations; his conviction, in the words of one informant, that "the opposition should have more of a sporting chance." Several considerations suggest that this explanation is more accurate than those premised on political expediency. Most tellingly, if the latter was correct, the calling of a "snap" election (as the opposition professed to fear) would have made more sense than the course decided upon. The Alliance had regular access to the population; that is, the opposition had more reasons to desire extended political debate.

The overloading of the communal tolerance cir-

culits during the election cannot be exclusively attributed to decisions on its timing. The end of 1967 had already brought a quickening of interest in the election, possibly still well over a year in the future. "Various political parties are vigorously preparing to participate in the next general election, which is expected . . . early next year," reported the China Press in the middle of February 1968.¹⁷ A further stimulus to the growing interest in the coming election was the establishment, in March, of a new political party -- The Malaysian People's Movement (MPM).

OPPOSITION PARTY ACTIVITY

Formation of The Malaysian People's Movement

The MPM's formation occurred at a time of dawning realization in opposition circles that it was none too soon to begin thinking of some sort of common front to oppose the Alliance in the election. While the MPM furnished a roof for politicians (and individuals wishing to enter politics) who could not find a home to their liking among the existing parties, its founders appreciated that their new

party could only benefit from a pact with more established opposition parties to avoid mutually harmful competition. In fact, the MPM's establishment and the discussions for and eventual achievement of a partial opposition electoral pact were interconnected developments.

The decision to found the MPM, according to the Nanyang Siang Pau, was made at a "secret meeting" held during the second weekend in March.¹⁸ The most prominent individuals at the conclave were Dr. Lim Chong Eu, the president of the Penang-based United Democratic Party (UDP), Dr. Tan Che Khoo of the Labour Party, and Prof. Syed Hussein Alatas, head of the University of Singapore's Department of Malay Studies. Perhaps because of the party affiliations of Lim and Tan, the Nanyang Siang Pau erroneously concluded that the new party formed part of a larger scheme. "Up to now only the Democratic Action Party and the People's Progressive Party [whose strength centered in the state of Perak] have not yet joined the new party."¹⁹ Thus the newspaper assumed that the new party was the united opposition front which the DAP and PPP had already endorsed in principle when, in effect, the MPM's creation represented the lack of success up to that point in achieving a united front.

The Nanyang Siang Pau story ended on a puzzling note. It commented that the new party "might" seek an understanding with the existing opposition parties on an allocation of constituencies. The inconsistency may have simply derived from the initial uncertainty on the MPM's nature; it may, on the other hand, have reflected the conviction of MPM leaders that if the consolidation of opposition parties could not be achieved, then the next best outcome would be an agreement among them not to nominate candidates in the same constituencies. The MPM was itself a mini-coalition, if one considers the party's leading figures.

Two of the six signatories of the formal declaration establishing the MPM, Dr. Tan Chee Khoo and V. Veerappen, had been prominent members of the Labour Party (LP). Tan when he resigned was chairman of its Selangor branch. The Member of Parliament for Batu constituency in Kuala Lumpur, his badgering of government spokesmen during parliamentary question sessions had earned him the sobriquet of Mr. Opposition. Veerappen had been an MP and a former vice-president of the LP.

A number of other members of the LP's moderate wing followed Tan and Veerappen into the MPM. The Alliance maintained that the defections from the LP stemmed from the latter's increased militancy. Be-

cause conditions were "unripe" for insurrection, according to the official line, the "extremists" in the LP had yielded most of the official positions in the party to the "moderates" who provided a legitimizing cloak.²⁰ In early 1968, however, the government alleged "ample evidence" that in the "past few years, and particularly in the last six months . . . the extremists had made a new assessment of the situation and decided to drop all pretence of respecting constitutional processes."²¹

Not all LP leaders dismissed the charges against their party as propaganda. Some acknowledged an increased radicalism which they attributed to the loss of faith in democratic processes engendered by Alliance repressiveness.²² Others appeared less concerned with the party's radicalization per se, than with the sense they had of having lost touch with its affairs. One former LP official described the party as out of control: demonstrations were held without his hearing about them or were not held when, in his opinion, justified. Another said the party had fallen under outside influence, pointing to the LP's support of Pakistan in its conflict with India as an example. He could understand such a policy if Pakistan was a socialist country rather than, in his words, a military dictatorship. When

he asked why the LP sided with Pakistan, he was told that that was also China's policy. Ultimately the LP branded those members who joined the MPM "renegades" or opportunists who, aware of an impending LP electoral boycott, put their own futures ahead of the struggle of the people.

Lim Chong Eu stated that his involvement in the new party had the "full knowledge and assent of the UDP central executive."²³ With the official registration of the MPM, Lim said, the UDP would dissolve so that its members could join and work for the new party.²⁴ Drs. Wang Gung Wu, Syed Hussein Alatas, and J. B. A. Peters, the MPMs remaining founding members, while political neophytes, were widely known for their professional accomplishments.

Wang was an historian of international repute. He had a doctorate from the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies and had taught at the University of Malaya since 1957 where he had advanced to department head -- a signal honor rather than an administrative headache as in American higher education.

Alatas received both his undergraduate and doctoral degrees from the University of Amsterdam, and had taught at the University of Malaya where he had been president of the Academic Staff Union, prior

to accepting in 1967 the chair in Malay studies at the University of Singapore. Less well-known than his colleagues, Peters had been trained at the Ceylon Medical College, had a medical practice in Teluk Anson, and was the incoming president of the Malayan Medical Association at the time of the MPM's birth. In short, the MPM's leaders were as long on credentials as they were short on demonstrated popular support.

The Opposition Pact

A joint statement by the DAP and PPP secretary generals, shortly before the MPM formation, "not to get into each other's way in the coming general elections," was the first concrete manifestation of opposition cooperation for the impending election.²⁵ The two leaders stated that negotiations were underway to include the UDP in the agreement. Details of the division of constituencies between the DAP and PPP became public a month later.²⁶ By that time, however, the UDP was about to merge into the MPM, frustrating the DAP/PPP desire for an understanding with the Penang-based party. In direct testimony to that fact Goh Hock Guan, at the time secretary general of the DAP, announced his party's intention to

contest in three of the four Penang parliamentary constituencies, "reserving" Tanjong for Dr. Lim Chong Eu.²⁷ The DAP, Goh said, would fill the "political vacuum" in Penang.²⁸

Lim characterized Goh's remarks as arrogant meddling. When, he rhetorically asked, had the people granted the DAP the right to reserve the Tanjong seat for him. He added that the UDP considered the electoral understanding between the DAP and PPP to be unsatisfactory.²⁹ At best, Lim asserted, it could bring a temporary halt in the struggle among opposition parties. He expressed, by contrast, the UDP's full support for the MPM as a "pure party" with the best chance to defeat the Alliance in Penang.³⁰ In the midst of these recriminations, the PPP president, D. R. Seenivasagam, invited the DAP and MPM to a round table conference to thrash out their differences.³¹ The points at issue emerged clearly as the two parties sought to demonstrate the correctness of their policies.

An important source of disagreement between the DAP and MPM centered on the appropriate membership of an opposition pact. The MPM felt that all West Malaysian opposition parties should be invited to participate; in addition to those attending the

round table conference, the leftist LP, the Muslim Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP; later the Party Islam or PI), and the predominantly Malay, leftwing Party Rakyat (PR). While the latter's membership would not matter very much electorally, given its numerically insignificant (secularist, Malay intelligentsia) following, this was decidedly not the case with respect to the PMIP which received almost 15 percent of the vote in the 1964 election. Probably, the DAP/PPP leadership feared their supporters would not accept cooperation with the PMIP or the two leftist parties. By contrast, the MPM -- not yet having confronted the seemingly inexorable tendency in Malaysia for ideologically multiracial parties to acquire communal coloration -- could ascertain the catholicity necessary to seek the widest possible anti-Alliance coalition.³²

"Communal" issues provided a more direct source of conflict between the two parties. Thus the DAP urged the MPM to clarify its stand on education and language. The former party vigorously championed adoption of Singapore's four official languages wherein Malay would remain the national language, but English, Chinese, and Tamil would be accorded equality of status in administration, education, and the media.³³ The DAP's position stood in stark con-

trast to the Alliance commitment to implement the Constitutional provision which implied that Malay was to become the sole official language of the country.³⁴ Understandably, Malaysians tended to perceive support of the latter as a pro-Malay position while multilingualism had the opposite connotation.

The DAP request that the MPM explain its education and language policies was a clever, albeit obvious ploy. Any response was bound to alienate a section of the population and hence hinder the MPM's development into an "umbrella" or supracommunal party. And by insisting that its leaders held different views, Dr. Chan Man Hin, the DAP president, made it difficult for the MPM to avoid the issue. He described Lim as a defender of Chinese education and culture and claimed that Tan admitted essential agreement with the DAP's viewpoint.³⁵ On the other hand, according to Chan, Alatas advocated Malay as the sole official language and had expressed opposition to multilingualism.

Forced to respond, the MPM demonstrated the conviction that its future depended upon attracting Malay backing. Alatas confirmed the accuracy of Chan's description of his (Alatas') convictions, denied any clash between Malay and non-Malay officials

of the party, and pledged the MPM's full support to the efforts to make Malay the sole official language.³⁶ Not limiting his remarks to the MPM's language policy, he attacked the DAP leadership as "more arrogant than able," thus beginning anew the recriminations, and ending, for the time, the possibility of agreement. Alatas blamed the breakdown in communication on the DAP's refusal to compromise.

According to Alatas, he and his colleagues had been ready and willing to affiliate with the DAP on three conditions. First, that the DAP change its name -- one possibility was the Malaysian Democratic Party -- so that "the new party into which we are all federated really shows a new spirit."³⁷ A second condition, that the DAP change its party symbol, also aimed at creating the image of a distinctly new party rather than the impression that Tan, Lim, Alatas and their respective followers had simply joined the DAP. Finally, the MPM had insisted that LP and UDP members so inclined should be accepted by the "new" party.

In Alatas' account, he and his colleagues (recognizing the validity of the argument that too great a change could not be thrust on the DAP's membership) ultimately agreed to accept the DAP symbol. More troublesome was the question of the party's name.

Alatas believed, however, that a mutually satisfactory one could have been agreed upon, had that remained the sole point in contention. But the DAP was unalterably opposed to the third condition -- that UDP and ex-LP members enter the party en masse. Maintaining that many of the UDP types were unstable and that the ex-LP members included communists, the DAP insisted that such people apply on an individual basis subject to the usual, rather strenuous, tests for membership.³⁸

Ideologically, the two parties found common ground only on the most general level: for example, in a rejection of both communism and capitalism. Alatas noted three particular areas of disagreement.³⁹ As already noted, the MPM acknowledged Malay as Malaysia's sole official language while the DAP advocated multilingualism or four official languages. A second difference concerned "style." The DAP was deemed by the MPM leadership as insensitive toward communal feelings and, generally, too abrasive. Thirdly, and relatedly, the MPM criticized the DAP for emulating the PAP, contending not only that the skill and effectiveness of the PAP leaders was greater than that of their largely untried PAP counterparts, but that the differences between Singapore and Malaysia did not permit uncritical imitation.

Seenivasagam's abortive attempt to reconcile the DAP and the MPM ended systematic contacts be-

tween the two parties for several months. On October 30, 1968, Alatas confirmed the MPM's intention to contest the election. "We will be fielding candidates in many constituencies but we are keeping the details a secret."⁴⁰ The MPM had felt from the outset, he said, "that the opposition parties should try to reach some form of understanding before the general election," and he held out the hope of future talks to that end.⁴¹

One confusing note was Alatas' denial that such discussions had been held. Possibly he excluded the developments just described because they had taken place, for the most part, before the MPM's formal launching and aimed, in effect, more at a merger than an electoral coalition. Assuredly, Alatas had no reason to attract attention to the rebuffs suffered by the MPM's foremost officials. If that was indeed the case, then the MPM must have derived considerable satisfaction from the next major development.

On December 20, Dr. Chan sent the MPM and open letter expressing the DAP's interest in cooperation.⁴² The impetus for the new initiative was the just completed Serdang (Selangor) by-election which had graphically dramatized the *raison d'etre* for an opposition electoral pact. Serdang had been a Socialist

Front (SF)⁴³ stronghold -- the by-election was necessitated by the detention of its assemblyman, the vice president of the PR. In 1959, K. Karam Singh of the SF received 60 percent of the vote. The SF candidate also won handily in 1964.

In the by-election, Serdang witnessed a three-cornered contest: the Alliance, DAP, and MPM all vied for the seat. The DAP's Lim Kit Siang, one of the party's strongest candidates, was outvoted by the Alliance candidate, 6,535 to 5,928. The MPM standard bearer lost his deposit, but the 1,330 votes he received might have spelled the difference between defeat or victory for the DAP.⁴⁴ To opposition politicians Serdang was a harbinger of what might happen in the general election if the opposition could not reach an agreement.

The MPM announced that it would consider Chan's appeal at its central executive committee (ex-co) meeting on January 12.⁴⁵ However, the question of membership in an electoral agreement remained at issue. In its response to Chan's letter, the MPM said that it hoped the DAP's interest in cooperation extended to other parties.⁴⁶ And the day after the ex-co meeting, the MPM called on all opposition parties to meet in Kuala Lumpur on January 25 to discuss the formation of an anti-Alliance front.⁴⁷

The time seemed propitious for a meeting of minds. The lesson of Serdang was still vivid. It had, moreover, become clear that the LP would probably boycott the election. To be sure, the LP had never indicated any willingness to work together with "bourgeois" parties. However, a decision to boycott would have made the left-wing party a tacit participant in any opposition arrangement to avoid the blunting of the anti-Alliance vote.

The DAP's response to the MPM's proposed all-party meeting was to invite the latter to attend a triangular -- the DAP, PPP, and MPM -- parley to discuss the united front idea.⁴⁸ Kit Siang at a Penang rally implied that the policy differences were too great to permit the strong united front desired by the MPM. For example, the FMIP advocated government for and by Malays while the DAP advocated a Malaysian Malaysia; Lim characterized the MPM as opposed to a multiracial, multilingual society.⁴⁹

In effect, the differences between the DAP/PPP and MPM remained unresolved. The January 25 Kuala Lumpur meeting resulted in the endorsement in principle of both an electoral understanding and a united front.⁵⁰ The latter called on the DAP/PPP, MPM, PR, SUPP (Sarawak United People's Party) and SNAP (Sarawak National Party) to draft and campaign

on a common program, had virtually no possibility of materializing, and was little more than a face-saving device for the MPM. Indeed, at the next gathering of the six opposition parties the agreement (if one actually had been achieved) broke down.⁵¹

With respect to the electoral agreement, the most vexing problem -- the distribution of constituencies -- remained unsettled. Five constituencies were at issue between the MPM and DAP. Leaders of both parties announced their intention to compete in Bungsar and Bukit Bintang, the two most populous constituencies in West Malaysia and traditional opposition strongholds.⁵² Both the DAP and MPM, moreover, wished to contest in Dato Keramat and Tanjong, the two opposition held parliamentary seats in Penang. Batu, another safe opposition seat in Kuala Lumpur, was the final disputed seat.

The PR, The LP, and The Election

The PR's ambivalency toward opposition cooperation was illustrated in a statement by the then head of the PR propaganda section, Kassim Ahmad, that the PR had decided "to withdraw from the proposed United Opposition Front."⁵³ What Kassim neglected to men-

tion was that, at the time of his announcement, the PR had not even made a formal determination of whether to take part in the election. It was only in December, at its twelfth annual meeting, that the central ex-co of the PR resolved in principle to participate in the election, despite the conviction of the Penang branch that the party should boycott the election unless the government pledged not to engage in arbitrary arrests.⁵⁴ The Thirteenth Congress of the PR sustained the ex-co and resolved that the PR would take part in the election, again not without opposition -- this time from the Selangor delegation which staged a walk out in protest at the refusal of the Congress to consider its proposal for an election boycott.⁵⁵ Paradoxically, the Selangor PR was a focal point of opposition to the party's central leadership desire to cooperate with the LP -- the latter having by then decided to boycott the election.

Although the resistance within the PR to collaboration with the LP took the form of questioning the procedures to be used in making the decision, substantive matters were at the heart of the dispute.⁵⁶ Some PR members felt extreme leftists or advocates of revolutionary violence were too influential in the LP while others harbored anxiety about rightist

or Chinese chauvinist elements. Reasons could, of course, be adduced both for or against working with the LP; the decision to promote the former largely reflected the replacement of Ahmad Boestamam by Kassim Ahmad as the paramount leader of the PR.

Boestamam, chairman of the PR since its 1955 formation, had opposed attempts to reforge the earlier links between the PR and the LP.⁵⁷ However, younger elements in the party (exemplified by Kassim Ahmad) denied Boestamam's contention that the time was not ripe for a new left-wing alliance. They were prepared to cooperate with any "patriotic and anti-imperialist political party" against the Alliance.⁵⁸ By 1968, according to the new Deputy chairman, a young University of Malaya lecturer, all of the PR branches with the exception of Selangor had agreed to the principle of cooperation with the LP.⁵⁹ Boestamam, who resigned from the PR and left for England to study law on a government scholarship, was attacked as having sold out the PR to the Alliance.⁶⁰

Boestamam announced the formation of a new party, the Party Marhaen Malaysia (PMM), on the eve of his departure.⁶¹ Led by several of Boestamam's former associates in the PR, including the (former) chairman of the Selangor branch, the PMM was advertised as an alternative for PR members unhappy with the

PR's new leadership or the decisions to participate in the election and to seek cooperation with the LP. The PMM claimed that about one-half of the thirty-four PR branches in Perak had been dissolved in favor of the new party. According to PMM sources, the Perak PR division itself faced dissolution because its chairman, Salim Babu, had allied himself with Boestamam and the PMM.⁶²

The former secretary of the Penang PR, Salleh Ya'acob, proclaimed that virtually all of the twenty-two PR branches in his state had become inoperative and at least nine would be reactivated as part of the PMM.⁶³ Salleh, who reportedly quit the PR because of a personal clash with Kassim Ahmad, couched his shift in party loyalty in ideological terms. Along with others who had left the PR, he described the PMM as carrying on the Sukarnoist struggle for "proletarianism," from which the PR had deviated by becoming a "revolutionary socialist" party.⁶⁴

The "proletarian socialists" and "intellectual socialists" provided another set of rubrics to describe the generational gap which had emerged in Malay leftist circles in the years preceding the 1969 election. Boestamam epitomized the older group in the party which largely came to their radicalism through identification with the Indonesian national-

ist movement.⁶⁵ The younger group knew an Indonesia characterized by economic stagnation and the political downfall of Sukarno and the left-wing forces. Their outlook stemmed largely from an analysis of indigenous conditions.

The PR strenuously denied that Boestamam's withdrawal sparked mass resignations, claiming that in the few dissolved branches a minority of members had acted "unconstitutionally."⁶⁶ Kassim Ahmad maintained that only forty-seven members had defected -- twenty from Selangor, eight from Kedah, three from Kelantan, and one each from Johore, Pahang, and Trengganu.⁶⁷ Assuredly the thirteen unaccounted for defections were in Perak, for a former leader of the PR in Kuala Kangar district, claimed to know personally at least seventy persons who had resigned from the PR.⁶⁸ All in all, however, the PR estimation of the damages was more accurate: the PMM did not contest the election and almost nothing was heard of the party after the excitement occasioned by its formation.

The willingness of the "intellectual socialists" to cooperate with any anti-Alliance party in the election opened them to the same charges of "right wing opportunism" as they leveled against Boestamam, Salim, Salleh, and other "renegades." Nonetheless, when the PR declared, toward the end of 1968, that

it would contest the election, it reiterated an interest in cooperating with other opposition parties, singling out the MPM as a potential partner.⁶⁹ And on February 20 (the DAP, PPP, and MPM having by then successfully worked out a compromise allotting the disputed constituencies) it was announced that the PR, as a party to the agreement, would concentrate its efforts in West coast rural areas.⁷⁰ Kassim Ahmad immediately disaffiliated the PR from the electoral understanding, however, saying that he had made clear his party's disinterest in such an arrangement.⁷¹ At the same time, he announced that the PR would not nominate candidates in seats where other opposition candidates confronted the Alliance. Obviously the PR wanted to associate itself with the electoral agreement without a formal commitment that could be interpreted as a surrender of principle. The LP was spared similar problems.

The LP Decision To Boycott The Election

The first clear sign that the LP might boycott the general election was its refusal to compete in the Segamat Utara by-election, unless the government met four conditions it deemed necessary to guarantee a fair contest: the unconditional release

of all political detainees;⁷² the restoration of the rights of association, strikes, and demonstrations; the lifting of the ban on all leftist organizations and the return of their confiscated property; and the withdrawal of all reactionary and oppressive ordinances and policies.⁷³ The government showed no willingness to consider the four LP demands. Its response was, in effect, to detain three more LP leaders for alleged involvement in a demonstration to protest the leveling of the death sentence against thirteen Malaysians charged with consorting with Indonesians during the confrontation.⁷⁴

Dr. Rajakumar, a leader of the LP's Selangor branch described the arrests as the first step in the government's campaign to prevent the LP from participation in the election.⁷⁵ Since the SP won 16 percent of the vote in the 1964 election, according to Rajakumar, over two hundred LP cadres had been detained, including many potential candidates.⁷⁶ Rajakumar placed the LP's predicament in a general context. "Today it is the LP that is being suppressed, tomorrow it will be the turn of any Party that grows strong enough to be a real opposition and not merely a decorative one."⁷⁷ And in an even broader vein: "What we are witnessing is the repetition of a pattern common to former colonial terri-

tories. The imperial power transfers power to a newly created native elite which proves to be corrupt and inefficient, growing fat and wealthy feeding on the spoils of office. Then faced with the prospect of loosing office, they use the Police (sic) and ultimately the Army to preserve for themselves the comforts and profits of political power. This leads inevitably to upheaval and civil war, to revolution."⁷⁸

Despite the LP's insistence that the government used undemocratic measures to maintain power, there was still no definite word as to whether it would boycott the election as 1968 drew to a close. The LP's chairman said that the decision depended on the views of the masses which party cadres were in the process of determining through door to door visits.⁷⁹ Whatever the decision, he added, elections had little significance in the LP's scheme of things. In contradistinction to other parties, the LP considered "the mass struggle as the main task and the parliamentary struggle as secondary."⁸⁰ The primary objective of the LP was to raise the political consciousness of the masses.

Rajakumar's analysis was made on October 4, 1968. In mid-November, the government released a White Paper which alleged that the PR and the LP

had been infiltrated by the banned Malayan Communist Party (MCP).⁸¹ Concurrently one hundred and forty people, including many LP leaders, were rounded up for subversive activities. Rajakumar, one of the few LP leaders unmolested, expressed surprise at the arrests since the country was peaceful. He concluded that the detentions only made sense as part of the government's "customary preparation" for elections.⁸² Continuing in a satirical mode, Rajakumar suggested that the role played by the Special Branch in the coming election was hardly less important than that of the Elections Commission.⁸³

The PR also viewed the White Paper and attendant arrests as an Alliance election tactic. If his party had been infiltrated, commented Kassim Ahmad, the culprit was the Alliance, which exaggerated the threat of Communism to distract from its failures.⁸⁴ In fact, he maintained, no substantial proof was offered for the accusations in the White Paper. The charge that the MCP followed the directives of Peking was, for instance, based wholly on Radio Peking commentaries praising the MCP struggle.⁸⁵

Even after the White Paper and arrests, statements by LP leaders with respect to contesting the election indicated uncertainty. Rajakumar said he could not make a definite statement until the party's

central committee had a chance to meet.⁸⁶ However, according to the national treasurer of the LP, C. Y. Choy, only two other Central Committee members had escaped detention in addition to himself. Nonetheless, the committee must have managed to caucus, despite the incarcerations, announcing on December 3 that the LP would boycott unless the government met eleven demands.⁸⁷

Most of the LP's demands centered on its grievances at past acts of the government; for example, the party called for the release of all political detainees and a rescindment of the Internal Security Act under which the government gained the right of preemptive arrest. A second category of demands involved election procedure; for example, the establishment of an all-party committee to supervise the conduct of the election. The remaining demands were policy oriented; for example, the encouragement of national industries and the cancellation of policies that benefited foreign capitalists. These demands, needless to say, received no satisfactory government response and the LP determined to boycott the election.

The initial step of the LP boycott policy was to direct all party representatives to resign from office.⁸⁸ The effect at the national level could

not have been expected to amount to much since (with Dr. Tan's shift in allegiance) Lim Kean Siew, the LP Deputy Chairman and the MP for Dato Keramat, was the party's only MP. Nor could the workings of any state assembly have been impaired given the mere handful -- eight out of two hundred and forty -- of LP assemblymen.

In fact, it was only in the urban, West Coast areas where the concentrations of working-class Chinese found reflection in the composition of local governing bodies that the LP call for party officials to resign had potential for disruption. However, local government organs were already moribund (for reasons outside the scope of the present discussion), although at least in Johore, LP resignations reportedly brought the activities of several local councils "to a standstill."⁸⁹ In any case, if the LP hoped to force a series of expensive, energy consuming, and confusing by-elections through resignations, such hopes were quickly dashed. The Alliance amended the Constitution so as to freeze by-elections within a six month period prior to the dissolution of Parliament.⁹⁰

ISSUES

In the absence of voting and attitudinal surveys, it is impossible to ascertain with precision the importance of issues as a determinant of Malaysian voting behavior in relation to communal-cum-party identification on the one hand and the attraction of individual candidates on the other. To be sure, general feelings on voting behavior combined with the unquestioned saliency of communalism justify the assumption that most Malaysians (perhaps three-fourths of the electorate) vote in accord with party loyalties that, in turn, are a function of race, type and extent of education, socioeconomic status, and the like.⁹¹ Nonetheless, the issues that emerge in any campaign are significant for at least two reasons. In the first place, issue-oriented voters, albeit a minority, can have an impact out of proportion to their numbers in close elections. Second, even if issues do not sway a single voter, they heighten political awareness and thus contain the seeds of change -- whether positive or negative.

There have been two types of election campaigns in Malaysia with respect to what might be termed the political mobilization function.⁹² The first are

where the most salient issues had a national frame. The 1955 and 1964 campaigns fell into this category.⁹³ In 1955 the Alliance achieved its overwhelming victory campaigning as the party best equipped to gain independence from Great Britain. This claim set the tone of the campaign; other parties maintained that they could achieve either a quicker or a "truer" independence. While a second important issue, the ending of the Emergency, had communal overtones, the common desire for a return to normalcy and the distress at the extent of the resources consumed for military purposes gave that issue a national coloration also.

Confrontation with Indonesia emerged as the major issue of the 1964 campaign.⁹⁴ The Alliance tarred large sections of the opposition with the brush of disloyalty, and asserted that support for the country in the face of external aggression could be demonstrated by returning it to power.

Nor does the fact that the foregoing "national" issues served partisan ends distract from the fact that the 1955 and 1964 elections enhanced national solidarity. The presence of an external antagonist -- Britain or Indonesia -- brought Malaysians together. It might also be observed that effective use of an issue is not tantamount to inventing one. Independence was a national issue in 1955; as was con-

frontation in 1964. Thus in the early stages of the 1969 campaign the Alliance attempted to present the Philippine claim to Sabah as a "national" issue without success -- the threat was simply not palpable enough for that role.⁹⁵

When national issues have not come to the force, Malaysia experienced election campaigns where the most salient issues have taken on a communal cast. The 1959 and 1969 campaigns fell into this category. Thus in both, education -- where the communal implications are almost impossible to obfuscate -- became a major issue. In such situations national solidarity suffers as the so-called constant pie outlook comes into play.⁹⁶ External pressure for unity give way to internal pressures for disunity.

EDUCATION

The Chinese University

Education arose, or rather re-emerged, as a campaign issue in 1969, primarily because of the demands by elements in the Chinese community for the establishment of a Chinese University.⁹⁷ The project's major champion, Sim Mow You, earlier ex-

pelled from the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in a conflict over the status of Chinese remained, as president of the United Chinese School Teachers' Association (UCSTA), an influential figure.⁹⁸ His organization along with the Association of Boards of Governors and Management of Chinese Schools (ABGMCS) provided the major foci in the agitation for a Chinese University.⁹⁹

The question of a Chinese University (CU) initially surfaced in the context of the campaign after a government declaration that students without a Senior Cambridge Certificate (SCC) could no longer go abroad for further study.¹⁰⁰ As the SCC examinations used English, Chinese (and Malay) stream students would have been most heavily affected by the new requirement. It was, therefore, argued that Chinese students desiring post-secondary education would require the requisite local facilities. However, the proponents of a CU refused to give up the idea, even after the Ministry of Education dropped the notion of making an SCC certificate prerequisite for overseas study. They now insisted that their proposal for a CU had merit without reference to the availability of educational opportunities abroad.

It was pointed out that the Philippines (as Marcos had stated in a 1968 visit to Malaysia) had

thirty universities -- six public run and twenty-four private.¹⁰¹ Malaysia, by contrast, had only one university to train the personnel required for national development. Even students who could afford to undertake higher education abroad would benefit, according to advocates of a CU, from the opportunity to attend a local university. For not only would a CU save individual expense and inconvenience, it would also, its supporters insisted, benefit society by conserving foreign exchange and, more subtly, by limiting alienation among the educated.¹⁰²

From the outset, the charge of communalism was leveled against the proposed CU. The reaction of the Minister of Education, Khir Johari, considered by non-Malays among the UMNO leaders most sympathetic to them, was that Malaysia must train Malaysian, not overseas, Chinese.¹⁰³ Sim and others responded that proof of the proposed university's non-communal character was its commitment to provide higher education for all Malaysians, not just Chinese.¹⁰⁴ Yet it was manifest that the major purpose and justification of a CU was to provide Chinese middle school students (who lacked the qualifications for admission to the English-medium University of Malaya) an opportunity for higher education, an objective which seemed to foreclose the possibility of a multicommunal student body.

That is, there seemed no way -- since so few non-Chinese speak Chinese and only a handful of these can read the language -- to reconcile the objective of providing the Chinese-educated with higher education and the claimed intention of the proposed CU to welcome students from all communities.

The dilemma of creating a non-communal institution of higher education for Chinese educated students was "resolved" by adopting a policy of multilingualism. As the Union of Chinese Senior Normal Teachers (UCSNT) pointed out, subsidies were, after all, given to primary schools in all four language streams (English, Malay, Chinese, and Tamil) in the country.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, English and Malay secondary school received government support while private Chinese schools were allowed to exist. The right, so argued the UCSNT, of the Chinese community to establish the proposed (by now called) Merdeka University (MU) logically followed. Such an institution was no less essential, chauvinist, or divisive than MARA (Majlis Amanah Ra'ayat or Council of Trust for the Indigenous People).

The foregoing line of reasoning was profoundly obnoxious to Malays. An educational system conceived by them to be in the midst of transformation from a colonial-cum-communal basis where diversity ran ramp-

ant in the content and language of instruction to a national basis where first the curriculum and then the language of instruction would be standardized, was being used to justify the extension of an "atavistic" system to the highest level of education. Nor were they prepared to entertain the analogy with MARA because its essential purpose was remedial. Established in 1966 "with the object of promoting, stimulating, facilitating and undertaking economic and social development . . . especially in the rural areas," MARA reflected and meshed with the basic *raison d'être* of Alliance policy, namely, the uplift of the Malays to the point where they could compete on equal terms with non-Malays.¹⁰⁶

Then, too, for most Malays (and some non-Malays as well) multilingual instruction was no less than the exclusive use of Chinese, an indication of "non-Malay communalism." Both the Constitution, as interpreted by Malay opinion, and the Razak and Talib Educational Reports envisaged Malay becoming the sole medium of instruction. Accordingly, the only acceptable, indeed possible, non-communal or national university was one which exclusively used the national language or Malay. "We should remember," commented a Malay newspaper, "that the struggle for multilingualism is no longer suitable."¹⁰⁷ The sup-

porters of the MU retorted that multilingualism was consonant with the spirit of the Constitution which encouraged the free development of language and education.¹⁰⁸

Moulding attitudes toward the MU were diverse views of the relationship between education and nation building. The university's backers felt that "cultural unification" could best be achieved by raising the level of individual cultures and then promoting a synthesis among them. To achieve the first stage of this process Malaysia required, in addition to the existing English language university, at least national language and Chinese language universities so that the country's two major races could "receive higher education and become the real intellectuals of Malaysia."¹⁰⁹ Malay opinion naturally held that cultural unification was most appropriately realized through the medium of Malay language and culture.

However ideologized the proposed MU became, its significance in the campaign stemmed from the responsive chord struck in Chinese breasts. The Chinese flocked to the project's support. Over seven hundred individuals representing some two hundred registered organizations attended the founders meeting of the university in April 1968.¹¹⁰ The outpouring of popu-

lar response posed an acute problem for the MCA, a particularly dramatic manifestation of the Party's recurrent dilemma: how to satisfy the demands of its constituents (actual and potential) in the Chinese community without in the process alienating UMNO, the dominant Alliance partner.

The MCA, to be sure, had chosen access to the centers of decision-making and the perquisites of power at the cost of "uncle Thomism."¹¹¹ Yet the party needed to demonstrate a certain amount of support for the Alliance multiracial formula to remain operative; indubitably, the MCA could not afford the impression of losing ground.¹¹² But if the popularity of the MU project precluded the MCA's blanket opposition, the UMNO leadership could not begin to countenance anything approaching enthusiasm by its Alliance partner toward the proposed university. To have done so would have been perceived as a reprehensible bowing to Chinese pressure by Malays in general and by their own rank and file in particular. In other words, MCA could not advocate the MU without jeopardizing the harmony of intra-Alliance relations, the overriding desideradum of the party's central leadership.

Buffeted by conflicting pressures, the MCA engaged in a series of tactical maneuvers aimed at

capturing or neutralizing the attraction of a CU without backing the MU proposal. The initial response was a resolution by the party executive committee on February 8 urging the upgrading of the Department of Chinese Studies at the University of Malaya (UM) into a full faculty.¹¹³ At the same time the MCA criticized the MU in much the same terms as those prevalent in UMNO, that is, as contrary to Malaysia's educational policy and as a threat to communal harmony. The most telling Alliance argument, however, was that graduates of a CU could not find fruitful employment.

The difficulty in countering the contention that CU graduates could not be economically absorbed can be discerned in the feeble rebuttal by the Union of Chinese Senior Normal Teachers (UCSNT) to a Berita Harian editorial to the effect that a CU was unjustified from an economic standpoint.¹¹⁴ In response to the argument that the government could not provide jobs for graduates of a CU, the UCSNT denied the government had ever undertaken to guarantee employment or that, indeed, it should have that obligation. The Berita Harian had claimed that graduates of a CU could only find employment with commercial firms catering to the Chinese community. Curiously, the UCSNT did not choose to note the in-

consistency between that argument and the general thrust of the editorial; rather, it noted that graduates of Chinese-language institutions (probably referring to Singapore's Nanyang University) had been accepted for further studies by foreign universities and had gained employment in non-Chinese business enterprises. "It all depends," in the words of the UCSNT statement, "on the subjects studied. . . .The proposed University will set up faculties which will meet the requirements of the society and the nation."¹¹⁵

The MCA soon realized that criticism of the MU only left it exposed to charges of indifference to Chinese aspirations. Sin Mow Yu echoed a common view when he characterized the MCA's rejection of a CU as mirroring the wishes of UMNO. Sim pointedly said that while he could understand UMNO and the PMIP opposing the MU, a similar stand by the MCA was beyond his comprehension.¹¹⁶ Deeply regretting the MCA failure in 1965 to support Chinese as an official language, he had accepted, by way of compromise, the MCA promise to promote the liberal use of Chinese on road signs, official documents, and the like. At that time, according to Sim, the MCA had reneged on its word and the refusal to lend support to the CU was yet another indication of the MCA's unwilling-

ness to fight for the status of the Chinese language, which "would only cause disappointment and frustration to the four million Chinese" in Malaysia.¹¹⁷

The MCA next adopted a posture of neutrality on the CU issue. MCA branches were told not to take a stand either for or against the establishment of a CU; party members were instructed to resign from any positions they may have held on MU communities or face expulsion from the party.¹¹⁸ Of course, the necessity of such a stern warning in itself indicated the MCA's need for more positive tactics in approaching the MU question. The MCA's political adversaries were gaining increasing mileage from the MCA opposition, and then neutralism, toward the MU. The MCA, therefore, turned again to emphasizing its suggestion that the Chinese Studies Department of the UM be upgraded to faculty level rather than focusing on direct opposition to the MU. The proposal made good academic sense and was acceptable to UMNO.

However, the call for a faculty of Chinese studies at the UM struck Chinese as vapid compared to the notion of an entire university established and supported by the Chinese community. The MCA proposal also had specific drawbacks which the party's opponents quickly pointed out. A faculty of Chinese

studies could not provide the range of subjects required by Chinese middle school graduates. If a major objection to the proposed MU was the availability of jobs for its graduates, how much more would this be a problem, it was asked, if the interest among Chinese for higher education merely resulted in graduates in "Chinese studies." But the clinching argument against a faculty of Chinese studies in lieu of a CU was the absence of any guarantee that the UM's admission requirements would be altered to allow the admittance of Chinese middle school graduates with little or no ability to use English.

In the event, the MCA dropped the faculty notion in favor of an MCA promoted college, called the Tengku Abdul Rahman (TAR) College. According to the MCA, such an institution had been in the planning stage since 1964 when Tan Siew Sin, the MCA president, investigated the possibility of establishing a junior college.¹¹⁹ The MCA had only been waiting for the propitious moment to implement the project. The timing of the TAR College's emergence to public attention naturally struck the political stratum as proof that it was aimed at capturing, so to speak, the MU's thunder. Any lingering doubts vanished when the government announced its support for the TAR college.¹²⁰

Denials by MCA spokesmen that the TAR college was politically motivated reached incredulous ears. One can sympathize with the MCA's dilemma. "On the one hand," complained Kam Woon Wah, the MCA secretary general, "they (the critics of the TAR college) blame the MCA for not defending people of Chinese descent in this country and on the other hand they try to condemn the Government for agreeing to give aid to the College."¹²¹

The government's support of the MCA college caused considerable resentment in UMNO.¹²² Nor did assurances that the college would be open to all races remove the sting, or the argument that the MCA college was formed to win back Chinese support after the MCA's rejection of the "communalistic" MU. "UMNO is duty bound," said Senu bin Abdul Rahman, the president of UMNO youth, "to support the MCA and prevent it from being weakened."¹²³ He went on to assure the Malays that the "MCA college would not be an institution for higher Chinese education like the Nanyang University in Singapore, but will be run in accordance with the national education policy."¹²⁴

Not many Chinese found the TAR college a viable alternative to the MU. (Remarks such as those by Senu in themselves assured this.) The college was not conceived as a full fledged institution of

higher learning; its main purpose was specified as helping students who lacked the necessary qualifications for admission to the University of Malaya or overseas institutions.¹²⁵ Another unattractive feature was that English language competency was to be an entrance condition.¹²⁶ Finally, non-Malays worried that the MCA college would either be dropped or implemented in token fashion after the election brought an end to its political usefulness.

Actually, the MCA did not advance the TAR college as an alternative to the MU, so much as it used the former to justify refusal to take a stand on the latter. Party officials insisted that all of the MCA's efforts in the field of education concentrated on developing the TAR college into a first-class institution.¹²⁷ Then, only a few days before the election, the MCA came full circle and voiced full support for the MU.¹²⁸ Siew Sin not only offered to bring the MU's founders in touch with the appropriate officials, he as much as guaranteed approval of the MU's application for registration, assuming all of the legal requirements were met.¹²⁹ Again, however, the timing of the MCA's decision elicited skepticism. How could one determine, after all, if the MCA endorsement was "a slovenly compromise on the eve of the election" or whether its expression of intent "would be put into

practice after the election."¹³⁰

Political motives aside, the DAP reaction to the MCA's change of heart may stand for the general suspiciousness of the Chinese education lobby.¹³¹ The DAP urged that two conditions be met before the founders and supporters of the MU project agree to cooperate with Tan Siew Sin or the government.¹³² The first was an Alliance guarantee that the MU would have real autonomy or freedom from governmental control. The second condition was that the MU be excluded from the ambit of the various policy statements on education, requiring Malay as the sole language of instruction. The DAP also wanted assurances that the MU would not be "Malayised" if it cooperated with the TAR college.

The CU issue was a classic case of the earlier described MCA dilemma.¹³³ The party's twistings and turnings helped convince many Chinese of the equivocality of the MCA's commitment to their interests. Ironically -- given the active propaganda use opposition parties made of the MU issue -- the MCA's shifting position on the CU afforded the impression that the MCA bore primary responsibility for the politicization of the issue. And if the MCA's handling of the MU proposal laid the party open to charges of political opportunism, on the one hand, its reactive maneuvering

conveyed an impression of timidity and indecisiveness, on the other.¹³⁴

Whatever the actual political costs among the Chinese, the MCA's equivocation toward the MU did not bring corresponding gains vis-a-vis UMNO. The latter's dominance of the Alliance did not automatically render the MCA's subordination (or conciliatoriness) praiseworthy. The MU controversy could only have enhanced the standing of the MCA in Malay eyes if it had demonstrated a genuine commitment to the national interest, and in the field of education that had a precise meaning for UMNO: policies to accelerate the use of Malay as the sole medium of instruction. Of course, the MCA could not politically afford to become identified with programs or policies of that nature. But while some UMNO leaders might be able to understand and appreciate the MCA's position, among the Malay masses it smacked of duplicity and as demonstrating the party's "real" sympathies.

The National University

Agitation for a CU intensified the pressure for the establishment of a National University (NU): a university, that is, where the medium of instruction was Malay.¹³⁵ Politically aware Malays felt that if the government was prepared to promise ten million

dollars to the TAR college, it could hardly do less for a university clearly in line with the country's declared educational policy.

A plea for a NU had been made as early as 1963, primarily because of the insufficient opportunities for higher education available to students in the Malay educational stream who (just as Chinese graduates) lacked the qualifications for admission to the UM or adequate proficiency in English to complete a course of study there successfully.¹³⁶ A more amorphous motive -- and here too a parallel can be drawn with the Chinese community -- had to do with questions of communal pride and anxiety.

Malaysians had assumed that the UM would evolve into a NU. However, the UM -- a majority of whose staff and student body were educated in English -- appeared increasingly unlikely to make the transformation, and toward the end of August 1968, fourteen well-known Malays announced the formation of a committee to raise funds for a NU. Personalities identified with the "ultra" wing of UMNO, such as Syed Nasir bin Ismail (chairman of the pro-tem committee) and Syed Jaafar bin Hassan Albar (contributions to the NU fund were sent to Albar's office) occupied prominent positions on the committee.

Nasir, observing that the NU, in common with the TAR college, would not serve just Malay students but all national (Malay language) secondary school students, gave several reasons for establishing a NU.¹³⁷ The most important was the need for a university level institution to accommodate graduates of national secondary schools. A related reason was the very limited number of vacancies in institutions of higher education generally. Nasir claimed -- a third reason -- that the UM had not made an effort to admit graduates of the national secondary schools. Finally, he argued that a NU would promote the use of the national language.

Given Malay poverty and comparative indifference to education, the money raised by the NU committee fell woefully short of the financial need. While the NU's sponsors counted contributions in thousands, their MU counterparts calculated in hundreds of thousands. Inevitably, the former attempted to obtain government funds. Their overtures received, however, a lukewarm reception from Khir Johari who, as Minister of Education, seemed to be gradually moving toward an educational policy of bilingualism.

Johari not only had expressed the possibility of asking all Malay secondary schools to require English as a compulsory second language, but had

begun trial programs in several schools.¹³⁸ If implemented, such a policy would ultimately have obviated the need for a NU because Malays would be able to attend English language institutions on equal terms with other students. The government also questioned whether a NU could maintain high academic standards.¹³⁹ But the Malay education lobby¹⁴⁰ could no longer be brooked once the government lent official backing to the TAR college. On September 8, 1968, the NU received the imprimatur of official approval.¹⁴¹

The Alliance, Johari maintained, had always planned to set up a NU. However, its establishment had to come earlier than intended because of the thrust of Malay stream school leavers, on the one hand, and because of dwindling hope for a quick transformation of the UM into a NU, on the other.¹⁴² Yet the government did not explain the concrete steps contemplated to make the NU a reality and the Malay education lobby, unsure of official firmness, kept up the pressure. On October 9, Nasir called on the government to bear the entire cost of the NU and shortly afterward another member of the NU working committee asked the government to appoint a vice-chancellor and registrar of the university.¹⁴³

When it became clear that the government's general endorsement of the NU had not satisfied Malay opinion, more specific support was forthcoming. On November 4, Johari, voicing the hope that doubts concerning the NU's prospects would be dispelled, took over the responsibility for collecting and receiving donations for the project. Johari attributed his decision to the poor response to the NU fund drive, and indicated that he would tour every state to receive donations from their respective governments.¹⁴⁴

The government's, or more precisely, UMNO's treatment of the NU proposal struck one as remarkably similar to the MCA's response to the MU proposal. The overriding impression in both instances was of political expediency. The Alliance appeared incapable of withstanding communal pressures; rather than explicating and defending some wider vision of the public interest, it bowed before parochial demands. Yet cannot the Alliance's handling of the MU and NU questions be interpreted as indicating its responsiveness, in the best democratic tradition, to public opinion? However, a sense of the phenomenological developments left little doubt that the Alliance's actions were basically opportunistic. Of course, insofar as opportunism is a synonym for sen-

sitivity to public opinion, the Alliance treatment of the higher education issue during the campaign might still be seen in a favorable light. Nonetheless, the point remains that the developments described above struck the author as primarily demonstrating a lack of leadership whereby, rather than channeling communal demands into a coherent program, the Alliance mirrored these in all their multivarioussness.

The Opposition and The Higher Education Issue

Compared to the tripartite, pragmatic Alliance, opposition parties could take clearer stands on the higher education issue either because of a more homogeneous membership or base of support, because they were more programmatic or ideological, or because they had less to lose. The proliferation of proposals for institutions of higher learning dovetailed nicely with the DAP's leitmotif that, as befitting a multiracial society, all of Malaysia's languages and cultures should be encouraged. Accordingly, the DAP welcomed each proposal irrespective of sponsorship. Yet some institutions were deemed more equal than others.

If the DAP leadership conceived of themselves

as heading a multiracial, democratic-socialist party, in actuality their party's support came essentially from the Chinese community; Malays, by and large, thought of the DAP as a Chinese party.¹⁴⁵ Political realities, in other words, led the DAP into becoming a staunch advocate of the MU.¹⁴⁶ This was consistent with DAP support for the NU and even the TAR college, however. In addition to the imperative of its multiracial motif, the DAP could not credibly champion the MU as desirable in order to maximize educational opportunities while opposing other institutions purporting to have the same objective.

The initial reaction of the MPM to the higher education issue was the opposite of the DAP's: instead of welcoming every proposal for new institutions, the MPM decried them all.¹⁴⁷ Like the DAP, however, the MPM's position(s) reflected a mix of ideological and electoral motives. The MPM presented itself as the one party equipped to advance the national interest in a rational manner. Other parties were depicted as somewhat mindlessly working to further communal interests.

In the MPM's political calculus, the Alliance was least culpable when it came to sacrificing the national interest on the altar of communalism or straying from the path of responsible leadership. The thrust of the

MPM campaign was its capability to pursue the national interest more vigorously and rationally than the Alliance, with greater probity, and without resort to an organizational structure that perpetuated communalism. Not that the MPM expected the Alliance to lose power in the election or, indeed believed that a desirable development; the party hoped, according to one of its leaders, that an Alliance loss in Penang (and Sarawak) would prepare "the people for a peaceful change of leadership."

Since no significant body of MPM supporters or potential adherents¹⁴⁸ were identified with any of the proposed educational institutions, the MPM could, in fact, approach the question more "rationally" than other parties. One symbol of this rationality was to have Professor Alatas -- perhaps the most visible educator in the country -- serve as the MPM's chief spokesman on education. And in his expert opinion, none of the proposed projects furthered the national interest; the proper course in the field of higher education was to improve and expand the already respected UM.

The MPM did not completely escape the temptation of trying to twist developments for partisan gain. The party called on the government to establish a college or university "untainted by politics or communal-

ism" to accommodate students from non-English streams.¹⁴⁹ In other words, the MPM would find a multilingual university under official aegis acceptable. Thus with one stroke, the MPM acknowledged the legitimacy of the demands underlying the proposed CU, NU, and TAR college, opposed the institutions, all of which were associated with other political parties, and lay responsibility for satisfying unmet higher education needs on the Alliance government. The MPM suggested, moreover, that one method whereby the government could discharge its responsibility was to expedite establishment of the "long overdue" Penang University; a proposal consonant with the MPM's electoral strategy of concentrating on gaining control of the Penang state government.¹⁵⁰

Toward the end of the campaign, Alatas declared that the MPM was in favor of both the MU and NU,¹⁵¹ the latter, earlier castigated by him as an "UMNO university", now deserved endorsement by reason of the government decision to take responsibility for its implementation. The MPM now became, as it were, the most expansive of all parties when it came to higher education. It released an eight point program for solving the higher education problem which advocated expansion of the UM as well as the prompt

establishments of the Penang, National, and Merdeka universities.¹⁵² The program also called on institutions of higher education to absorb more students from the Malay, Chinese, and Tamil streams, and for the recognition of educational credentials where Chinese or Tamil were the languages of examination. These proposals could hardly be reconciled with the party's professed rejection of multilingualism. By the campaign's end, in effect, the MPM advocated multilingualism while continuing to pay lip service to the opposite.

The LP's election boycott did not prevent it from manifesting strong support for the MU. Transcending rhetoric, it declared the readiness to organize a publicity and fund-raising drive for the proposed university, providing it would be run on the same pattern as the Nanyang University in Singapore.¹⁵³ Such a campaign would have had every chance for success given the LP's powerful hold on the loyalty of many working class Chinese. Yet the Chinese education lobby, probably because of the fear that too close an association with the LP would compromise the MU in official and Malay circles, did not take up the offer.

More acceptable (albeit unexpected) was the PR's support for the MU, a position in stark contrast

with the party's adamant advocacy during Boestaman's day of one language and one NU. The PR was, indeed, the only party to support the MU without endorsing the TAR college as well, virtually compelling the pro-UMNO Utusan Melayu to ask whether the PR "regarded the MU which will be the highest institute of Chinese learning as better than the TAR college clearly bound to the national educational policy."¹⁵⁴ Actually, the response to that rhetorical question would have been "yes": the PR's attitude reflected neither educational concerns per se nor, unlike the rest of the opposition, electoral strategy or constituency pressures, but was a tactic to woo the LP. Identification with a project dear to Chinese hearts was thought likely to strengthen the PR ties with the LP.

Of all the parties which participated in the 1969 election, the PI seemed least concerned with the higher education issue. To the author's knowledge, it never publicly mentioned the MU or TAR college. This muteness was assuredly interpreted by the Alliance as evidence of the East coast, rural, Malay PI's tacit complicity with the West coast, urban, predominantly non-Malay opposition parties, the DAP, PPP, LP, and MPM. Of course, the PI may simply have seen no reason for involvement in the controversy. Support for either

the MU or the TAR college would have alienated Malay opinion while strong opposition would not have yielded discernable advantage, and might have cost the PI future backing (or indifference) from other anti-Alliance parties on issues of more direct concern to it.

Nor did the NU give evidence of exciting the interest of the PI leadership, especially once the government gave its blessings to the project and thus belied a major weapon in the PI's propaganda arsenal, namely, that the Alliance government was surrendering the birthright of the Malays to immigrant groups. The PI, with perhaps the most principled position on the higher education issue of all the contesting parties, simply stressed that a NU was not equivalent to a Muslim university. Muslims were advised by the party to fight for the upgrading of the Muslim college into a Muslim university.¹⁵⁵ And finally, as if to characterize the politicization of the issue during the campaign, the Indian community made demands (with about 10 percent of the population) for a Tamil language university.¹⁵⁶

Other Education Issues

Education impressed itself on politically aware

Malaysians prior to the 1969 election in ways other than the debate on the number and kinds of appropriate or desirable tertiary educational institutions. For example, the poor results made by students in the 1967 Lower Certificate Education (LCE) examination generated (communally tinged) controversy. A leading Chinese newspaper proposed that students who failed only the Malay paper be allowed to pass on to form four and retake their LCE the next time the examination was given.¹⁵⁷ It was ". . . unfair and regrettable that a student with excellent examination result (sic) cannot pursue his education just because he fails to pass Malay."¹⁵⁸

The paper suggested that the high failure rate may have been the fault of the government for not providing enough qualified teachers of Malay. While all citizens accepted Malay as the National Language and a compulsory school subject, the paper continued, some leeway in learning the language should be given to non-Malays. Malay groups expressed concern at the poor LCE results, too, without singling out the language paper. One ameliorative suggestion would have allowed students who received grade "B" to go on to form four.¹⁵⁹ Another would have retained LCE failures in form three one more year (since trade and vocational schools could not absorb them all) and

thus provide them one more chance to obtain a pass and continue their education.¹⁶⁰

The question of the poor 1967 LCE results was resolved before the campaign had fully gotten under way. Yet it was not devoid of political significance, given the implied criticism of the education system developed under the Alliance's aegis. It also provided a pointed lesson of the efficacy of agitation. After only slight resistance, the government yielded to the proposal that "B" grade holders be admitted to form IV or vocational schools and "C" grade holders to vocational schools if openings existed or into form four for another year if not over age.¹⁶¹

An assertion by Johari that all of the students detained by the arrests attendant on the issuance of the White Paper on subversion were from independent Chinese secondary schools sparked another educational-cum-political controversy. Some of the twenty-one schools whose management committees had received warnings, in connection with the government's raids to uproot Communist elements, had not taken any action, according to Johari, and might have to be closed unless they did so.¹⁶²

Chinese middle schools had undeniably been centers of Chinese chauvinism and, closely related to this, pro-Communism in the past.¹⁶³ However, the

Chinese education lobby insisted that the true purpose of reopening the question of subversion was an opening ploy, looking toward the abolishment of independent secondary schools.¹⁶⁴ It was argued that if individual students or staff were involved in Communist activities, they should be dealt with by the security forces in accord with the law and not used as a justification for closing entire schools.¹⁶⁵

A related issue stemmed from some of the recommendations of the so-called Aziz Report, a lengthy analysis of the country's educational system particularly concerned with the systematizing and upgrading of teacher training and conditions of employment. The Report's proposals to institute a minimal qualification requirement for teachers in Chinese schools and the changes suggested in the system of management struck the Chinese education lobby as an attack on Chinese education: in the words of the United Chinese School Teachers Association, the Aziz Report was "harmful to Chinese schools and aimed at eradicating Chinese education."¹⁶⁶

The election about a month away, the MCA did not defend the Aziz Report against the charges that it was anti-Chinese, although a credible case could have been made. Instead, the MCA urged Chinese school teachers not to worry about the report as the government might

not accept its recommendations, and assured the Chinese education lobby that MCA MP's would work against the implementation of those recommendations considered detrimental to the interests of Chinese education.¹⁶⁷

Economic and Other Issues Raised By The Opposition

On the left, the economic arguments advanced by the LP and PR during the campaign were consistent with their views over the years. They described Malaysia as a neo-colonial society where Western capitalists owned most of the country's wealth, although few Malaysians realized it. According to this analysis, Malays and non-Malays shared a false picture of reality, a false consciousness. While Malays resented the apparent (because visible) domination of the modern economic sector by immigrant groups, and non-Malays worried that the fruits of their hard work might be plucked by the Malays, both should have been joining hands against the common enemy of Western (primarily British) capitalism and neo-colonialism.

According to the leftist critique, the Alliance represented a marriage of Malay feudalists and Chinese capitalists cemented by the shared interest

in exploiting the country, and relying on communal appeals to disguise and protect their class interests.¹⁶⁸ Western backing further buttressed their position. The Malaysian left, never remotely near power at the national level, did not devote much attention to concrete policy prescriptions. It can be assumed that these would reflect, on the one hand, a belief in the desirability of nationalization, especially of tin mining and rubber production and, on the other hand, the need to modify the pro-Western foreign policy of the Alliance.

The DAP maintained that the government's pro-Malay policy alienated non-Malays without actually benefiting the so-called bumiputera; that official favoritism had little or no impact because of Alliance corruption, nepotism, inefficient administration, and, above all, commitment to private enterprise.¹⁶⁹ While not denying the backwardness of the Malay peasantry -- indeed, the DAP claimed it could do more for this group than the Alliance -- the DAP emphasized that the plight of poor non-Malays in the countryside and urban poverty also required attention.¹⁷⁰ The DAP insisted, in brief, that poverty in Malaysia was a class, not a racial problem.

A major DAP campaign theme was the growth of

unemployment during the Alliance's tenure. This had reached 400,000 in 1968, about half of whom were 1966 and 1967 school leaders, according to the DAP.¹⁷¹ Party leaders argued that the problem had become far too serious to yield to the Alliance's policy of establishing a handfull of land schemes and factories. It required, rather, a massive program of industrial and agricultural development which the DAP could achieve best through socialist planning, "scientific administration," the willingness to work hard, and because it had the requisite drive and esprit de corps to provide direction to the society at large.

The DAP's socialist protestations tended to bow before communal-cum-political pressures when a choice between ideology and interest was inescapable. During the campaign, for example, the Federal Agricultural Marketing Association (FAMA) proposed a marketing scheme aimed at preventing the exploitation of fishermen.¹⁷² The DAP criticized the scheme for violating the principle of private marketing -- a rather peculiar stand for an ostensibly socialist party until one discovers that the fish buyers or middlemen were Chinese almost to the man, and most of the fisherman or producers Malay. The DAP went so far as to describe the FAMA marketing plan as part of

the bumiputera economic "invasion" of non-bumiputera rights.¹⁷³

The rest of the opposition put less emphasis on economics in campaigning. The MPM, despite close ties with organized labor, did not present itself as a worker's party. Rather, as noted earlier, the MPM premised its major pitch on being, in the long run, the best choice to supplant the Alliance at the national level and, in 1969, the best alternative in Penang, the only state where the party nominated sufficient candidates to form a government. By "best" the MPM meant not only that it possessed superior skill and dedication but also that it was the most responsible opposition party. "Responsible," in turn, implied sobriety and sensitivity to communal sensibilities.

The MPM depicted its major competitor, the DAP (prior to the electoral pact, and after the election) as irresponsible, maintaining that the intellectual arrogance untempered by experience of its leadership caused them to exacerbate communal enmities. In truth, the MPM was closest, among opposition parties, to the centrist position of the Alliance on the Malaysian political spectrum. Certainly the MPM gave every indication of aiming to fill that slot, indicating agreement with the fundamentals of most Alliance poli-

cies, and reserving criticism for questions of implementation. It saw the opposition's immediate function not as the elimination of a thoroughly evil regime but as keeping the ruling party "on its toes."¹⁷⁴ At its Penang rallies, while decrying the poor economic situation in the state and the erosion of the island's free port status, the MPM emphasized its intention, if elected, to cooperate with the central government.¹⁷⁵

While the PI during the campaign did not systematically attempt to link the economy and Islam, at least some party leaders appeared to feel that the development of a modern economy was intrinsically corrupting, perhaps the "this world" character of the enterprise coloring their perceptions. It required trafficking in such "un-Islamic" behavior as usury and necessitated constant interaction with non-believers. One PI official suggested in an interview that if his party came to power self-sufficiency in food would be its primary objective. Here the PI's sacral orientation dovetailed with a specific developmental strategy: the government should concentrate on expanding agricultural opportunities, preserving, *inter alia*, a way of life where worldly temptations were minimal, rather than preparing Malays for absorption into a modern, urban environment conducive to

secularism.

As in earlier elections, the PI's appeal centered on Islam.¹⁷⁶ Religiosity was to the PI as responsibility was to the MPM. The typical PI candidate was selected either on the basis of formal position in the national or state religious hierarchies -- to which the PI's relationship was roughly analogous to UMNO's relationship with the secular administrative structure --, religious training and knowledge, or a reputation for piety.¹⁷⁷ The saliency of religion for many PI supporters can perhaps best be underscored by recounting a story heard in Kelantan.

It seemed that in Bachok, one of the state's eight administrative districts, there lived an old, devout man. He had voted for the PI in the last two elections and was particularly keen to vote for its candidates a third time because he had been told, and believed, that anyone who voted three times for the party was thereby guaranteed admission to shurga, the Muslim heaven. In the past, the old man's family also supported the PI. However, several younger members of the family, won over to UMNO in school, managed to convince the rest, except for the old man, their grandfather, to shift party allegiance. Thereupon the family hid his identification card without which he could not vote. He begged for its return,

saying that he would vote anyway they wished in future elections. They refused. Unable to vote and convinced he was thereby doomed to an eternity in hell, the old man actually went mad (gila).

Apocryphal or not, the story suggests that PI candidates were especially apt in talking in the idiom of the village folk. Indeed, communication at the kampong level sometimes posed a serious problem for their UMNO or PR opponents who had assimilated into an urban culture or had attained a high level of education in English. One Malay candidate, who had spent years in England taking advanced degrees, explained how he spent hours developing his ideas before gatherings of blank looking, uncomprehending villagers. After he spoke a local supporter would "translate" his remarks. This would usually take no more than a few minutes. However, by stringing together traditional proverbs, religious injunctions, and items of local gossip, the interpreter would arouse the apathetic audience to excited life without at all losing the essence of the original plea.

A persuasive PMIP argument involved telling villagers that the election presented them with the choice of living in one of two houses, each with three rooms. In the Alliance house, Chinese occupied one room (with their pigs), Indians a second, and

Malays the third. Malays occupied all of the rooms in the other house. In other words, under the Alliance the Malays could not truly be secure. And in the words of an unpublished analysis by one of the parties, "if there was anything the Malays could not stand, it was the loss of political power, which they have come to regard as their last defence against non-Malay inroads. The PMIP's campaign along this line struck the chord of Malay feelings and it was most effective." (emphasis in the original). Thus the PMIP maintained that the liberal citizenship policy followed by the Alliance had enhanced the political power of non-Malays. The 1967 Penang riots and the sporadic left-wing demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur showed how bold the Chinese had become.¹⁷⁸

PMIP propagandists asserted that the UMNO leaders lived in constant fear of a revolt, interpreting, for example, the revocation of the death sentence leveled against eleven Chinese found guilty of consorting with Indonesia during the confrontation as evidence of UMNO's fearfulness.¹⁷⁹ The PMIP attributed the alleged failure of the government's rural development programs to Chinese middlemen, protected by the MCA. As for the recently established educational and financial institutions such as MARA and Bank Bumiputera, the PMIP argued that these served only a favored class of

Malays while Chinese middlemen curtailed the work of PAMA.

In the absence of improvements in the living conditions of most peasants commensurate with the expectations engendered by Alliance claims, government programs in the rural area became the butt of PMIP ridicule.¹⁸⁰ Mosques were said to be so numerous and so close to one another that the farmers could not decide where to pray; the new community centers being used by goats for shelter; and the like.

A common opposition campaign theme was the alleged corruption of the Alliance. Urban-based opposition parties accused the Alliance of squandering money on prestige projects and on unnecessary overseas junkets for party leaders.¹⁸¹ The PMIP charged the Alliance with, so to speak, moral corruption. It criticized Alliance leaders for using religion to advance political purposes on the one hand and for disobeying Islamic injunctions such as the prohibitions against eating pork or drinking liquor on the other.

The Alliance was accused of corrupt practices in conducting its campaign. Tan Che Khoon alleged, for example, that local capitalists provided some of the funds to run the Alliance's campaign in exchange

for obtaining pioneer status for their factories.¹⁸² Additional money, Tan claimed, came from foreign companies, acting perhaps as conduits for the CIA. The secretary general of the PR, Syed Husan Ali, also said "he had reason to believe" that foreign agents and funds had entered the country to ensure an Alliance victory.¹⁸³ Ali accused a Minister and two UMNO leaders of having received CIA money for the Alliance.

These charges of corruption forced the Alliance on the defensive. How does a party prove that it is not corrupt? Certainly corruption and ineffectiveness existed in Malaysia, as in every polity, and was acknowledged by Alliance members in private. It was hardly a subject for public debate, however. A rebuttal based on a comparative analysis of corruption might have worked with a few sophisticated voters; it was not promising material for campaign polemics. In general, the parochial character of the issues raised during the campaign, unlike in 1955 and 1964, hindered the Alliance from taking the offensive. But the Alliance did present a defense of its stewardship.

The Alliance Defense

The Alliance ascribed Malaysia's unusual political stability and economic progress compared to the experience of other new states to its tolerance and moderation; to its interfering "as little as possible with the habits and customs of (the) different (Malaysian) races" while relying on the gradual process of education to achieve "a Malaysian outlook and loyalty."¹⁸⁴ The Alliance also pointed out that while no other party had nominated enough candidates to form a government of its own, Alliance candidates were not permitted to stand in more than one constituency. The difference was presented during the campaign in order to underscore the Alliance's unimpeachable position and generate a bandwagon psychology.¹⁸⁵

The "lack of a meaningful alternative" argument had another dimension, namely, that the Alliance was the only party with significant support in all communities. This could be carried to the point of warning voters that an Alliance setback might result in communal violence. "Any increase of PMIP or DAP/GRM representatives in Parliament," the Alliance candidate for Bungsar told a group of factory workers, "must mean increasing friction among our people."¹⁸⁶ "The people must accept the fact," said the then Dep-

uty Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, in a campaign broadcast, "that only the Alliance can maintain racial harmony" without which there would be "chaos" in the country.¹⁸⁷

The Alliance response to criticisms of the economic situation in the country was a rather lame resort to bloodless facts and figures. Tan Siew Sin, Minister of Finance for about a decade, cited a World Bank Report that favorably assessed the country's economy, without attempting to show how ostensible indicators of economic progress such as rising foreign exchange reserves affected ordinary Malaysians.¹⁸⁸ Indubitably those unemployed or otherwise in dire straits would have felt better about a government that demonstrated concern at their plight than one that provided rosy depictions of the state of the economy which, however accurate on a macro-level, had no clear bearing on their day-to-day lives. In general, the Alliance campaign indicated the belief that any note of pessimism, admission of failure, or uncertainty would provide ammunition for the opposition and therefore could not be countenanced. The result of such a pose in infallibility, however, was a one-sided campaign that ignored inconvenient facts and wreaked considerable damage on Alliance credibility.

The PMIP control of the Kelantan state government provided the one real opportunity for the Alliance to take the offensive. The people of Kelantan were told to vote Alliance, if they wanted development projects. "If the Alliance regains control of the State Government," Razak said, "it will see that the people of Kelantan enjoy development projects as are being carried out in other states."¹⁸⁹ The Alliance claimed to have spent \$1.5 million for mosques, suraus, and religious schools in Kelantan since the Sultan approved the channeling of national funds through the State Religious Council.¹⁹⁰ By contrast, the uncooperative attitude of the state government, according to the Alliance, prevented the opening up of land schemes and the introduction of other economic projects. However, these appeals appear largely to have backfired, although the Alliance did make some gains in Kelantan.¹⁹¹

Campaign Developments and Communalism

Several developments during the campaign lent fuel to the exacerbation of tensions. This was, in retrospect, a major consequence of the movement to obtain a pardon for eleven young Chinese who had received death sentences for consorting with

the enemy during confrontation.¹⁹² To be sure, appeals to the government -- more specifically, to the Sultans who possessed the power to pardon -- on their behalf were humanitarian pleas for mercy which stressed the youth of the defendants and the fact that confrontation had not done permanent damage. Even the official organ of the Alliance requested that reprieves be granted on these terms.¹⁹³ As all the youth were Chinese, however, the matter quickly took a communal turn. While Tan Che Khoon, who initiated the campaign for pardon, had a long association with humanitarian causes and a notion of political action as service in the Christian more than the patronage sense, he was still identified with the predominantly Chinese LP and his efforts on behalf of the condemned men received backing exclusively from Chinese organizations.

The Malay response to appeals for clemency was "that those who have no loyalty to the country deserve to die."¹⁹⁴ Support for the death sentence came, for example, from the Malay Language Society of the University of Malaya, an organization which has been termed a de facto Malay student union.¹⁹⁵ In campus discussions non-Malay speakers called for clemency while Malay students, often with great emotion, demanded execution. A petition circulated

on the University of Malaya campus on behalf of the prisoners received not one Malay signature. When it became known, however, that two Malays in Perak faced death sentences for the same crime, Malay intransigence toward reprieve evaporated, and all of the death sentences commuted to life imprisonment.

Of the incidents of violence during the campaign, two received national attention. Early on the murder of an UMNO election worker in Penang aroused Malay anger.¹⁹⁶ More consequentially, was the shooting by police, several days before the election, of a young LP worker while putting up signs in Kepong (several miles northeast of Kuala Lumpur) urging the people not to vote.¹⁹⁷ The LP alleged that the victim had been shot in the back of the head and not, as the government maintained, while attacking the police. The DAP and other groups joined the LP in demanding an investigation of the incident, among them the University of Malaya Student Union (UMSU).¹⁹⁸ The UMSU involvement justifies a short digression on the role of Malaysian students during the election campaign, albeit their impact was minor in the extreme.

The UMSU published its own election manifesto

and organized several rallies around the country to discuss it.¹⁹⁹ Despite the protestations of neutrality by student activists, the manifesto and rallies indicated an essential agreement between their views and those of the left-wing parties. Thus at their last pre-election rally, on May 3, UMSU leaders urged voters not to support the Alliance, if it continued in its refusal to release all political detainees or to vote for the DAP if that party continued in its refusal to condemn the Internal Security Act.²⁰⁰ The UMSU also criticized the DAP for using the MU project for "vote catching" and the Alliance for dividing Malaysians into "bumiputeras" and "non-bumiputeras." Still, student agitation had not a fraction of the impact of the Kepong incident, to which the discussion now returns.

The LP showed no qualms about trying to turn the outrage at Lim Soon Sing's death to political advantage. The dead boy's father, if not an LP member, was sympathetic to the party and willing to cooperate. On May 7, he told a press conference that the funeral would take place on the morning of the tenth and outlined the route of the cortege for reporters.²⁰¹ Funerary ritual, to fill in the context somewhat, is an important aspect of Chinese culture and since the middle of the nineteenth cen-

tury funeral processions have provided, along with other religious processions, recurrent settings for violence in Malaysia.²⁰²

The decision to hold Soon Sing's funeral on the same day as the election was patently provocative, but Lim's father told the press that he had the right to determine when the funeral would be and warned the police not to interfere. An LP cadre, Miss Siow See Lim, who had attended the press conference on May 7 in her capacity as chairman of the Funeral Committee, voiced the LP's full support for the decision of Lim's father. Calling on all right-thinking people to attend the funeral, See Lim distributed photographs to the reporters allegedly showing that the bullet had entered the victim's head from behind, that is, that he had been running away when the police opened fire.²⁰³

The remarks of some Alliance leaders heaped further fuel on the already inflammable situation. For example, T. H. Tan, a well known Alliance personality, rejected out of hand the formation of a commission to investigate the Kepong incident -- because the police acted in self-defense!²⁰⁴ On the UMSU denouncement of the police, he commented, "students throughout the world act alike. . ."²⁰⁵

The authorities predictably refused to permit the funeral on polling day. Lim's father agreed to May 9 instead. However, the LP Kepong branch rejected the "undemocratic demands of the Police that there should not be more than 1,000 persons participating in the funeral procession and that the procession should . . . reach the Kepong graveyard by way of Jalan Ipoh," thus skirting the center of Kuala Lumpur and avoiding Malay sections of the city.²⁰⁶ Despite the limitations insisted upon by the authorities, thousands participated in the funeral procession while the LP deviated from the specified route in ways that ensured the marchers maximum exposure.

With a largely Malay police force confronting slogan-chanting Chinese carrying pictures of Mao a clash seemed likely. Fortunately, no incidents occurred either because of police discipline as claimed by the government, the effective monitoring of the demonstration by the LP as claimed by party leaders, or both. On the other hand, the killing and subsequent funeral on top of a long communalistic campaign assuredly contributed to the violence that broke out in Kuala Lumpur a few days later, on May 13. But before discussing that traumatic event, it is first necessary to consider the election results -- the subject of Chapter 2.

APPENDIXTHE 1969 MALAYSIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN:PARTIES, ISSUES, CONSTITUENCY

<u>Party</u>	<u>Issues</u> ¹	<u>Constituency</u> ²
Alliance	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. political stability 2. economic well-being 3. racial harmony 4. "lack of any realistic alternative." 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. non-Malay business class. 2. middle class Malays, especially government employees such as school teachers. 3. West coast Malay peasantry, especially the secularized or moderately religious.
DAP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. the need for a "Malaysian Malaysia," i.e., multilingualism, support for vernacular education, and, in general, the need for a more equitable society. 2. inefficiency, corruption. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. non-Malay 2. English educated 3. middle class 4. West coast

<u>Party</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Constituency</u>
PPP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. multilingualism 2. support for Chinese education 3. inefficiency, corruption 4. poor economic situation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. non-Malay 2. Chinese education 3. working class 4. Perak
MPM	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. multiracialism 2. endorsement of Malay as the sole national language 3. inefficiency, corruption 4. "best alternative" 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. former UDP supporters, i.e., Chinese educated in Penang. 2. former members of the LP's moderate wing. 3. organized working class 4. intelligentsia
LP ³	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "socialism," i.e., nationalization of the economy 2. anti-imperialism 3. free Ang Gel A and all political prisoners 4. support for issues raised by the Chinese community, e.g., MU. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. non-Malay 2. Chinese educated 3. working and lower classes 4. militants; ideologically oriented

<u>Party</u>	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Constituency</u>
PR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. "socialism," i.e., nation-alization of the economy 2. anti-imperialism 3. opposition to "anti-democratic" Alliance policies, especially political detention 4. support for issues raised by the Malay community, e.g., endorsement of Malay as the sole official language. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Malay secular 2. Malay students 3. militants; ideologically oriented
PI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Islamic based state and society. 2. "selling out" of Malays to non-Malays 3. corruption 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Malay 2. Malay or arabic educated. 3. East coast peasantry, especially the traditional or strongly religious.
UMCO ⁴	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. recognition of Chinese as an official language 2. promotion of Chinese education, especially the MU 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Chinese education lobby 2. former MCA members 3. Negri Sembilan
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Issues refer to the appeals made by the different parties during the election and taken collectively 		

(within, not among, the parties) describe their electoral strategies.

2. Constituency means that "most" of the category listed supported the particular party or tended in that direction all other things being equal. These judgments are not based on survey data, but on (1) the political stratum's consensus, and (2) deductions from electoral studies.
3. The major LP appeal, of course, was to boycott the election. But it expressed its views even if it could not ask for votes.
4. The United Malays Chinese Organization put up a handful of candidates in Negri Sembilan, all of whom fared disastrously.

CHAPTER 2

THE ELECTION

Introduction

Elections can be analyzed from anthropological, sociological, or statistical perspectives. While the last approach is adopted here to describe the 1969 Malaysian election results, some comment on the two roads not taken are in order. The nub of the anthropological approach is the attempt to apprehend a setting, social unit, or event in toto. With respect to the election, the implied research strategy called for participation-observation, aiming at a comprehensive understanding of the election's meaning in a manageable area -- conventionally a village for anthropologists, although a political scientist might aspire to in-depth knowledge of an electoral constituency.

Whatever the unit of analysis, the longer and the more intense the observer's familiarity with it prior to the election the more fitted he would have been to determine the role of patron-client ties, class consciousness, familial and lineage influences, and communication networks on the election outcome, and its embeddedness in the collective memories or

historical experiences of the locale.

Two advantages of the anthropological approach bear mention. It is, firstly, a likely stance for tempering bias by allowing the sort of continuing existential confrontation, necessary (perhaps) for viewing the election through, as it were, the eyes of (some) Malaysians. Statistics cannot capture the fine shadings of experience. A second advantage is its capacity to apprehend the unique, to sense the unarticulated, and to appreciate the manifold, conflicting pressures which eventuate in deceptively decisive action. The defect of these virtues, the low capacity to generalize, is the prime drawback of the anthropological approach from the vantage point of social science.

An anthropologist can seldom even project his findings to the village down the road. Structural similarities can be assumed -- a lineage system, a division of labor, an agricultural technology, and the like -- but in the nature of the anthropological approach their content must wait for empirical investigation. A single observer thus cannot obtain an anthropological view, as defined here, of an election. A research team could have by pooling observations approached and inductive description of the election

which, like any phenomenon, was in some sense the sum of its parts. Of course, even with the requisite manpower, problems of coordination and design (how to conceptualize the "parts" is not self-evident) would have remained. There is, however, no point in becoming paralyzed by the impossibility of perfection, and it is regrettable that no anthropological observations were made to compliment the analysis presented in this chapter.

Sociological is a less self-evident label for the approach now to be discussed than anthropological is for the one just sketched. The term seems apt because the approach centers on elites and the socioeconomic determinants of behavior, two central concerns of sociology. Actually, the second is touched upon at the mass or voter level insofar as the racial complexion of constituencies are used to help explain party decisions on which seats to contest as well as their drawing power at the polls.

Race is only the most obvious of a large number of factors which might be treated as independent variables in analyzing Malaysian voting. Income, education, occupation, residency, are among the other standbys that can be listed. General agreement is found on how such socioeconomic attributes relate to support for the various Malaysian parties.¹ Thus it can be

reasonably assumed that a wealthy rubber-dealer from a straights-Chinese family would vote for the MCA; that an ulama, educated in Islamic schools and long-resident in rural Kelantan would support the PI; that a young Malay university lecturer in sociology with a PhD from abroad would place his hope for the future in the PR; that an Indian lawyer with a degree from the University of Singapore and a practice in Johore would harken to the DAP's call for a Malaysian Malaysia; or that an MCS officer who started up the administrative ladder during the colonial period would perceive the Alliance as the guarantor of responsible, moderate government. Yet such judgments, however obvious to Malaysians or students of Malaysian politics, do not stem, for the most part, from systematic research but reflect "common sense," voting patterns, and inferences from party appeals. The generation of survey data or the reworking of compiled information on the characteristics of party supporters would provide an objective test of the assumptions about these and, assuming that the broad profiles of the sources of the party support would be confirmed, afford a more refined, detailed, and quantified portrait of party support than that available at present.

In the context of Malaysian history, the socio-

logical approach is probably applied more fruitfully at the elite (party leadership) than at the mass (voter support) level. Indubitably, too, the methodological tasks are easier in determining the backgrounds and socioeconomic characteristics of party leadership, however defined. A fair amount of this sort of data was collected almost fortuitously in the course of field work, but an exhaustive analysis of the party elites did not seem justified for two reasons. First, the assumption that an elite's socioeconomic profile will explain its behavior is probably false in most instances or, at least, is an investigable hypothesis, not a self-evident truth.^{1a} Of course, such knowledge is of intrinsic interest where one aims to describe an election as fully as possible. This is not, however, the intent of this chapter and is, therefore, the second reason why sociological analysis (as defined here) is only incidentally attempted. Basically, the election is of interest in this study in that it sets the stage, as it were, for the racial rioting in Kuala Lumpur (dealt with in Chapter 3) and the subsequent dramatic, albeit not necessarily structurally significant, developments (the subject of Chapters 4 through 7). What is needed for that purpose is a sense of the election outcome, and its import. What is called

here the statistical approach seemed most appropriate to that task.

THE STATISTICAL APPROACH:

A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

Logic as well as convenience suggested that analysis of the election be organized in terms of the individual states. These have distinctive histories and are among the major categories used by Malaysians to order the external world. Several hypothetical statements can exemplify the kinds of perceptions politically cognizant Malaysians had with respect to the election results. "Penang fell to the opposition." "The Alliance met with reversals in every West Malaysian state except for Johore." "The PI managed to ward off the Alliance challenge in Kelantan." A number of similar statements could be proffered that would be as true as they would be trite. The objective in this chapter is to look at the obvious in more depth by asking a number of questions of the election data for each state.

One interest is the consequence of the opposition electoral pact: did it increase the number of seats won by the opposition? To put this question in a

negative, more answerable form, how might the election outcome have differed if the DAP, PPP, and MPN had not achieved agreement to cooperate against the Alliance. A number of conceptual problems, which frustrate a definitive answer, emerge immediately.

Assessment of the import of the pact is, first of all, unavoidably a comparative question. The basic quantitative question is the number of constituencies in which more than one of the parties to the electoral pact competed -- those instances where the arrangement failed -- vis-a-vis the '59 and '64 elections. The urban-based, predominantly non-Malay opposition parties are taken as the relevant universe here because of the three parties to the electoral pact, only the PPP also contested in the 1959 and 1964 elections.

It should be noted, too, that in constituencies in which a multicandidate race in either the 1959 and/or the 1964 elections gave way to a straight contest in 1969 that cannot automatically be attributed to the pact. Decisions arrived at independently by the three parties in the absence of the pact could quite possibly have led to the same reduction in candidates. This caveat is important to keep in mind because the discussion assumes that the pact "caused" straight races where these occurred in constituencies

experiencing multicandidate races in a prior election or elections.

Nor does the more important qualitative question, the electoral pact's effect on party fortunes, admit of a definitive answer. The basic assumption here is that a necessary condition for those Alliance victories achieved with under 50 percent of the vote cast was a split in the opposition vote; in other words, the sole voting cleavage is posited as between an Alliance and non-Malay opposition vote. An unsatisfactory, if analytically helpful assumption, practically speaking its persuasiveness will be seen to increase in inverse relationship to the proportion of the Alliance vote.

In a constituency where the Alliance received just under 50 percent of the vote with the rest equally divided between, say, the DAP and PPP, it is virtually inconceivable (although theoretically possible in the present framework) that if the pact eliminated, as it were, one of the opposition candidates the Alliance would have lost the seat. As the Alliance margin of victory narrows reaching the point, for example, where it triumphs in a three-way race with one third plus one of the vote cast, so does the likelihood increase that a reduction in candidates to an Alliance and one oppositionist would change the outcome. All of the

foregoing is, of course, premised on the familiar maxim -- all other things being equal which seldom, if ever, obtains. One might simply note that a vigorous statistical analysis of the effect of the pact would somehow have to take into account the general decline in support experienced by the Alliance in 1969.

A second topic investigated in Chapter 2 is the Alliance charge that the PMIP nominated candidates in selected constituencies to attract Malay votes from the Alliance.² To ascertain whether the PMIP indeed entered a tacit alliance with the DAP/PPP/MPM, the first task was to compare the seats contested by the PMIP in the 1969 election in the light of those it contested in earlier elections. In those constituencies where the PMIP competed for the first time in the '69 election, their racial compositions and electoral histories provided the bases for informed judgments on the Alliance contention.

A third question examined is the success of the LP call for an electoral boycott. Two sets of data, the voting percentages per constituency and the number of ballots spoiled, are used to shed light on this topic. An election boycott can, in effect, be expressed in one of two ways: by not voting or by

spoiling one's ballot. Yet either behavior can originate in indifference or carelessness as well as political protest so that, again, the complexity of reality resists the categorical attribution of causal relationships. The impact of exogenous factors can be controlled to some extent, however, by cross-constituency comparisons on the assumption that the greater the SF vote in earlier elections the greater the increase in spoiled votes and decrease in voting percentage to be expected in 1969. The basic technique used here is to compare the rank ordering of SF support per constituency (vote received is usually but not invariably the indicator) with changes in the percentages of rejected vote and voting. These three concerns, the effect of the electoral pact, the Alliance charge of collusion between the PMIP and the non-Malay opposition, and the LP call for a boycott of the election, will be examined in the context of a general review of the election results in the eleven West Malaysian states.

THE RESULTS

Johore

The Alliance made its strongest showing in Johore

in the 1969 election. Among the reasons suggested for its success were the logistical problems posed to the opposition by the state's relative size and dispersion of population, its comparative prosperity, a state-run land program which assuaged Chinese land-hunger, a rather cohesive and effective MCA organization, and the popularity of the Sultan and his identification with the Alliance.³ Whatever the explanation, the Alliance held its own in Johore. Its 65 percent of the state vote represented a drop of less than 3 percent from the lofty totals of 67.1 percent in 1959 and 67.6 percent in 1964 and assured continued Alliance domination of the Johore Assembly. The Alliance was returned in thirty of the thirty-two state constituencies, a loss of two seats compared to its clean sweep in the 1964 election but a gain of two over 1959. The DAP replaced the SF as the Alliance's major non-Malay opponent, outdoing the SF if one compares the average vote received per constituency contested. Strict comparison is not, however, possible -- partly because of the uncertain effects of the SF boycott and the DAP/PPP/MPM pact.

The opposition electoral pact was a success insofar as the constituent parties did not confront one another in any state constituency. It was obviously decided that the DAP represented the logical choice

to face the Alliance in Johore. Against the twelve DAP candidates (eleven engaged the Alliance in straight contests) for the state assembly, no PPP candidates entered the lists while three MPM candidates lost dismally in straight races with the Alliance. This does not imply, however, that clashes among the PPP, DAP, and MPM would have been rampant but for the electoral pact. In fact, in earlier elections there was (excluding the SF) no competition among non-Malay parties.

By boycotting the 1969 election the SF became, as noted in Chapter 1, a tacit participant in the opposition pact: assuredly the SF would have stood in many of the same constituencies as the other non-Malay parties had it participated. Political and ideological considerations both militated against the SF joining an opposition front, however short-lived. With staunch, proven support among working-class Chinese, the SF had less to gain from doing so than the PPP or MPM, neither of which had any illusions about having national followings, or the DAP which was untested at the polls. Even if the SF leadership became convinced that their party's interests could best be served by cooperating with other opposition parties, it would not be an easy matter for them to compromise so blatantly their insistence that the

SF would never sacrifice conviction to expediency.

In any event, the Alliance won all twelve of the state seats in the 1964 election in which both the SF and the PAP or UDP contested by majorities that assured Alliance victories even if all of the "opposition vote" went to one candidate. If anything, the opposition benefited from multi-candidate races in 1959. Three seats were won with under 50 percent of the vote, Pontian Dalem, Bandar Segamat, and Tanjong Petri; the first two by the Alliance and the last by the SF. It seems incontrovertible, however, that all of the seats would have fallen to the Alliance in straight contests, given the racial composition of the three constituencies, the votes received by the contesting parties, and the '64 and '69 election results. Yet unexplored is the effect of the SF boycott in state elections in Johore.

In line with the reasoning advanced in the methodological note, state constituencies in which the SF vote exceeded its average vote per constituency contested were deemed as high in SF support and compared with the remaining constituencies with respect to changes in rejected votes and voting percentages. As hypothesized, the percentage of rejected votes increased more and the voting percentage

declined more between the '59 and '69 elections in "high SF" seats. The differences are so slight, however, as to be insignificant, 5.1 percent and 4.9 percent in rejected votes and -3.2 percent and -3.1 percent in the percentage of eligible voters who cast ballots. Moreover, the percentage of rejected votes decreased in only one of the twenty-seven state constituencies contested in both '59 and '69; the percentages voting increased in six of the twenty-seven. Thus it might well have been that the SF had a small body of hard and fast supporters spread throughout the state and the indicator used, vote received by SF candidates, could not adequately discriminate. A second possibility is that the decrease in voting percentage and increase in rejected votes reflected an exogenous factor, not necessarily political in character. The paired rank orderings do not help clarify the roles played by the SF boycott. As can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, the discernable relationship with respect to the '59 election is completely absent when one turns to the 1964 election.

Proportionally, the PMIP's strength increased more than that of the non-Malay opposition. The PMIP's share of the vote rose to 6.5 percent from 2.6 percent in the '59 election and 2.4 percent in

TABLE 1

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: JOHORE STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Gunong Lambak	(50.9%)	Rengit	(+10.0%)	Senai-Kulai	(-9.8%)
Senai-Kulai	(50.5%)	Sri Lalang	(9.3%)	Broleh	(7.9%)
Sri Lalang	(47.5%)	Senai-Kulai	(6.7%)	Glang Patah	(7.2%)
Tanjong Petri	(40.5%)	Gunong Lambak	(6.0%)	Tanjong Petri	(6.5%)
Rengit	(36.7%)	Glang Patah	(6.0%)	Sri Lalang	(5.6%)
Glang Patah	(32.3%)	Bandar Maharani	(5.9%)	Rengit	(5.6%)
Kota Tinggi	(25.5%)	Kota Tinggi	(5.4%)	Pontian Dalam	(3.7%)
Pontian Dalam	(25.5%)	Bandar Segamat	(4.0%)	Bandar Maharani)	(3.4%)
Bandar Segamat	(25.3%)	Tanjong Petri	(1.8%)	Gunong Lambak	(1.5%)
Broleh	(23.3%)	Pontian Dalam	(1.6%)	Bandar Segamat	(0.0%)
Bandar Maharani	(18.9%)	Broleh	(.4%)	Kota Tinggi	(+5.6%)

TABLE 2

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: JOHORE STATE
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Gunong Lambak	(48.6%)	Sri Lalang	(7.3%)	Batu Anam	(-16.9%)
Senai-Kulai	(36.3%)	Tanjong Sembrong	(6.4%)	Broleh	(15.6%)
Rengam	(36.1%)	Kota Tinggi	(5.8%)	Senai-Kulai	(13.7%)
Tanjong Petri	(36.0%)	Gunong Lambak	(5.6%)	Sri Lalang	(12.1%)
Pontian Kechil	(32.8%)	Labis	(5.6%)	Bekok	(11.5%)
Sri Lalang	(32.5%)	Plentong	(5.5%)	Labis	(10.6%)
Batu Anam	(31.7%)	Glang Patah	(5.3%)	Tanjong Sembrong	(10.6%)
Labis	(31.6%)	Senai-Kulai	(4.9%)	Pontian Dalam	(10.4%)
Bandar Maharani	(31.5%)	Tampoi	(4.8%)	Tanjong Petri	(10.3%)
Bandar Segamat	(30.4%)	Rengam	(3.7%)	Rengam	(10.1%)
Pontian Dalam	(30.1%)	Bandar Maharani	(3.6%)	Glang Patah	(9.6%)
Parit Bakar	(29.5%)	Parit Bakar	(Unc.)	Parit Bakar	(Unc.)

SF VOTE AS PERCENT-
AGE OF VALID VOTE

Tampoi	(29.2%)
Bandar Penggaram	(27.8%)
Glang Patah	(26.7%)
Tangkak	(26.3%)
Plentong	(25.5%)
Tanjong Sembrong	(25.4%)
Bekok	(22.3%)
Kota Tinggi	(22.3%)
Jorak	(19.5%)
Broleh	(13.4%)
Plentong	(12.9%)

CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE
OF SPOILED VOTES BET.
'64 AND '69 ELECTIONS

Bekok	(3.2%)
Bandar Segamat	(3.0%)
Batu Anam	(1.0%)
Serom	(.6%)
Tanjong Petri	(.1%)
Bandar Penggaram	(-.4%)
Broleh	(1.0%)
Pontian Dalam	(1.6%)
Jorak	(Unc.)
Pontian Kechil	(2.8%)
Tangkak	(3.5%)

CHANGE IN PERCENT-
AGE VOTING BET.
'64 AND '69 ELECTIONS

Bandar Penggaram	(8.9%)
Serom	(7.6%)
Endau	(6.8%)
Tangkak	(5.7%)
Pontian Kechil	(5.6%)
Gunong Lambak	(4.9%)
Bandar Maharani	(4.9%)
Kota Tinggi	(4.9%)
Jorak	(Unc.)
Tampoi	(3.4%)
Plentong	(3.4%)

1964. Its average vote per constituency contested was 17.1 percent in 1969 compared to 7.0 percent in 1959 and 6.3 percent in 1964. Nor were these gains in the context of a broadened PMIP effort. The Muslim party nominated nine candidates for assembly seats, the same number as in 1959, and two less than in 1964. PMIP candidates stood for the first time in three state constituencies: Bukit Serampang, Pontian Kechil, and Bandar Segamat.

Heavily Malay, Bukit Serampang had been an Alliance preserve going into the election. The Alliance won the seat with over 75 percent of the vote in 1959 and without contest five years later. In 1969 the PMIP was the Alliance's sole challenger in Bukit Serampang, obtaining 12 percent of the vote. Uncontested in 1959, the Alliance overwhelmingly defeated the SF in Pontian Kechil in the 1964 election. Yet Pontian Kechil, unlike Bukit Serampang, could not be considered a safe Alliance seat. For the SF candidate in 1964 was a Chinese while about 55 percent of Pontian Kechil's registered voters were Malay. In fact, in the 1969 election the two challengers -- an independent in addition to the PMIP candidate -- as well as the Alliance incumbent were Malays. The independent took the seat with 55 percent of the vote while the PMIP candidate received under 2 percent.

The point here, however, is that as no non-Malay opposition party stood in Pontian Kechil the PMIP and the non-Malay opposition parties could not be accused of an "unholy alliance." Circumstantial evidence does point to a PMIP "spoiler strategy" in Bandar Segamat, where the party's candidate was only the second Malay ever to stand. The first, an Alliance candidate, won the seat in 1959 with 42.8 percent of the vote against two Chinese opponents, an independent (31.5 percent) and an SF candidate (25.3%). One surmises that, in this 60 percent Chinese constituency, the UMNO candidate received the bulk of the Malay votes and enough non-Malay support to achieve victory. The probability is high, in other words, that the Alliance would have been defeated in a straight race.

Three Chinese stood in Bandar Segamat in 1964. The Alliance squeaked to victory with 50.7 percent of the vote; SF and UDP candidates received 30.4 and 18.9 percent of the vote respectively. The DAP represented, as it were, the non-Malay opposition in 1969; the Alliance as in '64 nominated an MCA candidate; and the third candidate, as noted, was a Malay from the PMIP. The Alliance again achieved a narrow victory; it obtained 51.1 percent of the vote while the DAP drew 45.2 percent and the PMIP 3.7 percent

The poor showing of the PMIP could not have come as a surprise to the party's leadership in view of the ethnic composition and electoral history of Bandar Segamat, thus raising the possibility that the PMIP might have stood in Bandar Segamat in hopes of attracting enough Malay votes from the Alliance to throw victory to the DAP. Nonetheless, the PMIP's decision appears an ad hoc tactical move rather than as part of a strategic design when one discovers that the party did not compete in the two other Johore state constituencies which, like Bandar Segamat, had a non-Malay majority, an MCA candidate, and a Chinese opposition candidate.

A major problem in determining whether or the extent to which the PMIP cooperated with the non-Malay opposition in 1969 is that the MPM was founded in 1968, the PPP did not compete in Johore in 1959 or 1964, and the DAP was formed in 1965 while its progenitor, the PAP, made only a token appearance in 1964 (at that, all three of its candidates lost their deposits). Depending on the SF and UDP for cross-electoral comparison, however, one finds no evidence of an agreement between the PMIP and DAP/PPP/MPM, that is, the distribution of candidates found in the 1969 election does not differ markedly from earlier general elections. Of the nine PMIP candidates in 1969, one stood in the

same constituency as a non-Malay opposition party candidate. The comparable figures for 1964 were eleven and six; for 1959, nine and one. In other words, there is more reason to infer cooperation between the Malay and non-Malay opposition in the 1964 than in the 1969 election.

Parliamentary wise the Alliance in Johore kept its perfect record of never having lost a seat. Indeed, five of the sixteen Johore Parliamentary constituencies were uncontested in recognition of Alliance strength; a judgment borne out by the election -- Johore being the only West Malaysian state in which the Alliance percentage of the vote increased over the 1959 election, 65.7 to 67.6 percent. Generally the patterns found at the assembly level obtained in the parliamentary vote. All eleven contested parliamentary constituencies saw straight races in 1969. None of the handfull of multiparty contests in the two earlier elections can be attributed to the inability of the non-Malay opposition to come to agreement, excluding the SF as a member of the opposition pact had it not boycotted in 1969. The DAP replaced the SF as the second most popular party in Johore as measured by the percentage of vote received. The PMIP improved its position considerably over past elections, although remaining an insignificant force in the state. Similar calcula-

tions to those done at the state level, relating to SF support to changes in rejected votes and voting percentages were even more problematic than otherwise because of the small number of seats (five of the nine being uncontested either in '59 or '69) in the "low" SF category. In the event, rejected votes increased in "high" SF constituencies 4.8 percent between '59 and '69 and 5.1 percent in the others. The percentage voting, on the other hand, changed in the expected direction -- the vote in high SF constituencies dropped by 6.3 percent against a decline of 4.6 percent in the low SF constituencies. Generally, the paired rank orderings (Tables 3 and 4) show discernable relationships between support for the SF (as measured by votes received) and increased spoiled votes and decreased voting, a relationship made more impressive by the small differences involved.

Kedah

The PMIP confronted the Alliance in twenty-three of Kedah's twenty-four state constituencies in the 1959 election.⁴ The Alliance won all twenty-four seats, polling over 70 percent of the vote statewide. In '64 the PMIP contested one less seat than in '59, seventeen of which were straight contests with the

TABLE 3

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: JOHORE PARLIAMENT
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Kluang Utara	(43.1%)	Kluang Utara	(+7.5%)	Segamat Selatan	(-10.9%)
Segamat Selatan	(38.3%)	Segamat Selatan	(6.6%)	Kluang Selatan	(9.3%)
Johore Bahru Barat	(38.2%)	Kluang Selatan	(5.5%)	Kluang Utara	(7.0%)
Pontian Selatan	(37.4%)	Pontian Selatan	(Unc.)	Pontian Selatan	(Unc.)
Johore Bahru Timor	(35.3%)	Johore Bahru Timor	(4.0%)	Johore Bahru Timor	(3.8%)
Kluang Selatan	(34.2%)	Johore Bahru Barat	(3.3%)	Muar Pantai	(3.7%)
Muar Pantai	(11.8%)	Muar Pantai	(1.2%)	Johore Bahru Barat	(2.3%)

TABLE 4

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: JOHORE PARLIAMENT
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Kluang Utara	(39.0%)	Segamat Selatan	(+3.7%)	Segamat Selatan	(-10.7%)
Kluang Selatan	(35.0%)	Kluang Selatan	(3.5%)	Kluang Utara	(10.0%)
Pontian Selatan	(35.0%)	Pontian Selatan	(Unc.)	Pontian Selatan	(Unc.)
Johore Bahru Timor	(28.6%)	Kluang Utara	(3.3%)	Kluang Selatan	(9.6%)
Johore Bahru Barat	(28.3%)	Johore Bahru Barat	(1.4%)	Segamat Utara	(7.0%)
Segamat Selatan	(27.7%)	Muar Pantai	(1.2%)	Muar Pantai	(6.4%)
Segamat Utara	(27.7%)	Johore Bahru Timor	(1.1%)	Johore Bahru Timor	(6.2%)
Batu Pahat	(27.4%)	Batu Pahat	(Unc.)	Batu Pahat	(Unc.)
Muar Pantai	(27.0%)	Segamat Utara	(.3%)	Johore Bahru Barat	(5.1%)
Muar Utara	(18.8%)	Muar Utara	(Unc.)	Muar Utara	(Unc.)
Muar Dalam	(15.6%)	Muar Dalam	(Unc.)	Muar Dalam	(Unc.)

Alliance, including thirteen of sixteen which had also been straight fights in '59. Once again, the Alliance won every seat, although its vote fell slightly to some 68 percent. A comparison of the 1959 and 1964 Kedah state elections thus reveals, on the whole, great continuity. The 1969 election, however, brought a major rupture with the past. The Alliance, contesting in all twenty-four constituencies, not only lost its former monopoly but came perilously close to losing the state as nine constituencies returned PMIP candidates and two went to the MPM. Eight of the PMIP victories occurred in constituencies in which it had been bested by the Alliance in straight contests in both 1959 and 1964.

The Alliance set-back in Kedah was across-the-board. The percentage of the vote it received increased in only one constituency; the decreases ranged from 2 to 36 percent, with an average decline per constituency of slightly over 16 percent. These statistics do not, of course, indicate whether tacit cooperation existed between the PMIP and DAP/PPP/MPM in Kedah. It does appear as if the opposition gained when both its Malay and non-Malay wings, as it were, stood for election. There were four such constituencies and the opposition won in three or 75 percent of these compared to its victories in eight of the

twenty or 40 percent of straight contests. On the other hand, militating against possible collusion is not only the small number of constituencies in the former group but the fact that all four of them had also been contested by non-Malay parties in 1964 and (with one exception) in 1959 also. They include, it should be observed, the two Kedah state constituencies with non-Malay majorities. Non-Malay opposition parties have played, in fact, a minor role in Kedah elections, receiving about 5 percent of the '59 and '64 vote. But in 1969 the more or less same vote total restricted to one party, the MPMA, and distributed over four seats, resulted in a considerably greater average vote per contested constituency (35 percent) than that ever before obtained by a non-Malay opposition party in the state and, when combined with the loss of Alliance support (mostly to the PMIP), brought victory in two state constituencies.

Another break with the past in Kedah was the emergence of two "minority" victors, in the sense that the winning candidates received under 50 percent of the vote cast. In Sungai Patani Luar the Alliance won a "minority" victory, but it is readily apparent from the breakdown of the vote⁵ that the Alliance would have most likely also won in a straight contest. On the other hand, in Pekan Sungai Patani (Alliance,

38.7 percent; PMIP, 13.1 percent; MPM 48.2 percent) the MPM could quite possibly have lost the seat had the PMIP not (it can be reasonably surmise) drawn Malay votes from the Alliance. (In neither constituency could the number of candidates have altered the outcome in either the '59 or '64 elections.)

In seeking to gauge the effect of the SF boycott, only four seats qualified as high SF seats. The problem of working with such a small number is, however, somewhat offset by confidence that these are, on the basis of the SF's electoral performance and their racial compositions, truly the main centers of SF support in Kedah. A comparison of these four constituencies with the rest indicates an evident relationship. Thus the percentage of spoiled votes in the high SF constituencies rose by 4.5 percent between 1959 and 1969 vis-a-vis an increase of 2.2 percent in the other constituencies. The changes in the percentage of eligible voters going to the polls between the two elections is even more indicative of likely SF influence: a 4.5 percent decline in high SF constituencies compared to a slight increase (about .2 percent) in the others. These relationships are further buttressed by the differences among constituencies contested by the SF (see Tables 5 and 6), especially with respect to changes in voting

TABLE 5

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: KEDAH STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Pekan Sungei Patani	(30.3%)	Kulim	(+5.3%)	Pekan Sungei Patani	(-7.1%)
Kulim	(19.8%)	Sungei Patani Luar	(2.2%)	Kulim	(4.3%)
Alor Star Pekan	(10.0%)	Alor Star Pekan	(1.5%)	Alor Star Pekan	(3.8%)
Sik-Gurun	(10.0%)	Pekan Sungei Patani	(1.5%)	Sik-Gurun	(2.9%)
Sungei Patani Luar	(8.1%)	Sik-Gurun	(.5%)	Sungei Patani Luar	(+1.5%)

TABLE 6

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: KEDAH STATE
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Pekan Sungei Patani	(31.2%)	Bandar Bahru	(+4.0%)	Pekan Sungei Patani	(-6.2%)
Kulim	(29.2%)	Kulim	(3.9%)	Alor Star Pekan	(4.1%)
Bandar Bahru	(18.3%)	Baling Timor	(2.0%)	Alor Star Luar	(3.8%)
Alor Star Pekan	(13.8%)	Pekan Sungei Patani	(.8%)	Kulim	(2.2%)
Sungei Patani Luar	(7.3%)	Sungei Patani Luar	(.6%)	Bandar Bahru	(1.2%)
Baling Timor	(6.7%)	Alor Star Luar	(- .2%)	Sungei Patani Luar	(+1.2%)
Baling Barat	(6.7%)	Baling Barat	(.6%)	Baling Timor	(4.6%)
Alor Star Luar	(3.1%)	Alor Star Pekan	(1.5%)	Baling Barat	(4.7%)

percentages between '59 and '69 where the correlation is "perfect."

At the parliamentary level, two seats qualify as high SF constituencies; that is, in two of the four parliamentary constituencies contested by the SF its vote exceeded its average vote per constituency contested. The small number makes comparison vacuous but, for what its worth, spoiled votes increased 3 percent between 1959 and 1969 in the two high SF constituencies and 2.5 percent in the ten other constituencies; voting percentages in the two groups increased .2 and 1.8 percent respectively. Comparisons among SF contested constituencies with respect to spoiled votes and percentage voting are reported in Tables 7 and 8.

As was the case at the state level, continuity had been the keynote at the parliamentary level in Kedah in the pattern of party competition. In seven of the eight parliamentary constituencies (there are twelve in all) with substantial Malay majorities, all three general elections witnessed straight contests between the Alliance and the PMIP. The eighth was Baling where in the 1964 election, the SF and UDP (their combined 13.8 percent of the vote could not have affected the outcome) nominated candidates in addition to the Alliance and the PMIP. The non-

TABLE 6

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: KEDAH PARLIAMENT
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. 1959 AND 1969 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. 1959 AND 1969 ELECTIONS	
Sungei Patani	(38.2%)	Kulim-Bandar Bahru	(+4.6%)	Alor Star	(-2.3%)
Kulim-Bandar Bahru	(30.4%)	Kedah Tengah	(3.0%)	Sungei Pat	(1.8%)
Alor Star	(13.3%)	Alor Star	(1.5%)	Kedah Teng	(+ .2%)
Kedah Tengah	(7.3%)	Sungei Patani	(1.3%)	Kulim-Bandar Bahru	(2.2%)

TABLE 7

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: KEDAH PARLIAMENT
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. 1964 AND 1969 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. 1964 AND 1969 ELECTIONS	
Kulim-Bandar Bahru	(20.9%)	Kulim-Bandar Bahru	(+3.8%)	Sungei Patani	(-3.1%)
Sungei Patani	(18.2%)	Sungei Patani	(- .1%)	Alor Star	(2.1%)
Baling	(9.1%)	Baling	(.9%)	Kulim-Bandar Bahru	(1.6%)
Alor Star	(7.7%)	Alor Star	(1.0%)	Baling	(+5.3%)

Malay opposition, represented by the MPM, contested in two parliamentary constituencies, Sungei Patani and Alor Star. The first was the one Kedah parliamentary constituency with a non-Malay majority, and had been contested by the SF in the '59 and '64 elections. Alor Star is about 47 percent non-Malay. While the MPM won neither seat -- nor appeared to have affected the outcome -- the one-third or so of the vote it received, favorably compared with the showing made by non-Malay opposition parties in earlier elections.

The PMIP won three parliamentary races in the 1969 election -- in 1959 and 1964 the Alliance had achieved a clean sweep of Kedah's twelve parliamentary seats -- in straight races with the Alliance in heavily Malay constituencies. To account for the Alliance losses one need not go beyond the fact that these occurred in the three constituencies in which the Alliance obtained its smallest majorities in 1964, so that the "normal" loss it suffered at the parliamentary level in Kedah (an average of 16 percent per constituency) left the party with under 50 percent of the vote. In other words, the opposition pact had no discernable effect on the outcome of the '69 election. Finally, none of the Alliance victories in the '59 or '64 elections could be attributed to the failure

to achieve an electoral pact similar to that obtaining in 1969.

Kelantan

There is no evidence of collaboration between Malay and non-Malay opposition parties in Kelantan where Malays predominate in all thirty state constituencies, in many cases approaching 100 percent of the electorate. In the 1959 election, banking either that ideology might prove more compelling than religion or hoping to draw votes from the Alliance, the SP nominated candidates (eighteen of whom were Malay) in twenty constituencies. The outcome left no room for misinterpretation. All of the SP candidates lost their deposits; the party received only 2.3 percent of the votes cast. About the only impact of the SP was that in one constituency, Tumpat Tengah, its participation was possibly a necessary condition for the PMIP's victory. Be that as it may, no non-Malay opposition party competed in Kelantan after the SP's '59 debacle. In other words, the Alliance and the PMIP were the only parties to put up candidates in the '64 and '69 elections. Five independents stood in the latter election, however, and might have changed the outcomes in two seats won by the

Alliance and one by the PMIP.

The Alliance proved its position vis-a-vis the PMIP in Kelantan in 1969 on a number of measures. While the Alliance picked up only two assembly seats in 1959, it had increased its total to nine in '64 and reached eleven in '69. Its statewide vote was, respectively, 26.9, 43.0, and 47.1 percent. Between '64 and '69, the Alliance percentage of the vote increased in twenty-five of the thirty state constituencies. Several points may be made about these results in the context of the Alliance having lost ground in the other West Malaysian states. There is the obvious fact that, despite inroads, the Alliance failed to redeem its pledge to supplant the PMIP in Kelantan. Moreover, the Alliance's headway was less, proportionally, than its losses in the rest of West Malaysia, a circumstance suggesting a general "anti-establishment" tendency in the 1969 election which, in every state but Kelantan, translated into an increased vote against the Alliance, with the qualification that anti-Alliance sentiment must have been a force in its own right or the ground gained by the Alliance in Kelantan would have been more equivalent to the extent of its setback in those states where it formed, as it were, the establishment.⁶ One further item of evidence can be adduced in corroboration of

the hypothesis that the '69 results indicated, inter alia, an inclination to vote against the party in power: all five Kelantan seats in which the Alliance percentage of the vote declined between the '64 and '69 elections had Alliance assemblymen. There was no attempt to ascertain the effect of the SF boycott in Kelantan because the left-wing party fared so badly in 1959 and did not contest at all in 1964. Nor did it make sense to use the percentage of Chinese registered voters per constituency as an indication of SF support since members of that community comprised over 10 percent of the voters in only four constituencies.

The Alliance and PMIP have dominated Kelantan elections even more at the parliamentary than at the state level. There has, in effect, been one third-party candidate per election. The PN candidate received 1.7 percent of the vote in the one constituency contested by that party in 1959; an SF candidate 1.9 percent in 1964; and an independent .9 percent in 1969. The Alliance's standing vis-a-vis the PMIP continued to improve with respect to the number of elected candidates; it gained four MPs in 1969 compared to one in 1959 and two in 1964. Additional confirmation of a general anti-establishment thrust was that the two

parliamentary constituencies in which the Alliance's percentage of the vote decreased were the only one's in Kelantan controlled by the Alliance going into the election.

Malacca

Malacca presented the Alliance its greatest setback, after Penang, in the 1969 election. Its percentage of the state vote dropped from 67.0 percent in 1959 to 65.2 percent in 1964 and 48.1 percent five years later. The Alliance gained all twenty assembly seats in 1959, eighteen in 1964, and fifteen in 1969. The DAP won four of the five remaining seats, in Bukit Rambai and Kota Barat with under 40 percent of the vote. Bukit Rambai⁷ was the only Malacca state constituency where the PMIP's participation probably caused the Alliance to lose a seat. However, if that reflected a PMIP "spoiler strategy," the PMIP must have had the same objective in 1959 and 1964 as well, when it also contested the constituency. Actually, the PMIP's decisions to contest in Bukit Rambai had a prime facie logic since the constituency had a slight Malay majority. Only one Malacca seat contested in 1969 by the PMIP, Batang Malaka, had been contested by the Muslim party in earlier elections.

More problematic is the PR's effect on the Bukit Rambai's result. One's hunch is that the second choice of most of those who voted for the PR would have been the Alliance rather than the DAP or PMIP. Thus the second seat won by the DAP with a minority of the vote, Kota Barat, could conceivably have fallen to the Alliance but for the PR's participation: Alliance, 30.6 percent; PR, 30.8 percent; DAP, 38.5 percent. The PR was quite active in Malacca in 1969, compensating in a sense for the SF which had nominated candidates in every constituency in 1964. In eleven constituencies the PR prevented, as it were, straight races; that is, without its participation the number of straight races in the state would have been two rather than thirteen. In five state constituencies, including the two already noted, the PR's participation might have affected the outcome.

The PR did not capture all of the former SF voters. While its 16.0 percent of the vote was the PR's best showing in any state and surpassed the SF's 1959 total of 11.4 percent, the vote per constituency contested were 18.9 percent and 25.8 percent respectively. In 1964, the SF's total on both measures -- since the party contested every seat -- was 26.8 percent. Such cross-electoral comparisons between

the SF and PR raises the question of the number of former SF voters who chose not to go to the polls at all in 1969. To shed light on this question, constituencies deemed "high" and "low" in SF support were, as in other states, compared with respect to spoiled votes and percentage voting. High SF constituencies were taken as those in which the party's vote exceeded its per constituency average in the pertinent election. A comparison of the constituencies, thus categorized, between the '59 and '69 elections yielded an inconclusive, somewhat anomalous finding: the percentage increase in rejected votes was about twice as much in the low SF constituencies (3.9 percent) as in the high ones (2.1 percent). The changes in voting percentages were not, however, similarly out of line with those hypothesized -- increasing by 1.1 percent in low SF constituencies and decreasing by 2 percent in high SF constituencies. Tables 9 and 10 bear out the difference, showing a closer relationship between SF vote and decreases in voting than between SF vote and increases in spoiled votes.

There were two major differences between voting at the state and parliamentary levels in the 1969 election in Malacca, from the Alliance's perspective. First, unlike the progressive loss in the percentage of vote received experienced in the assembly vote,

TABLE 9

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: MALACCA STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Batang Malaka	(39.9%)	Batu Berendam	(+5.0%)	Batu Berendam	(-6.4%)
Batu Berendam	(39.8%)	Kota Selatan	(4.1%)	Kota Tengah	(4.3%)
Kota Tengah	(35.8%)	Kota Barat	(3.4%)	Kota Timor	(1.6%)
Sungei Rambai	(32.0%)	Kota Utara	(3.2%)	Sungei Rambai	(+2.0%)
Palau Sebang	(29.9%)	Pulau Sebang	(Unc.)	Pulau Sebang	(Unc.)
Kota Barat	(17.3%)	Kota Timor	(2.7%)	Kota Utara	(3.2%)
Kota Selatan	(13.9%)	Kota Tengah	(2.4%)	Kota Barat	(4.3%)
Kota Utara	(13.4%)	Batang Malaka	(- .8%)	Batang Malaka	(5.0%)
Kota Timor	(10.0%)	Sungei Rambai	(3.1%)	Kota Selatan	(5.1%)

TABLE 10

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: MALACCA STATE
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Kota Tengah	(48.2%)	Masjid Tanah	(+5.0%)	Kota Tengah	(-14.2%)
Kota Selatan	(44.8%)	Ramuan China	(4.8%)	Kota Timor	(13.5%)
Kota Timor	(39.2%)	Alor Gajah	(4.8%)	Kota Selatan	(11.8%)
Batang Malaka	(34.8%)	Semabok	(3.5%)	Kota Utara	(11.5%)
Kota Barat	(33.2%)	Kota Selatan	(3.4%)	Rim	(8.1%)
Batu Berendam	(31.7%)	Kota Barat	(3.1%)	Kota Barat	(7.9%)
Kota Utara	(31.0%)	Bukit Rambai	(3.0%)	Batang Malaka	(7.7%)
Pulau Sebang	(29.5%)	Pulau Sebang	(Unc.)	Pulau Sebang	(Unc.)
Sungei Rambai	(28.8%)	Batu Berendam	(2.8%)	Bukit Rambai	(6.7%)

TABLE 10 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Bukit Rambai	(27.0%)	Sungei Bharu	(2.7%)	Batu Berendam	(6.6%)
Jasin	(26.9%)	Kota Utara	(2.4%)	Semabok	(6.2%)
Rim	(25.7%)	Tanjong Kling	(2.3%)	Tanjong Kling	(5.8%)
Semabok	(23.0%)	Kota Tengah	(2.1%)	Kandang	(5.3%)
Ramuan China	(20.6%)	Kota Timor	(1.6%)	Sungei Bahru	(5.2%)
Sungei Bahru	(18.5%)	Kandang	(1.2%)	Masjid Tanah	(4.5%)
Alor Gajah	(17.7%)	Batang Malaka	(-1.2%)	Alor Gajah	(4.3%)
Tanjong Kling	(13.4%)	Rim	(1.6%)	Ramuan China	(3.6%)
Kandang	(10.4%)	Jasin	(2.4%)	Jasin	(3.3%)
Masjid Tanah	(8.5%)	Sungei Rambai	(3.0%)	Sungei Rambai	(1.4%)
Serkam	(7.3%)	Serkam	(4.3%)	Serkam	(.7%)

the Alliance's parliamentary level performance conformed to the general cross-electoral pattern in which the Alliance received its maximum vote in the 1964 election (66.2 percent with respect to Malacca's parliamentary vote); its second highest in the 1959 election (58.9 percent); and its lowest in 1969 (48.8 percent). In other words, taking its 1959 vote as the "norm," 1969 saw the Alliance doing below average, albeit less than appeared the case because of the inclination to use the '64 results as the point of reference despite the fact, for reasons noted later in this chapter, that these results inflated the "normal" level of Alliance support.

A second difference between the 1969 parliamentary and state returns in Malacca is the relative number of seats won by the Alliance. The Alliance gained three of the four parliamentary seats -- a return to its 1959 total. The seat lost by the Alliance, Bandar Malacca, contained the largest percentage of non-Malays of the four parliamentary constituencies and had long been, as it were, the Alliance's achilles heel in Malacca. It was one of the two parliamentary seats won by the Malayan Party in 1959. And while the Alliance rolled up majorities of 74.1, 70.8, and 72.3 percents in the other three Malacca parliamentary constituencies in

1964, its majority in Bandar Malacca was 49.4 percent (the rest of the votes were divided between the SF and PAP). In 1969 Bandar Malacca -- further testimony to the Alliance's relative weakness in that constituency -- was the one Malacca parliamentary seat contested by the non-Malay opposition; the DAP obtaining the seat with 60.8 percent of the vote. It should also be noted that Bandar Malacca was the one Malacca parliamentary seat -- the three others having solid Malay majorities -- where the DAP/PPP/MPM pact may have prevented the loss of a seat that "rightfully" belonged to the non-Malay opposition. Yet even if the PPP or MPM contested and received one-half of the DAP's votes, Bandar Malacca would still have gone to one of them and not to the Alliance.

The PMIP made a better showing in Malacca in the 1969 election than in earlier elections but did not, as in the past, nominate a candidate in Bandar Malacca. The PR contested in three parliamentary constituencies, including Bandar Malacca; its vote (which averaged 15 percent) could not have affected any of the outcomes. Because of the small numbers, the one attempt to measure the effect of the SF boycott at the parliamentary level which made sense was to relate the percentage of non-Malay votes in each constituency⁸ with changes in rejected votes and voting percentages.

The results of these comparisons, as indicated in Table 11, suggest, if anything, the opposite relationships to those hypothesized.

Negri Sembilan

Elections in Negri Sembilan have described a more complicated mosaic than those in any other West Malaysian state. There were seventy-one candidates, an average of slightly under three per contested constituency, in the 1959 election; seventy-eight in 1969 or 3.3 per contested constituency; and seventy (3.2 per constituency) in 1969. The number of multicandidate races further conveys the convoluted character of Negri Sembilan elections. Thus in 1959 there were seven straight state contests; eleven constituencies with three candidates; and six with four candidates. In 1964, straight races decreased to four, thirteen constituencies had three candidates, four had four candidates, and three had five. The comparable figures for 1969 were six, seven, eight, and one respectively, with two seats uncontested.

Despite the foregoing figures -- which would seem to indicate the breakdown of the electoral pact in the Negri Sembilan state election -- the DAP was the only party to the pact to nominate candidates.

TABLE 11

RANK ORDERINGS OF PERCENTAGE OF NON-MALAY REGISTERED VOTERS,
SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE VOTING
MALACCA PARLIAMENT
1964 AND 1969 ELECTIONS

PERCENTAGE OF NON- MALAY VOTERS	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69
1. Bandar Malacca (84.4%)	3. (+5.2%)	1. (+3.0%)	4 (-13.1%)	4. (-15.1%)
2. Malacca Selatan (42.0%)	1. (4.8%)	3. (2.7%)	2. (6.6%)	2. (11.8%)
3. Malacca Tengah (36.3%)	2. (2.3%)	2. (1.3%)	3. (2.6%)	1. (5.5%)
4. Malacca Utara (29.5%)	4. (1.0%)	4. (-2.3%)	1. (+ .2%)	3. (5.4%)

Independents were especially numerous in Negri Sembilan in the 1969 elections with eight obtaining an average vote per constituency of 15.1 percent and 4.3 percent of the total assembly vote in the state. Considerable independent activity was, however, a distinguishing feature of the two earlier elections in Negri Sembilan as well. In 1964 ten independent candidates averaged 11.7 percent of the vote in constituencies contested and 3.7 percent of the total vote. In neither '69 or '64 moreover, did independent candidates approach their 1959 showing when seventeen independents obtained an average vote of 18.7 percent in the constituencies in which they stood and 10.9 percent of the statewide vote. In sum, an unusually large number of independents has been a constant factor contributing to the complexity of Negri Sembilan elections. A unique feature of the 1969 election was the participation of a local splinter party, the United Malaysian Chinese Organization (UMCO). Formed by dissident MCA leaders in the state, UMCO attracted so few votes that all twelve of the party's candidates forfeited their deposits. Despite this rather remarkably poor showing, however, UMCO may have influenced the outcome in five state constituencies and, more to the point of the present discussion, added twelve candidates to an already crowded

field.

The large number of candidates complicates assessment of the possible effects of that factor per se on party fortunes in Negri Sembilan. It does appear likely that in all but three cases the same candidates would have been returned in straight contests. Additional evidence that the number of candidates had a minimal effect on the results is the close correspondence between the Alliance's over all vote and the number of seats it won over the span of the three elections. In 1959 the Alliance's 55.8 percent of the state level vote translated into twenty seats. Three seats fell to the SF which had the second highest vote total.⁹ The Alliance vote in 1964 increased to almost 60 percent which was enough to assure it a clean sweep, although in two (and perhaps three) constituencies Alliance victories can reasonably be attributed to a divided opposition vote. The PPP nominated only two candidates, one of whom competing against a UDP (one of seventeen) candidate contributed to a five-man race which permitted an Alliance victory with 34.6 percent of the vote. While the combined SF and UDP vote fell below the SF's 1959 total, their twelve clashes contributed to the failure of either to win any state seats in 1964. The Alliance 1969 vote dwindled to

46.2 percent and the number of its assemblymen to sixteen. The remaining eight seats went to the DAP, a fact reflected in that party's 36.4 percent of the vote.

The PMIP's state level vote varied only slightly over the three elections. The most noticeable difference in the '69 election was the PMIP's much higher vote per contested constituency vis-a-vis the earlier elections. More specifically, the PMIP's percentage of the vote was higher in five of the seven constituencies it contested in both 1964 and 1969 and in eight of the ten constituencies in which it nominated candidates in both the 1959 and 1969 elections. As the overlap implies, the distribution of PMIP candidates did not deviate in ways suggesting the attempt on its part to carve out a spoiler role in the Negri Sembilan state elections in 1969 as compared to earlier elections. Only one of the eleven state constituencies, Jimah, contended by the PMIP in 1969 had never before been contested by the party. The PMIP's 7.4 percent of the vote probably did not affect the disposition of the seat, won by the DAP with 56.5 percent of the vote.

Given the SP's impressive showings in the '59 and '64 state elections, one would expect a discernable increase in spoiled votes and decrease in the

percentage voting in high SF constituencies in 1969, taken as encompassing constituencies in which the SF vote in both '59 and '64 exceeded its average per constituency vote in each election. The findings here are mixed. Thus the average increase in the percentage of rejected votes between '59 and '69 turns out to have been greater in constituencies judged low on SF support (3.3 percent) than in those in the high category (2.3 percent).¹⁰ There was, on the other hand, a noticeably greater decline in voting in the high SF constituencies (5.1 percent) than in the low SF constituencies (3.9 percent). The paired rank-orderings, Tables 12 and 13, also show a clearer relationship with respect to the percentage voting, although spoiled votes also appears to correlate with SF vote.

At the parliamentary level in Negri Sembilan, the Alliance vote fell from 51.9 to 46.4 percent between the '59 and '69 elections, and its MPs from four to three. In 1964 all six parliamentary seats were won by the Alliance with a fraction under 60 percent of the voters. The disposition of parliamentary seats in both the '59 and '69 elections mirrored the state level results rather closely. Of the three Alliance victories in the latter election, two were in straight races with the PMIP while the third

TABLE 12

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: NEGERI SEMBILAN STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Labu	(56.0%)	Labu	(+7.6%)	Lakut	(-10.6%)
Rompin	(51.1%)	Rompin	(3.7%)	Rompin	(7.0%)
Rahang	(48.6%)	Sungei Ujong	(3.0%)	Gemas	(6.8%)
Bukit Nanas	(48.6%)	Rantau	(2.7%)	Bukit Nanas	(6.0%)
Rantau	(43.5%)	Rahang	(2.4%)	Labu	(4.7%)
Lukut	(43.0%)	Lenggeng	(2.4%)	Rantau	(4.7%)
Bahau	(41.9%)	Bahau	(Unc.)	Bahau	(Unc.)
Gemas	(37.2%)	Lukut	(1.3%)	Lenggeng	(4.3%)
Sungei Ujong	(26.6%)	Bukit Nanas	(- .7%)	Sungei Ujong	(1.7%)
Lenggeng	(24.8%)	Gemas	(.7%)	Rahang	(+ 9.1%)
Tampin	(22.5%)	Tampin	(Unc.)	Tampin	(Unc.)

TABLE 13

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: NEGRI SEMBILAN STATE
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Rompin	(41.9%)	Jempol	(+6.2%)	Gemas	(-7.8%)
Labu	(37.0%)	Labu	(6.1%)	Rahang	(7.4%)
Bahau	(34.5%)	Bahau	(Unc.)	Bahau	(Unc.)
Lenggeng	(34.0%)	Lenggeng	(2.9%)	Lenggeng	(6.5%)
Gemas	(33.6%)	Pertang	(2.9%)	Terentang	(6.3%)
Rahang	(30.7%)	Sri Menantri	(2.8%)	Rompin	(5.6%)
Tampin	(30.3%)	Tampin	(Unc.)	Tampin	(Unc.)
Bukit Nanas	(29.9%)	Kuala Klawang	(2.2%)	Bukit Nanas	(5.4%)
Kuala Klawang	(28.1%)	Johol	(1.8%)	Kuala Klawang	(5.3%)
Jimah	(27.5%)	Sungei Ujong	(1.8%)	Johol	(5.3%)

TABLE 13 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT-
AGE OF VALID VOTE

Sungei Ujong	(27.2%)
Rantau	(25.8%)
Pertang	(18.2%)
Johol	(14.3%)
Sri Meantri	(12.6%)
Terentang	(12.6%)
Jempol	(8.1%)
Kota	(7.0%)

CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE
OF SPOILED VOTES BET.
'59 AND '69 ELECTIONS

Rompin	(1.0%)
Dukit Nanas	(.9%)
Rantau	(.7%)
Rahang	(.7%)
Terentang	(-1.6%)
Kota	(1.8%)
Jimah	(2.7%)
Gemas	(3.2%)

CHANGE IN PERCENT-
AGE VOTING BET.
'59 AND '69 ELECTIONS

Sri Menantri	(5.2%)
Sungei Ujong	(4.9%)
Pertang	(4.5%)
Rantau	(4.3%)
Labu	(3.1%)
Jimah	(3.1%)
Jempol	(3.1%)
Kota	(1.8%)

was uncontested. In 1959 the Alliance also won two seats in straight races with the FMIP; a third by defeating the Malayan Party; and a fourth was uncontested. In other words, in two of the three (those with straight races) parliamentary seats contested by the FMIP in 1969, there was no question of cooperation between it and the non-Malay opposition. The third seat, Port Dickson, may have represented a bid to attract Malay support from the Alliance. The FMIP did not contest Port Dickson in 1959 (it nominated no candidates at all in 1964 when the Alliance won all six parliamentary seats) and there seemed no compelling reason why it would do so since the constituency was about two-third non-Malay. Whatever the FMIP's intentions in Port Dickson, it did not affect the outcome; the DAP won the seat by a solid majority.

In trying to gauge the effectiveness of the SF boycott, the two seats contested by the SF in the 1959 parliamentary elections were included in the high SF groups since the SF also stood in both in 1964, garnering more than the party's average per constituency vote in that election. To these two was added the third parliamentary constituency in which the SF's vote exceeded its per constituency

average in 1964. Unfortunately, an uncontested constituency in each election left only one seat for comparison. For what it may be worth (the cases are too few to allow meaningful conclusions) the average increase in spoiled votes between '64 and '69 in the three high SF constituencies was 6.9 percent compared to 4.6 percent in the single seat postulated as low in SF support and for which there are statistics for both the '59 and '69 elections. The corresponding figures with respect to the percentage voting were, respectively, -4.5 percent and +1.8 percent. With the SF having contested just two seats in the '59 election, the presentation in tabular form of paired rank orderings has been limited to the '64 election. Here, as can be seen from Table 14, the relationships are strong.

Pahang

Pahang remained an Alliance stronghold in the 1969 election, although the opposition made inroads. In 1959 and 1964 all twenty-four assembly seats had fallen to the Alliance with 63.6 and 68.4 percent of the vote respectively. In 1969, however, the Alliance lost four seats -- two to the PR, one to the MPM, and one to an independent candidate. Three seats -- won

TABLE 14

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: NEGRI SEMBILAN PARLIAMENT
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Seremban Barat	(35.5%)	Jelebu-Jempol	(+10.2%)	Jelebu-Jempol	(-7.2%)
Jelebu-Jempol	(26.5%)	Seremban Barat	(1.1%)	Seremban Timor	(5.3%)
Seremban Timor	(23.5%)	Seremban Timor	(1.0%)	Seremban Barat	(4.9%)
Rembau-Tampin	(19.8%)	Rembau-Tampin	(Unc.)	Rembau-Tampin	(Unc.)
Kuala Pilah	(17.1%)	Kuala Pilah	(-.1%)	Kuala Pilah	(4.2%)
Port Dickson	(12.6%)	Port Dickson	(3.6%)	Port Dickson	(3.9%)

by the Alliance with overwhelming majorities in the 1964 election -- were uncontested in 1969, that is, the Alliance was returned on nomination day. The Alliance's average vote loss in the fourteen seats in which its support declined was 16.3 percent; in the seven remaining contested constituencies the average Alliance gain was 3 percent.

At the parliamentary level the Alliance vote, an impressive 60.8 percent, was down from 71.1 percent in 1964 and 66.9 percent in 1959. The Alliance was again victorious in every parliamentary contest, but by reduced majorities. Indeed, for the first time in Pahang, the Alliance garnered less than an absolute majority of the vote in a contested parliamentary constituency, winning the Kuantan seat with 44.6 percent of the vote.¹¹

There was not a significant reduction in the number of multicandidate state races in Pahang, comparing 1969 with the earlier elections; there were thirteen in 1959, eleven in 1964, and twelve in 1969. None of the latter can be attributed to a breakdown in the electoral pact. The pact's constituent members were singularly inactive in the Pahang state elections: the DAP and MPM nominated one candidate while the PPP was not represented. The

lone MPM candidate stood in the Cameron Highlands where he bested the Alliance nominee in a straight fight. The MPM victory could be considered as a measure of the success of the electoral pact in that the presence of a PPP or DAP candidate could very possibly have thrown the election, as it were, to the Alliance. But that would be an exceedingly strained interpretation because, excluding the SF, in the entire electoral history of Pahang state elections, the only non-Malay opposition party candidate was a UDP candidate in '64. Accepting the Alliance and PMIP as the two major parties in Pahang, all the multicandidate races experienced by the state were attributable either to SF or independent candidates. The latter have been almost as active in Pahang as in Negri Sembilan.

Nine independents stood for election in Pahang state in 1959. Their total share of the vote was 6.3 percent; 17.6 percent per constituency contested. In 1964, eight independents received 3.9 percent of the statewide vote and averaged 12.3 percent in contested constituencies. Independent candidates had an even greater impact in 1969 than in the two earlier elections, reflecting in part the heightened anti-Alliance vote and in part the unfilled vacuum left

by the SF boycott. In three state races independents, winning in one constituency and obtaining a fair share (38.7 and 48.2 percent) of the vote in the other two, provided the Alliance's sole opposition. Grouped as a bloc, the 13.7 percent of their state-wide vote placed independents third, behind the Alliance and the PMIP, in the number of votes received at the state level in Pahang. In terms of the average vote per contested constituency, the 34.5 percent figure for the independents put them second only to the Alliance.

Independent candidates caused, as it were, three of the multiparty state contests in Pahang in 1969; if no independents had stood, the number of such contests would have been nine instead of twelve. (Six multiparty contests were attributable to independents in the 1959 state elections in Pahang and four in 1964.) The major cause in 1969 of multicandidate races in Pahang was the PR -- only one of its eleven candidates faced the Alliance in a straight race. Thus the election pact had no discernable effect on the number of multiparty state contests in Pahang. These were attributable, as in '59 or '64, either to independents or to opposition parties not part of the pact. Nor is there any instance in Pahang where

an Alliance assembly victory can be accounted for by a split, as it were, in the non-Malay opposition vote -- the situation the electoral pact aimed to prevent. Only one of the Alliance's twenty-three victories in 1959 occurred with less than 50 percent of the vote cast. In Mentekab, the Alliance received 48.8 percent of the vote against the PMIP (20.7 percent) and the SF (30.5 percent), but won the seat in 1964 and in 1969 with 52.3 and 57.0 percent of the vote respectively.

In 1969 the Alliance triumphed in two state seats with less than 50 percent of the vote, Benus and Chenor. The vote was as follows: Alliance, 48.9 percent; SF, 28.3 percent, UDP, 14.1 percent; and Independent, 8.6 percent. Thus the Alliance could theoretically have lost Benus in a straight race, although that seemed highly unlikely.¹² In fact, however, the Alliance lost Benus in 1969 in a straight race against an independent candidate. Even more suggestive, the Alliance vote in Benus increased over 1964 to 49.9 percent while its overall vote at the state level in Pahang declined from 68.4 to 55.1 percent.

The Alliance's percentage of the vote also increased in Chenor between the '64 and '69 elections.

The 1964 breakdown was: Alliance, 49.4 percent; PMIP; 23.5 percent; Independent, 15.7 percent; and SP, 11.5 percent. In 1969, facing PMIP and PR candidates, the Alliance was returned to power in Chenor with 52.3 percent of the vote. Thus in the two Pahang state constituencies where an Alliance victory in 1964 might have been linked to the absence of an election pact (actually, there were no such cases, excluding the SP as a potential pact participant) 1969 brought no essential change. The Alliance won two seats in 1969 by less than 50 percent of the vote, but in neither was more than one non-Malay opposition party involved.

At the parliamentary level the Alliance won every Pahang seat in 1964, with comfortable majorities ranging from 11.5 to 37.4 percent. In no constituency could the Alliance victory be attributed to a divided opposition vote. Indeed, the SP was the only non-Malay opposition party to compete in 1959 and 1964. In 1969, the PMIP and PR were the only two Alliance challengers at the parliamentary level.

The PMIP appears to have been the major beneficiary of the Alliance setback in Pahang. Its percentage of the state vote rose from 8.5 to 16.7 percent between 1964 and 1969. While this gain is

partly accounted for by an increase in FMIP candidates from twelve to fourteen, nonetheless the average vote per candidate obtained by the FMIP went from 16.5 to 25.0 percent. If one sets the 1959 against the 1969 election -- a more meaningful comparison as explained later in this chapter -- one finds the FMIP receiving about one-quarter of the votes in the seats it contested in both elections. It may well be, in other words, that in 1969 the FMIP simply regained its "normal" strength.

The aggregate statistics on the percentage of spoiled votes and voting suggest that the SF boycott appeal had a discernable impact. Thus the percentage voting in state contests declined to 71.4 percent from 78.0 percent and 78.1 percent in 1964 and 1969 respectively. The percentage of spoiled votes increased from 2.4 (1959) to 6.2 (1964) to 7.2 percent (1969). Essentially the same pattern by and large emerges regarding parliamentary elections in Pahang. Voting percentages were 71.0, 77.6, and 72.7 percent respectively, and spoiled votes 1.0, 4.9, and 5.8 percent. These figures are too global, however, to permit inference to be made, with confidence. For example, the fall in the percentage of eligible voters casting a ballot in 1969, might have reflected a natural growth of popular indiffer-

ence compared to 1959, the country's first full-fledged election or 1964, an election held in the midst of Indonesian confrontation. A more refined measure than cross-electoral comparison, or a means for holding constant historical influences, therefore, is an intra-electoral comparison of high and low SF seats as done for other states.

Determining constituencies high in SF support (in relative terms) was not a problem in Pahang. Those contested by the party in 1959 could reasonably be taken as centers of SF support; all seven were among the seventeen seats contested by the SF five years later. Moreover, the party's vote exceeded its average vote per constituency in 1964 in five of the seven; indeed, the SF received its largest vote in these five in 1964. The same is true, mutatis mutandis, at the parliamentary level. Three of the four seats contested by the SF in 1964 had also been contested in 1959; in the fourth, the percentage of the vote garnered by the SF was the least received by it among the four constituencies.

Grouping the state seats in which the SF stood in 1959, then, one finds a 4.5 percent average increase in spoiled votes between that election and 1969. The corresponding figure in those seats in

which the SF did not compete was 5.3 percent.¹³ Nor do the paired rank orderings (Tables 15 and 16) demonstrate a strong relationship between the SF's 1959 vote and changes in spoiled votes between '59 and '69. Although these findings suggest that the SF boycott campaign had little or no effect on the Pahang state elections with respect to spoiled votes and percentage voting, one still cannot lightly dismiss the increase in spoiled votes between 1959 (2.4 percent) and 1969 (7.2 percent). It may be, for example, that a small number of voters (about 4.8 percent) in each constituency heeded the SF's call not to vote. At a minimum, then, the SF boycott had no effect the Pahang state election in 1969; at a maximum, the boycott increased the number of spoiled ballots by 4.8 percent.

A similar analysis at the parliamentary level is precluded because two of the three seats contested by the SF in 1959 were uncontested in 1969. It may be noted, however, that the percentage of rejected votes between the two elections increased from 1.0 to 5.8 percent. On the assumption that SF supporters were overwhelmingly Chinese, the paired rank orderings used the percentage of registered Chinese voters (in relationship to Malay rather than total voters)

TABLE 15

RANK ORDERINGS OF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PAHANG STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Bandar Raub	(41.6%)	Chenor	(+9.6%)	Triang	(-11.4%)
Mentekab	(30.5%)	Triang	(6.6%)	Mentekab	(10.9%)
Triang	(28.7%)	Kuala Semantan	(5.3%)	Benus	(6.9%)
Kuala Semantan	(25.6%)	Ulu Kuantan	(4.9%)	Chenor	(6.1%)
Ulu Kuantan	(24.3%)	Benus	(1.9%)	Bandar Raub	(4.1%)
Benus	(12.5%)	Mentekab	(1.8%)	Ulu Kuantan	(2.8%)
Chenor	(7.4%)	Bandar Raub	(1.5%)	Kuala Semantan	(2.6%)

TABLE 16

RANK ORDERINGS OF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PAHANG STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Kuala Semantan	(44.9%)	Kuala Pahang	(Unc.)	Kuala Pahang	(Unc.)
Ulu Kuantan	(40.2%)	Chenor	(+7.0%)	Dong	(-16.4%)
Bandar Raub	(40.1%)	Jerantut	(5.5%)	Triang	(11.1%)
Mentekab	(34.6%)	Telok Sisek	(5.2%)	Mentekab	(8.2%)
Triang	(34.0%)	Jenderak	(3.9%)	Bandar Raub	(7.9%)
Bandar Bentong	(33.1%)	Sanggang	(3.5%)	Benus	(7.5%)
Tras	(33.9%)	Triang	(2.8%)	Tras	(7.4%)
Sabai	(29.1%)	Ulu Kuantan	(1.7%)	Sabai	(6.9%)
Benus	(28.3%)	Kuala Semantan	(1.0%)	Jerantut	(6.3%)
Jerantut	(21.2%)	Benus	(-1.2%)	Telok Sisek	(6.2%)

TABLE 16 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Cameron High-lands	(18.6%)	Bandar Bentong	(1.7%)	Sanggang	(6.0%)
Telok Sisek	(16.2%)	Bandar Raub	(2.0%)	Chenor	(5.8%)
Dong	(14.8%)	Cameron High-lands	(2.9%)	Ulu Kuantan	(5.1%)
Jenderak	(11.9%)	Sabai	(3.1%)	Cameron High-lands	(4.8%)
Chenor	(11.5%)	Mentekab	(4.9%)	Kuala Semantan	(4.4%)
Sanggang	(8.9%)	Dong	(5.1%)	Jenderak	(3.9%)
Kuala Pahang	(3.3%)	Tras	(5.7%)	Bandar Bentong	(2.3%)

for each Pahang parliamentary constituency. As indicated in Tables 17 and 18, a relationship in the anticipated direction can be discerned.

Turning to voting percentages, there was a decline at the state level in Pahang from 78.1 to 71.4 percent between the 1959 and 1969 elections (the 1964 figure was 78.0 percent). The vote in the seven, as it were, SF constituencies declined an average of 6.4 percent compared to slightly under 5.4 percent in the others which included the only two state constituencies in which the percentage voting increased between the two elections. On the other hand, the rank orderings (Tables 15 and 16) reveal no clear-cut relationship. At the parliamentary level, the SF boycott had a slight impact at best in terms of the analysis undertaken here. The overall percentage of the vote decreased from 72.7 percent in 1959 to 71.0 percent in 1969; however, there was actually a small increase (from 71.5 to 71.7 percent) in the one seat where the SF stood in '59 and which witnessed a contest ten years later. Finally, similar breakdowns to those for the state level show no discernable relationship between the proportion of registered Chinese voters in the six parliamentary constituencies and changes in voting percentages (Tables 17 and 18).

TABLE 17

RANK ORDERINGS OF PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED CHINESE VOTERS, SPOILED
VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE VOTING
PAHANG PARLIAMENT
1959 ELECTION

CHINESE REGISTERED VOTERS AS PERCENTAGE OF MALAY REGISTERED VOTERS		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Bentong	(63.5%)	Bentong	(Unc.)	Raub	(Unc.)
Raub	(50.4%)	Raub	(Unc.)	Bentong	(Unc.)
Kuantan	(40.8%)	Lipis	(+6.6%)	Pekan	(-3.3%)
Lipis	(29.0%)	Temerloh	(5.9%)	Kuantan	(2.0%)
Temerloh	(24.9%)	Kuantan	(4.0%)	Lipis	(.4%)
Pekan	(6.7%)	Pekan	(2.0%)	Temerloh	(+ .2%)

TABLE 18

RANK ORDERINGS OF PERCENTAGE OF REGISTERED CHINESE VOTERS, SPOILED
VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE VOTING
PAHANG PARLIAMENT
1964 ELECTION

CHINESE REGISTERED VOTERS AS PERCENTAGE OF MALAY REGISTERED VOTERS		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTERS BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Bentong	(63.5%)	Bentong	(Unc.)	Bentong	(Unc.)
Raub	(50.4%)	Raub	(Unc.)	Raub	(Unc.)
Kuantan	(40.8%)	Lipis	(+2.1%)	Temerloh	(-6.5%)
Lipis	(29.0%)	Temerloh	(1.9%)	Pekan	(5.4%)
Temerloh	(24.9%)	Kuantan	(- .5%)	Kuantan	(4.8%)
Pekan	(6.7%)	Pekan	(1.3%)	Lipis	(3.8%)

Penang

Penang in 1969 gained the distinction of becoming the first West Coast state to fall to the opposition. The Alliance won four of the twenty-four assembly seats against the seventeen it gained in 1959 and the eighteen in 1964. Votewise the Alliance's fortunes declined in every state and parliamentary constituency with the exception of the assembly seat of Tanjong Selatan where the Alliance vote held steady at 15 percent of the total. The Alliance slim majority, 51.1 percent, of the Assembly vote in 1959 fell to 47.2 percent in 1964 and 34.6 in 1969.

The 1969 Penang election saw ten multiparty state races compared to twenty-two such contests in 1964 and sixteen in 1959. But the consummatory achievement of the electoral pact in predominantly Chinese Penang had to be that the leading non-Malay opposition parties, the DAP and MPM, did not come into direct rivalry. The electoral agreement did appear to break down in three constituencies in which both the MPM and PPP challenged the Alliance. However, no outcomes were affected since the MPM gained almost 80 percent of the vote in each constituency while the PPP's candidates received an insignificant 3 percent or so. In the 1964 assembly election, rivalry between the SF and UDP pos-

sibly added as many as five state seats to the Alliance columns.¹⁴ The SP's impressive 32.1 percent of the '64 vote translated, as it were, into only two seats while in '59 the SP, with 29.4 percent of the vote, won seven seats. The major cause of this disparity is that the UDP (formed in '62) received 17.4 percent of the Penang assembly vote in 1964 and won four seats.¹⁵

Non-Malay opposition parties triumphed in straight contests with the Alliance in ten seats in 1969, won by the latter in multiparty races in 1964. However, the magnitude of the decline in Alliance support -- the Alliance received under one-third of the vote in thirteen constituencies (including seven straight contests) -- leads to the conclusion that the major fruit of the opposition pact in Penang was not that it assured an opposition victory per se but that it afforded the MPM a decisive majority. Unrestrained competition would probably have necessitated an opposition governing coalition if not a united front government of all Penang parties, including the Alliance.

As for the PMIP's role in the 1969 election in Penang, the brunt of the evidence militates against the likelihood of Malay and non-Malay oppositionist cooperation. However, the PMIP did make a much im-

proved showing in 1969 with its five state candidates obtaining an average vote of 32.6 percent; in 1964, by contrast, four PMIP candidates gained an average vote of 13.5 percent. The PMIP also gained ground votewise vis-a-vis the Alliance in parliamentary contests, albeit the Muslim party nominated only two candidates in 1969 compared to three in 1964 and five in 1959. There is no ground in either constituency to assume a tacit alliance between the PMIP and other opposition parties; the former's decision to compete is fully justified by the racial composition and prior history of the two constituencies.

One would expect, by virtue of the SP's impressive vote in Penang, that that state would provide strong evidence concerning the effects of the SP boycott. Yet even when only those seats (seven in all) in which the SP's portion of the vote in either election surpassed 45 percent are categorized as high SP seats, the findings are, strikingly, indeterminate. Rejected votes increased more in low (4.3 percent) than in high (3.1 percent) SP seats. Voting percentages increased in both categories although, as hypothesized, somewhat less in the "high" group (3.1 as against 3.7 percent). Nor do the rank orderings reveal any significant patterning. (Tables

19 and 20).

The Alliance won two of Penang's eight parliamentary seats in 1969 (one uncontested), both of which it had also won in 1959 in the process of winning five seats and in 1964 when it gained six. Overall the Alliance share of the parliamentary vote was, respectively, 44.0, 47.3, and 36.3 percent. Former Alliance supporters thus would appear to have shifted to both wings of the opposition in 1969. The non-Malay opposition's (DAP and MPM) 55.7 percent of the vote represented a 5 percent gain over 1964 (based on the combined SF, UDP, and PAP vote) and ten percent over 1959. Then, too, the MPM was successful in all five seats it contested, obtaining an average vote of 64.7 percent. The sole DAP candidate did almost as well, winning 61 percent of the vote. In one parliamentary constituency, Tajong, the opposition pact "failed," but as indicated by the vote -- MPM, 78.9 percent; Alliance, 18 percent; PPP, 3.1 percent -- the opposition victory was not thereby jeopardized.

Against their perfect record (in winning all of the constituencies they contested) in the 1969 Penang parliamentary election, non-Malay opposition parties went two for fifteen in '64 and three for nine in

TABLE 19

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PENANG STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Tanjong Selatan	(71.9%)	Permatang Pauh (+7.9%)	Tanjong Seiatan (-1.3%)
Jelutong	(60.1%)	Bukit Mertajam (6.2%)	Permatang Pauh (1.1%)
Sungei Pinang	(56.1%)	Jelutong (5.7%)	Nibong Tebal (.1%)
Kota	(56.0%)	Alma (4.9%)	Tanjong Bungah (+ .4%)
Tanjong Tengah	(48.7%)	Tanjong Selatan (4.6%)	Glugor (+1.7%)
Ayer Itam	(48.5%)	Tanjong Bungah (4.4%)	Jelutong (2.1%)
Tanjong Utara	(48.1%)	Glugor (4.3%)	Tanjong Utara (2.4%)
Tanjong Barat	(41.7%)	Balik Pulau (4.3%)	Alma (2.4%)
Glugor	(40.6%)	Sungei Bakap (4.2%)	Kota (2.8%)

TABLE 19 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Sungei Bakap	(34.8%)	Nibong Tebal	(4.2%)	Sungei Bakap	(3.3%)
Nibong Tebal	(32.1%)	Sungei Pinang	(3.1%)	Sungei Pinang	(4.4%)
Alma	(30.2%)	Tanjong Utara	(2.8%)	Ayer Itam	(5.0%)
Bukit Mertajam	(29.7%)	Tanjong Barat	(2.1%)	Tanjong Barat	(5.5%)
Balik Pulau	(23.9%)	Ayer Itam	(2.0%)	Balik Pulau	(6.0%)
Tanjong Bungah	(18.6%)	Tanjong Tengah	(2.0%)	Tanjong Tengah	(6.5%)
Permatang Pauh	(9.7%)	Kota	(1.3%)	Bagan Ajam	(6.7%)
Butterworth	(4.2%)	Bagan Ajam	(.7%)	Bukit Mertajam	(7.5%)
Bagan Ajam	(3.6%)	Butterworth	(-.8%)	Butterworth	(10.2%)

TABLE 20

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PENANG STATE
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Tanjong Selatan	(51.9%)	Permatang Pauh (+7.5%)	Tanjong Selatan (-9.9%)
Jelutong	(46.7%)	Bukit Mertajam (4.8%)	Glubor (9.9%)
Ayer Itam	(41.7%)	Jelutong (4.4%)	Tanjong Utara (9.8%)
Nibong Tebal	(41.3%)	Tasek Glugor (4.3%)	Tanjong Bungah (9.3%)
Butterworth	(39.7%)	Balik Pulau (3.9%)	Sungei Pinang (8.8%)
Balik Pulau	(39.7%)	Bayan Lepas (3.9%)	Ayer Itam (8.7%)
Glugor	(39.4%)	Tanjong Selatan (3.8%)	Jelutong (8.1%)
Bagan Ajam	(38.9%)	Tanjong Bungah (3.6%)	Kota (7.3%)
Sungei Bakap	(36.3%)	Glugor (3.5%)	Permatang Pauh (6.8%)

TABLE 20 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Sungei Pinang (35.7%)	Alma (3.2%)	Alma (6.1%)
Tanjong Tengah (34.4%)	Nibong Tebal (2.3%)	Nibong Tebal (5.5%)
Tanjong Bungah (32.9%)	Kepala Batas (2.3%)	Bukit Mertajam (5.4%)
Kota (32.2%)	Kelawei (2.1%)	Tanjong Barat (5.1%)
Bukit Mertajam (31.2%)	Tanjong Barat (2.0%)	Sungei Bakap (5.0%)
Tanjong Utara (30.7%)	Sungei Pinang (1.9%)	Bayan Lepas (4.9%)
Tanjong Barat (30.4%)	Ayer Itam (1.8%)	Kelawei (4.7%)
Alma (27.5%)	Muda (1.8%)	Balik Pulau (4.0%)
Kelawei (24.2%)	Sungei Bakap (1.7%)	Dhoby Ghaut (3.6%)
Dhoby Ghaut (24.2%)	Tanjong Utara (1.2%)	Tasek Glugor (3.6%)
Permatang Pauh (22.8%)	Dhoby Ghaut (1.2%)	Kepala Batas (3.3%)

TABLE 20 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Bayan Lepas (22.2%)	Kota (.8%)	Tanjong Tengah (3.2%)
Tasek Glugor (22.2%)	Bagan Ajam (.5%)	Muda (2.0%)
Muda (8.2%)	Butterworth (-1.1%)	Butterworth (1.9%)
Kepala Batas (6.4%)	Tanjong Tengah (2.2%)	Bagan Ajam (1.0%)

'59. This is not, however, tantamount to positing a one-to-one relationship between the DAP/PPP/MPM pact and the opposition's improved showing. Dato Keramat (MPM, 75.4 percent; Alliance, 24.6 percent) as well as Tanjong would surely have fallen to the opposition even with another candidate in the fray. Tanjong had, in fact, been won by the DAP in 1964 with 46 percent of the vote against the SF (30 percent), the Alliance (22 percent), and the PAP (3 percent); Dato Keramat was won by the SF with 39 percent of the vote to the Alliance's 30 percent and the UDP's 32 percent.

In two of Penang's eight parliamentary constituencies, as indicated, while doubtlessly contributing to the opposition's impressive margin of victory, the pact almost certainly did not alter the outcome that would have eventuated in its absence. A third parliamentary seat, Bagan, was uncontested and thus won by the Alliance on nomination day. The second Alliance win came in a straight race against the FMIP in Seberang Utara (the only Penang parliamentary constituency with a Malay majority), although the Alliance vote plummeted to 55 percent from 73.8 percent in 1959 and 67.7 percent in 1964. The opposition pact may conceivably have accounted for the

Alliance's defeat in the four remaining parliamentary constituencies, however. The Alliance might have squeaked out narrow victories in these seats had more than one opposition candidate contested.

At the parliamentary level, the two constituencies in which the SF achieved its highest percentage of the vote, avoiding overlap between the '59 and '64 elections, were considered as high SF seats, thus providing two groups of four constituencies each for comparison. The findings here were as inconclusive -- and approximately of the same magnitude -- as those at the state level. Rejected votes between '59 and '69 increased more in the low (5.7 percent) than in the high (3.9 percent) SF seats while the percentage voting increased more in the low SF seats than in the high SF seats (4.6 to 3.1 percent). With one exception -- the changes in percentage voting between '64 and '69 -- the paired rank orderings show no distinct variation from, as it were, randomness. (Tables 21 and 22).

Perak

The Alliance not only lost its firm control of the Perak government in the 1969 election, it actually failed to achieve a majority in the state assembly,

TABLE 21

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PENANG PARLIAMENT
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Dato Keramat (66.3%)	Seberang Tengah (+6.8%)	Seberang Tengah (- .5%)
Tanjong (57.0%)	Penang Selatan (4.8%)	Seberang Selatan (+ .2%)
Penang Utara (45.1%)	Dato Keramat (3.8%)	Penang Selatan (3.3%)
Penang Selatan (42.8%)	Penang Utara (3.8%)	Dato Keramat (5.0%)
Seberang Selatan (40.7%)	Seberang Selatan (3.7%)	Tanjong (5.4%)
Seberang Tengah (39.2%)	Tanjong (2.9%)	Penang Utara (7.4%)

TABLE 22

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PENANG PARLIAMENT
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Dato Keramat	(38.8%)	Seberang Utara	(+5.6%)	Penang Selatan	(-8.3%)
Bagan	(37.8%)	Bagan	(Unc.)	Bagan	(Unc.)
Penang Selatan	(37.6%)	Seberang Tengah	(4.8%)	Dato Keramat	(8.1%)
Seberang Selatan	(36.7%)	Penang Utara	(2.8%)	Penang Utara	(6.9%)
Penang Utara	(31.7%)	Penang Selatan	(2.1%)	Tanjong	(6.9%)
Tanjong	(30.0%)	Dato Keramat	(1.9%)	Seberang Tengah	(6.1%)
Seberang Tengah	(26.4%)	Tanjong	(1.8%)	Seberang Selatan	(5.2%)
Seberang Utara	(14.4%)	Seberang Selatan	(.6%)	Seberang Utara	(2.9%)

gaining nineteen seats while twenty-one fell to the opposition: PPP, twelve; DAP, six; MPM, two; and PMIP, one. With the PMIP assemblyman likely to vote with the Alliance, the election left the future of the Perak government uncertain and portended political stalemate. Clearly the election represented a major setback for the Alliance which had won thirty-one state seats in the 1959 election (eight seats went to the PPP) and thirty-five seats in 1954 (with five seats going to the PPP). Attendant on this Alliance loss of 50 percent or so in assembly seats between 1959 and 1969 was an approximate drop in its vote of about 20 percent (from 54.7 to 43.8 percent).

On its face the PPP's selection of constituencies to contest in the 1969 Perak state elections was more judicious than in past elections. The PPP won twelve of the thirteen seats (or approximately 92 percent) in which it nominated candidates; the equivalent figures for the 1959 and 1964 elections were eight of twenty four (33 percent) and five of nineteen (26 percent) respectively. To put this point differently, while the percentage of the vote received by the PPP statewide actually declined somewhat (it was 20.3 percent in 1969; 20.7 in 1964; and

24.3 in 1959), the PPP's average vote per constituency rose dramatically from 30.3 percent in 1959 to 39.2 percent in 1964 to 62.6 percent in 1969.

The PPP in 1969 concentrated on its proven center of strength in and near Ipoh, the state capital: all of the party's 1959 and 1964 victories had been in that area. While the PPP's allocation of candidates made sense in its own right, the DAP/PPP/MPM pact appeared to have been faultlessly implemented in Perak -- none of the parties stood in the same constituencies -- and may have contributed to the PPP's concentrated effort. Thus five of the eight seats contested by the DAP and MPM in 1969 had been unsuccessfully contested by the PPP in 1964, and PPP candidates went down to defeat in seven of the eight in 1959.

The number of multicandidate races in the three Perak assembly elections were, respectively twenty-three, twenty nine, and thirteen. Surprisingly little if any of this decline can be attributed to the electoral pact given the assumption that the SF would not have participated in the pact. Treating the SF as the third party after the Alliance and the FMIP, the left-wing party was responsible for four of the multicandidate state races in 1959, and for

fourteen in 1964. The rest were caused by the PPP, the UDP, or independents. However, there was no case in which the parties (or their progenitors) to the 1969 pact competed against each other in Perak in '59 or '64. The lineup in the latter election is of particular interest.

In 1964 the UDP, which nominated fourteen assembly candidates, did not once face the PPP. With nineteen PPP candidates, the absence of direct clashes may simply have been fortuitous but one cannot dismiss the possibility of a pre-electoral agreement between the PPP and UDP (and perhaps the PAP as well)¹⁶ in 1964 akin to the 1969 pact. In any event, while the latter may have prevented destructive competition among non-Malay opposition parties, it cannot be credited with overcoming past internecine electoral warfare. Moreover, in four of the straight contests in 1969, non-Malay opposition party candidates received over two-thirds of the vote so that the Alliance would have still lost these seats if another opposition candidate contested in each.

A brief electoral history of the three Perak assembly constituencies, Pengkalan Bharu, Tanjong Tualang, and Batak Rabbit, won by the Alliance in

1959 with under 50 percent of the vote can shed additional light on the impact of the electoral agreement in Perak. In Pengkalan Bharu the Alliance obtained 47.7 percent of the vote in 1959, the PMIP 24 percent, and an independent candidate 24.9 percent. The Alliance again won the seat in 1964 in a three-way race against the PMIP and UDP with, unlike in 1959, an absolute majority: Alliance, 56.8 percent; PMIP, 23 percent; and UDP, 20.2 percent. Finally, in 1969 the Alliance bested the PMIP in Pengkalan Bharu 56.3 to 43.7 percent. It is clear, therefore, that the electoral pact played no part in the Pengkalan Bharu outcome.

The Alliance won in Tanjong Tualang in 1959, narrowly beating out the PPP, by 46 to 44 percent of the vote. The PMIP and SF also contested, although, assuming that the former's 6.2 percent of the vote would have gone to the Alliance and the latter's 3.8 percent to the PPP, a straight race between the Alliance and PPP would not have altered the result. This assumption received corroboration in 1964. While the Alliance's overall vote remained essentially unchanged, its vote in Tanjong Tualang increased by 6.2 percent (to 52.6 percent) or by about the same amount as the PMIP's 1959 vote,

the latter not having a candidate in 1964. Then, too, the combined vote of the Alliance's two 1964 challengers, the PPP (36.8 percent) and the SF (10.6 percent) approximated the total vote obtained by these parties in the 1959 election, albeit divided differently.

A rather stable non-Malay opposition vote combined with the Alliance's general falloff of support in Perak state in 1969 is a more tenable explanation for the Alliance's loss of the Tanjong Tualang seat in the 1969 election (the DAP won the seat with 50.4 percent of the vote; the Alliance collected 44.9 percent; and the PMIP 4.7 percent of the votes) than the opposition pact. To be sure, if a PPP or MPM candidate stood in the constituency sufficient votes may have been drawn from the DAP candidate to throw the election to the Alliance. The unanswerable question, on the basis of the electoral statistics per se, is whether the fact that the DAP was the only non-Malay based opposition party facing the Alliance in the Tanjong Tualang in 1969 was a function of the DAP/PPP/MPM agreement. One's initial inclination toward such a conclusion is greatly dampened by the essentially same situation found in the 1964 election in Tanjong Tualang without (openly anyway) an elec-

toral pact.

In Batak Rabbit -- the third Perak assembly seat which fell to the Alliance with less than 50 percent of the vote in 1959 -- the pattern is remarkably similar to that found in Tanjong Tualang: the only difference in the lineup of candidates between the two constituencies is the presence of an independent candidate in Batak Rabbit in the 1959 election. Thus rather than repeat the Tanjong analysis, it will suffice simply to present a tabular (Table 23) breakdown of the Batak Rabbit results.

TABLE 23

BATAK RABBIT
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTY

	ALL	PMIP	SF	PPP	DAP	IND
1959 Election	42.0	14.7	3.4	32.2		7.8
1964 Election	52.8		15.7	31.5		
1969 Election	41.8	9.6			48.6	

The Alliance won four seats in the 1964 election with under 50 percent of the vote: Kuala Kurau, Chemor, Kuala Dipang, and Pasir Bedamar. As all four were won by non-Malay opposition parties in 1969, three in straight contests with the Alliance, each will be con-

sidered in turn given the present objective of obtaining a deeper understanding of the electoral pact's payoff in Perak or, perhaps more accurately, of the impossibility of doing so with precision.

Over two-thirds of Kuala Kurau's registered voters are Malay. The Alliance won the seat handily in 1959 over the PMIP, 58.2 to 41.8 percent. In 1964 the Alliance vote declined to 48.6 percent in a three-way contest with the PMIP (35.6 percent) and the SF (15.8 percent). Most of the Alliance loss between 1959 and 1964 reflected, it seems reasonable to assume, a shift of Chinese voters to the SF, an option unavailable in 1959. In 1969, Kuala Kurau witnessed a return to 1959 in the sense that there was another straight race between the Alliance and PMIP. The Alliance kept control by a narrow margin, 50.3 to 49.7 percent. On their face these figures suggest the anomalous conclusion that the bulk of the SF's 1964 supporters transferred their votes to the PMIP. However, 38.8 percent is a more apt figure in determining the "normal" Alliance vote -- that is, the Alliance's 1964 vote of 48.6 percent minus the 10.8 percent average loss per constituency -- than the 1964 vote per se. With these terms of reference, one finds statistical corroboration for the logical

assumption that the Kuala Kurau 1969 result reflected the convergence of two forces, namely, the return of Chinese voters to the Alliance and the loss of (probably a smaller number of) Malay voters to the PMIP.

Perhaps the simple inference one can confidently make about the effect of the electoral pact in Kuala Kurau is that it may have assured the Alliance victory. The argument starts with the premise that a PPP, DAP, or MPM candidate would have attracted enough votes from the Alliance to assure a PMIP victory in the constituency. Now, although a decision by a non-Malay opposition party to participate in Kuala Kurau was not logical in terms of the history or ethnic composition of the constituency, it may be hypothesized that the electoral pact necessitated a rationality with respect to the distribution of candidates which would not otherwise have obtained. In this respect, a striking feature of the 1969 election results in Perak is the high proportion of seats won to seats contested by the parties to the pact: twelve of thirteen by the PPP, six of eight by the DAP, and two of two by the MPM.

Won by the Alliance with 45.8 percent of the vote in 1964, the PPP victory in Chemor in 1969 can be considered as a return to "normalcy." The

point can be most economically made in tabular form (Table 24).

TABLE 24

CHEMOR
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTY

	ALL	SF	PPP	IND
1959 Election	25.7	14.7	43.9	15.7
1964 Election	45.8	15.8	38.4	
1969 Election	41.7		58.3	

As can be seen from Table 24, the Alliance's support in Chemor (a constituency where Malay voters outnumber non-Malay voters by about a two to one margin) was consistently below average relative to the party's statewide vote. Yet the Alliance might have managed a victory in 1969 had the DAP or MPM contested the seat in addition to the PPP. One thus cannot categorically rule out the possibility that the straight race and hence the opposition victory in Chemor was a function of the electoral pact.

The electoral histories of Kuala Dipang and Pasir Bedamar are sufficiently similar to Chemor's (unlike the latter, however, the Alliance was returned in both constituencies in the 1959 election) that commentary would be redundant and the results

may speak for themselves (Tables 25 and 26).

TABLE 25
KUALA DIPANG
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTY

	ALL	PMIP	DAP	SF	PPP
1959 Election	50.8	5.4		3.2	40.6
1964 Election	44.5			17.8	37.7
1969 Election	32.1	5.3	62.6		

TABLE 26
PASIR BEDAJAR

	ALL	SF	PPP
1959 Election	75.9		24.1
1964 Election	46.6	13.4	40.1
1969 Election	34.6		65.4

Despite winning just one seat, the PMIP achieved a marked success in Perak in 1969, vis-a-vis its showing in earlier elections. There were twenty-nine PMIP candidates in 1969, nine more than in 1964 but the same number as in 1959. Over the three elections, the PMIP's percentage of the vote was, respectively, 15.3, 11.4, and 29.0 percent of the vote; its average vote per contested constituency was 23.2, 24.7, and 29.0 percent. Taking the latter figures as providing

the best single indicator of support, the FMIP has gradually increased its following in Perak, and should not be considered as a peripheral actor in Perak elections, important only insofar as its participation may have affected the fortunes of other parties. In fact, the FMIP's major role in Perak is the primary obstacle in determining the extent to which it may have tacitly cooperated with the non-Malay opposition against the Alliance.

Twenty-two of the twenty-nine state constituencies contested by the FMIP in the 1969 Perak elections were over 50 percent Malay so that the FMIP could realistically nourish hopes of victory. In 1959, the FMIP contested in all twenty-two Malay majority constituencies while in 1964 nineteen of the twenty seats contested by the FMIP fell in that category. Obviously, then, the pertinent universe in exploring the FMIP's role vis-a-vis the other opposition parties in 1969 are the seven constituencies in which the FMIP could not expect success; the percentage of registered Malay voters in these constituencies were, in ascending order, 11.9, 15.5, 23.6, 24.7, 31.8, 37.1, and 38.9 percent respectively. It should be pointed out, however, that in 1959, when the FMIP could be less selective in deciding in which constituencies to

contest, five of these constituencies were also contested. Still one must seriously entertain the possibility that the PMIP nominated candidates in these seven predominantly non-Malay constituencies to weaken the Alliance and thus aid and abet, in effect, the non-Malay opposition. Even accepting such motivation for argument's sake, however, only in Batak Rabbit (DAP, 48.6; ALL, 41.8; PMIP, 9.6) could the PMIP's presence have possibly been responsible for an opposition victory.

The first step in determining for Perak what has been termed in this chapter high SF seats was to list those seats contested by the SF in both 1959 and 1964. To this group was added seats contested by the SF in only one election provided its vote exceeded the party's constituency average. Using this classificatory scheme, the average percentage increase in spoiled votes in "SF constituencies" (thirteen in all) was 4.7 percent; it was 4.9 percent in the twenty-seven other constituencies. Although the comparison does not indicate a relationship between SF support and increased spoiled votes, it may be that the measure used for the former variable was too gross, as it were, to capture the small magnitude of the differences involved. Tables 27 and

28 insofar as they relate to the rank orderings of spoiled votes buttress that possibility.

Calculations which treated the change in voting percentages as dependent variables revealed broad similarities (in indeterminateness, inter alia) to the pattern with respect to spoiled votes. Here, too, the relationship was the opposite of that anticipated and, indeed, much more so: between the '59 and '69 elections the percentage voting increased more than twice as much in constituencies deemed high in SF support (5.4 percent) than in the others (2.6 percent). Seven constituencies in the latter group actually had a decline in percentage voting against only one (and that by .3 percent) among the constituencies high on SF support. The rank order comparisons (Tables 27 and 28) are indecisive but, impressionistically speaking, seem to indicate a positive relationship between the two variables.

Parliamentarywise the Alliance was successful in fifteen of the twenty parliamentary constituencies in 1959; in seventeen in 1964; and nine in 1969. If less than at the state level, the decline in the Alliance vote was also substantial: 51.8 percent in '59; 55.6 in '64; and 43.2 in '69. Most of the Alliance's loss was the gain of the non-Malay opposi-

TABLE 27

RANK ORDERINGS OF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PERAK STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Senggang	(20.4%)	Padang Rengas	(+7.1%)	Blanja	(-2.9%)
Padang Rengas	(17.9%)	Senggang	(6.9%)	Padang Rengas	(.3%)
Karai	(17.5%)	Taiping	(5.7%)	Slim	(+ .5%)
Slim	(16.3%)	Blanja	(5.6%)	Senggang	(.8%)
Matang	(16.2%)	Matang	(5.5%)	Gopeng	(1.2%)
Chemor	(14.7%)	Larut	(5.2%)	Batak Rabbit	(1.6%)
Taiping	(12.3%)	Gopeng	(4.7%)	Kuala Dipang	(2.3%)
Larut	(9.3%)	Karai	(4.2%)	Chemor	(3.4%)
Gopeng	(6.6%)	Chemor	(3.9%)	Lenggong	(5.6%)

TABLE 27 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Lenggong	(6.3%)	Batak Rabbit (3.9%)	Tanjong Tualang (6.4%)
Tajong Tualang	(3.8%)	Lenggong (3.4%)	Larut (7.2%)
Batak Rabbit	(3.4%)	Tanjong Tualang (3.2%)	Karai (7.9%)
Kuala Dipang	(3.2%)	Kuala Dipang (2.7%)	Taiping (12.8%)
Blanja	(2.7%)	Slim (2.1%)	Matang (12.9%)

TABLE 28

RANK ORDERINGS OF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PERAK STATE
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Slim	(29.0%)	Padang Rengas	(+5.5%)	Padang Bedamar	(-12.4%)
Grik	(23.1%)	Senggang	(4.3%)	Slim	(10.8%)
Gopeng	(22.9%)	Bidor	(4.0%)	Batak Rabbit	(9.9%)
Senggang	(18.7%)	Taiping	(3.7%)	Taiping	(9.6%)
Kuala Dipang	(17.8%)	Grik	(3.6%)	Padang Rengas	(8.6%)
Kuala Kurau	(15.8%)	Began Serai	(3.5%)	Bidor	(8.2%)
Chemor	(15.8%)	Matang	(2.9%)	Senggang	(7.6%)
Batak Rabbit	(15.7%)	Chemor	(2.8%)	Pasir Puteh	(7.5%)
Taiping	(14.4%)	Kuala Kurau	(2.7%)	Lenggong	(6.7%)

TABLE 28 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE	CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Padang Bedamar (13.4%)	Batak Rabbit (2.6%)	Chemor (6.5%)
Bidor (12.7%)	Padang Bedamar (2.4%)	Jalong (6.4%)
Lenggong (12.0%)	Lenggong (2.4%)	Gopeng (5.5%)
Bagan Serai (11.7%)	Kuala Dipang (1.6%)	Kuala Dipang (5.5%)
Padang Rengas (11.1%)	Jalong (1.5%)	Kuala Kurau (5.4%)
Tajong Tualang (10.6%)	Pasir Puteh (1.5%)	Farit Buntar (5.4%)
Jalong (10.4%)	Tanjong Tualang (1.1%)	Matang (5.0%)
Matang (10.0%)	Slim (1.0%)	Tanjong Tualang (4.4%)
Pasir Puteh (9.2%)	Pekan Lama (1.0%)	Grik (4.0%)
Pekan Lama (8.9%)	Parit Buntar (.9%)	Bagan Serai (3.6%)
Parit Buntar (6.5%)	Gopeng (-11.8%)	Parit Buntar (2.4%)

tion. The parties to the opposition pact won ten seats among them.¹⁷ Again the ratio of seats won to seats contested by the non-Malay opposition is striking. The DAP won five of six parliamentary races, the PPP four of five; and the MPM one for one.

The inroads by the non-Malay opposition were even more impressive than indicated by the foregoing. Thus the two seats lost were by margins of 1 and .3 percent. With the same percentage of the overall parliamentary vote in both 1964 and 1969, the PPP's vote per constituency contested rose from 41.5 to 62.3 percent. In fact, on this measure all three non-Malay opposition parties surpassed the Alliance in 1969, the first time the latter had not topped the list in average vote per contested constituency in Perak parliamentary elections. By contrast, the ratio of seats won to seats contested by the non-Malay opposition was three in twenty-five (12 percent) in 1959 and four in seventeen (23.5 percent) in 1964 -- rather less impressive than the ten for twelve (83.3 percent) record in 1969.

The extent to which the high opposition candidate win ratio may have been a function of the election pact has been considered above. As at the state level, the pact may have prevented undesirable (from the DAP/PPP/MPM point of view) opposition confrontations

in the 1969 parliamentary election but cannot be as credited for overcoming such dysfunctional clashes in earlier elections. The problem could not have risen in 1959 because the PPP was the only member of the pact to nominate parliamentary candidates. The SF challenged the PPP in the three urban, heavily Chinese constituencies of Ipoh, Menglembu, and Ulu Kinta. But this was the PPP heartland -- especially Ipoh and Menglembu represented by the Scenivasagam brothers, the party's foremost leaders -- and its margins of victory in the three constituencies assured that the SF could not have changed the outcome. Undaunted, the SF mounted the same challenge in the 1964 election which combined with the across-the-board Alliance gains, broke the weak link in the PPP chain as Ulu Kinta fell to the Alliance. Still, the Ulu Kinta results -- Alliance, 46.3; PPP, 40.0; and SF 13.7 -- leads to the conclusion that the SF in all probability assured the Alliance victory. On the other hand, the UDP which can be considered part of the electoral pact in that it was absorbed by the MPM did not contest against a single PPP parliamentary candidate in 1964 despite the fact that only four of the twenty constituencies were contested by neither the PPP nor the UDP, additional corroboration of a

possible 1964 electoral understanding between the PPP and UDP (and, possibly, PAP) in Perak.

The Alliance won three parliamentary seats with under 50 percent of the vote in 1959: Kuala Kangsar, Sitiawan, and Kampar. The Kuala Kangsar vote divided as follows: Alliance, 44.7; PMIP, 29.9; and SF, 25.4. On the basis of the overall state voting, it seems certain that the Alliance would have triumphed easily in a straight race with either the PMIP or SF, an assumption borne out in 1969 when the Alliance handily defeated the PMIP in Kuala Kangsar in the absence of third party involvement. The Alliance also won the seat in 1964, obtaining 50.5 percent of the vote in an exceedingly fragmented field, including as it did PMIP, SF, UDP, and Independent candidates.

The Alliance's fortunes in Sitiawan over the years cannot be confidently ascribed to the presence or absence of an opposition pact, although that possibility must be more seriously entertained than in Kuala Kangsar because Sitiawan ended up in the opposition columns in 1969. Actually, the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from Sitiawan's electoral history is that the DAP either enjoyed intrinsically greater popularity than any other non-Malay opposition party or found itself riding the crest of an opposition wave. But the reader is invited to make

his own interpretation.

TABLE 29

SITIAWAN
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTY

	ALL	PPP	UDP	DAP	IND
1959 Election	41.7	19.0			39.3
1964 Election	60.4		39.6		
1969 Election	40.7			59.3	

In Kampar, too, the DAP achieved in 1969 the victory that had been denied other non-Malay opposition parties in prior elections. There is little point in speculating on the respective contributions of the anti-Alliance trend, the popularity of the DAP, or the changed party configuration to this outcome. The pertinent data are as follows:

TABLE 30

KAMPAR
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTY

	ALL	PMIP	PPP	DAP	SP
1959 Election	48.6	9.1	42.3		
1964 Election	48.5		35.0		16.5
1969 Election	30.2	9.9		59.9	

There is evidence of the PMIP playing a "spoiler" role at the parliamentary level in Perak in 1969. Four of the fourteen parliamentary seats contested by the PMIP in the election had never been contested by the party in the past and were in predominantly non-Malay areas. Indeed, the latter circumstance surely accounts for the former, given the importance of race as a determinant of Malaysian voting behavior as indicated, for example, by the relationship in the five constituencies between the percentage of Malay voters and the PMIP vote (Table 31).

TABLE 31

PERAK PARLIAMENTARY SEATS CONTESTED BY THE PMIP
FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE 1969 ELECTION

CONSTITUENCY	MALAY REGISTERED VOTERS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REGISTERED VOTERS	PERCENTAGE OF PMIP VOTE IN '69 ELECTION
Bruas	41.0%	19.9%
Tanjong Malim	37.4%	7.7%
Telok Anson	28.7%	6.4%
Batu Gajah	21.6%	4.5%

The vote drawn by the PMIP in these constituencies could have cost the Alliance dearly in tight races. However, the magnitude of the Alliance loss was such that only its loss in Bruas can be attributed with con-

fidence to the PMIP. The same could almost have been said about Tanjong Malim where the PMIP's 7.7 percent of the vote assuredly accounted for the narrowness of the Alliance's victory over the DAP, 46.3 to 46.0 percent.

The effect of the SF boycott on the Perak parliamentary elections is, as assessed by the measures used in this chapter, uncertain. Thus the average increase in both the "high" and low SF seats between 1959 and 1969 is the same, 3.8 percent. On the other hand, a clear difference in the hypothesized direction emerges in percentages voting, which increased twice as much between 1959 and 1969 in the constituencies deemed low in SF support (3.8 percent) than in those considered as high in SF support (1.9 percent). While the paired rank orderings (Tables 32 and 33) appear to show some relationships, these tend to be at the extremes. As shown by the tables, the apex match in three of the four rank orderings.

Perlis

The most obvious feature of state level elections in Perlis is the steady erosion of Alliance support: from 63.8 percent of the vote in '59

TABLE 32

RANK ORDERINGS OF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PERAK PARLIAMENT
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Kuala Kangsar	(25.4%)	Kuala Kangsar	(+5.9%)	Kuala Kangsar	(-1.0%)
Ulu Kinta	(10.3%)	Menglembu	(3.2%)	Ulu Kinta	(+4.9%)
Ipoh	(7.2%)	Ipoh	(2.3%)	Menglembu	(6.1%)
Menglembu	(5.9%)	Ulu Kinta	(1.8%)	Ipoh	(7.1%)

TABLE 33

RANK ORDERINGS OF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: PERAK PARLIAMENT
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Telok Anson	(42.9%)	Hilir Perak (+3.1%)	Telok Anson (-11.9%)
Tanjong Malim	(18.9%)	Kuala Kangsar (2.8%)	Tanjong Malim (9.6%)
Kampar	(16.5%)	Tanjong Malim (1.2%)	Kuala Kangsar (8.0%)
Ulu Kinta	(13.7%)	Ulu Kinta (.9%)	Larut Selatan (7.1%)
Kuala Kangsar	(13.5%)	Kampar (.8%)	Menglembu (6.9%)
Larut Selatan	(11.5%)	Menglembu (.7%)	Hilir Perak (6.2%)
Hilir Perak	(10.7%)	Larut Selatan (.2%)	Kampar (5.6%)
Menglembu	(9.9%)	Ipoh (-0.1%)	Ulu Kinta (5.1%)
Ipoh	(9.1%)	Telok Anson (0.2%)	Ipoh (2.6%)

through a still impressive 60.9 percent in '64 to a comfortable but now rather precarious 53.5 percent in 1969. In 1959, the Alliance won all twelve assembly seats, including nine straight races with the PMIP, with pluralities ranging from 11 to 62.9 percent. The two SF candidates' average vote of 7.7 percent per constituency (1.3 percent of the statewide total) had no impact whatsoever on the outcome. That was also true of the two independents who entered the fray in Perlis, although they were more successful votewise, averaging 23.7 percent in the two constituencies they contested, and 3.2 percent of the statewide vote.

The 1964 assembly election was, even more than in 1959, dominated by the Alliance and PMIP. Only two of the candidates belonged to neither party. The SF nominated a candidate in Bandar Kangar, the one Perlis state constituency not predominantly Malay, which, surprisingly, the SF had not contested in 1959. While the SF's 26.8 percent of the vote was impressive vis-a-vis the party's 1959 showing and that of other third parties in Perlis, it brought, in a straight race with the Alliance, crushing defeat. And when combined with the vote received by one independent candidate accounted for 2 percent of the vote cast for Perlis assembly seats in 1964.

Returning to the main contenders, while the Alliance won eleven contests by comfortable, albeit generally reduced margins over 1959, its monopoly of the Perlis assembly was ended as it lost to the PMIP in Hutan Aji, a constituency with a handfull of non-Malays, where the Alliance had received its lowest plurality in 1959.

As in 1964, the Alliance gained eleven assembly seats in 1969, but the identical outcomes obfuscate more than they reveal. In 1964, for example, the Alliance received over 60 percent of the vote in seven assembly constituencies and under 50 percent in one, the Hutan Aji seat lost to the PMIP. In 1969, by contrast, the Alliance received over 60 percent of the vote in one constituency, under 50 percent in three constituencies, and in two others defeated the PMIP by five and sixteen votes respectively. What made it possible for the Alliance to win two seats with less than one-half of the vote was the presence of PR candidates, not that the Alliance victories can be attributed to the PR. While the latter's five candidates were the most ever nominated by a third-party in Perlis, the PR's impact on the fortunes of the two major parties was minimal and, in all probability, nil.

In three constituencies, the PR could not have changed the outcome, that is, if all of the PR votes would have gone to the PMIP, the Alliance would still have a plurality. In two other constituencies, Paya and Mata Ayer, this was not the case: Paya (All, 49.0; PMIP, 46.3; PR, 4.7); Mata Ayer (All, 47.4; PMIP, 46.2; PR, 6.4). It is difficult to surmise what the second choice of those PR supporters, who would vote at all, would be in the absence of a PR candidate. Would the Alliance's secularism and multiracial structure outweigh in their minds the image of an upper class party supportive of the status quo? What aspect of the PMIP would seem most salient to them -- its religious appeals and parochialism or the sense that it encapsulated an alternative world-view with the potential to wrought fundamental change in the existing system. These are empirical questions, but not having undertaken the requisite interviews or survey research and unaware of pertinent data elsewhere one can only surmise -- a judgment supported by internal statistical analysis -- that most PR votes would have gone to the Alliance and thus the Paya and Mata Ayer outcomes would have been unchanged.

There is no question in Perlis of a possible

PMIP "spoiler" role: the PMIP ran a full slate of assembly candidates in 1969 and eleven in 1964 when, as in 1959, it did not contest in Bandar Kangar, the one Perlis assembly constituency not overwhelmingly Malay. The only discordant note with respect to the PMIP's activities in Perlis was the party's failure in 1959 to contest in Mata Ayer, a seemingly "typical" constituency. There may have been prior opposition consultations involved since the sole SF candidate in 1959 and one of the two independents stood in Mata Ayer.

Estimation of the boycott's effect runs into the problem that the SF played a very minimal role in Perlis state politics. It can be noted, however, that while statewide voting declined slightly in Perlis (81.4, 1959; 81.8, 1964; 80.3, 1969) in the one seat where appreciable SF support was anticipated, in Bandar Kangar, the percentage voting increased by 1.5 percent between '59 and '69. On the other hand, the percentage of spoiled votes rose by 5.3 percent in Bandar Kangar between the two elections compared to an overall average increase of 4 percent.

The Alliance maintained control of the two parliamentary seats in Perlis in the 1969 election,

although its 51.2 percent of the vote represented a substantial decline from the 1959 and 1964 totals of 59.6 and 63.2 percent respectively; of the six parliamentary contests in the history of Perlis, five pitted the Alliance against the PMIP with the former's vote ranging from a low of 52.8 percent in Perlis Selatan in the 1969 election to a high of 67.2 percent in Perlis Utara in 1964. In the sixth race, Perlis Utara in 1969, the Alliance kept control of the seat with under one-half of the votes: All, 49.5; PMIP, 37.1; PR, 13.4. It is probable, as with state races in Perlis, that the PR's participation cost the PMIP more votes than the Alliance.

Selangor

The Selangor result bore a marked resemblance to Perak's, a reflection that they are the two most urban and hence Chinese states in West Malaysia. As in Perak, a secure Alliance position -- intermediate between the party's West coast strongholds of Johore, Negri Sembilan, and Malacca and the nip-and-tuck situation in the East coast states of Kelantan and Trengganu -- gave way in 1969 to an apparent stalemate. Instead of a decisive Alliance

majority in the Selangor assembly (twenty-three of twenty-eight and twenty-four of twenty-eight seats in '59 and '64) control of the state seemed to hinge on a single independent. That is, with the Alliance winning fourteen seats, the DAP nine, the MPM four, and an independent one, it appeared in the province of the latter to determine whether the Alliance would continue to govern on the assumption (reasonable in the immediate aftermath of the election) that the MPM and DAP would continue to cooperate.

To Alliance supporters, on the other hand, the ambiguous electoral verdict was more disturbing in Selangor, the home of the capital, than in Perak. Then, too, the national potential of the DAP and its assumed links with Singapore rendered that party a more threatening challenge than the PPP. Nor could the former's gains be dismissed; its win/contested ration in the state was 75 percent (nine of twelve) compared to the 50 percent (fourteen of twenty-eight) Alliance record, while the average DAP vote in the twelve seats it contested was 58.0 percent against 41.6 percent for the Alliance.

The electoral pact achieved 100 percent success in Selangor insofar as none of the constituent parties clashed. As in other states, however, such

internecine conflict, if one excludes the SF, had no effect on the 1959 election and a negligible impact in 1964. In 1964, the PAP faced the PPP in two state constituencies, Pantai and Bukit Raja, one result of which was to underscore the PPP's localized appeal vis-a-vis the SF and (perhaps) DAP: Pantai (SF, 37.1; All, 34.8; PAP, 25.8; PPP, 2.3); Bukit Raja (All, 49.8; SF, 24.4; PAP, 22.9; PPP, 2.9). In all, seven Selangor state seats were won with under 50 percent of the vote in 1969, five by the Alliance and two by the SF. The likelihood is that two of the five seats won by the Alliance would have been lost had the SF and PAP both not contested; the outcome in the three others would have probably been unchanged, if the candidates were limited to the two leading vote-getters. Evidence can be adduced for these conclusions; but they cannot be "proved"; the noteworthy point, in any case, is that opposition party leaders could not dismiss the possibility that their rivalry cost them at least two, and possibly more, seats.

There were five state constituencies in which the PMIP confronted the Alliance on the one hand and the MPM or DAP on the other. In one of these,

Sementa, the PMIP could not have changed the outcome since the DAP's 52.8 percent of the vote meant that if the Alliance received all of the PMIP's vote, it still could not have won the seat. In two seats the Alliance won despite the PMIP presence, although no doubt by a reduced plurality than otherwise. Finally, in two seats Alliance losses to the DAP and MPM can be attributed to the PMIP. To point out that the Alliance would probably have won these seats but for the PMIP is not, however, to insist that the latter's presence was a sufficient condition for the Alliance's defeat. If the general falloff in Alliance support had been less the party could have absorbed that much more of a loss of votes to the PMIP. Kuang, one of the two constituencies where the Alliance loss could be attributed to the PMIP is a case in point as illustrated by the '64 and '69 results presented in Table 34.

TABLE 34
KUANG
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTY

	ALL	PMIP	SF	MPM
1959 Election	73.0	27.0		
1964 Election	61.2	13.9	24.9	
1969 Election	42.0	15.4		42.6

Having established some sense of the PMIP's impact in the Selangor state election in terms of the competition between the Alliance and non-Malay opposition, the question becomes whether the PMIP's actions suggest collusion with the other opposition parties. Three of the six multiparty races involving the PMIP had a Malay majority so that the Muslim party's decision to contest needs no further justification. The possibility of collusion, more tenable in the three other constituencies, is discounted by the fact that one of the seats had been contested by the PMIP in 1964 and the other two in 1959. If, in other words, the PMIP leadership, ruling out victory, was motivated by the desire to see the Alliance loose ground even at the cost of strengthening the non-Malay opposition, that motivation was not unique to the '69 election.

The SF's all-out effort in Selangor in 1964 -- it contested all but two heavily Malay constituencies -- complicates investigation of the effectiveness of the party's 1969 boycott. To discriminate between constituencies "high" and "low" in SF support, the former was taken as encompassing seats contested by the SF in both the 1959 and 1964 elections where in at least one of the elections its vote exceeded the average SF vote per constituency

plus those seats omitted by such a criterion in which the SF's vote located it in the top quartile (39.3 percent and above) with respect to the votes received by the SF in 1964. One finds a small difference in the anticipated direction with respect to change in the percentage of rejected votes between the 1959 and 1969 elections, 6 percent in constituencies deemed high in SF support and 5.3 percent in the others. The inclination to see this difference as insignificant is bolstered by the absence of a discernable relationship between the SF vote by constituency in '59 and '64 and increases in spoiled votes (Tables 35 and 36).

It can be inferred from the calculations with respect to voting percentage that the SF's boycott appeal reduced the vote some $2\frac{1}{2}$ percent more in the constituencies rated as high in SF support than those putatively low: the percentage voting between 1959 and 1969 decreased by 5.5 percent in the former category and 3.1 percent in the latter. The paired rank orderings are puzzling, however. Comparison with the 1959 election shows a definite relationship, especially at the extremes where one would expect differences to become evident, while in 1964 there is, if anything, a converse relationship to that hypothesized. It may be that in 1964

TABLE 35

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: SELANGOR STATE
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Serdang	(59.6%)	Bukit Nanas	(+8.1%)	Serdang	(-10.4%)
Pantai	(50.6%)	Kepong	(8.0%)	Ampang	(9.6%)
Penchala	(48.1%)	Ampang	(6.7%)	Sentul	(7.9%)
Sentul	(47.6%)	Salak	(5.5%)	Ulu Bernam	(6.3%)
Bukit Nanas	(46.6%)	Ulu Bernam	(5.4%)	Pantai	(6.0%)
Kepong	(46.3%)	Penchala	(5.0%)	Kajang	(4.6%)
Ampang	(35.6%)	Sentul	(5.0%)	Kepong	(3.4%)
Ulu Bernam	(34.1%)	Serdang	(4.3%)	Penchala	(2.9%)
Kajang	(30.3%)	Kampung Bharu	(4.0%)	Bukit Nanas	(2.1%)
Kampung Bharu	(27.7%)	Pantai	(3.6%)	Salak	(1.2%)
Salak	(2.7%)	Kajang	(2.4%)	Kampung Bharu	(+ .2%)

TABLE 36

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: SELANGOR STATE
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS
Serdang	(56.6%)	Port Swettenham (+7.4%)	Kampung Bharu (-11.7%)
Kepong	(50.0%)	Tanjong Karang (5.3%)	Ulu Bernam (11.5%)
Sungei Rawang	(43.1%)	Bukit Nanas (5.0%)	Kuang (11.4%)
Kampung Jawa	(42.4%)	Kampung Jawa (4.7%)	Tanjong Karang (10.6%)
Salak	(40.9%)	Sungei Rawang (4.0%)	Serendah (10.4%)
Kuala Kubu	(39.5%)	Ampang (4.0%)	Dengkil (10.2%)
Penchala	(39.3%)	Kampung Bharu (3.3%)	Port Swettenham (9.0%)
Serendah	(38.3%)	Penchala (2.9%)	Pantai (8.7%)
Ampang	(37.5%)	Jeram (2.8%)	Kampung Jawa (7.7%)

TABLE 36 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Morib	(37.2%)	Sentul	(2.7%)	Ampang	(7.2%)
Pantai	(37.1%)	Salak	(2.5%)	Jeram	(6.1%)
Sentul	(36.9%)	Morib	(2.2%)	Kuala Kubu	(6.0%)
Sementa	(36.8%)	Sementa	(1.8%)	Sentul	(6.0%)
Dengkil	(34.6%)	Kuang	(1.5%)	Sungei Rawang	(5.8%)
Port Swettenham	(33.8%)	Pantai	(1.4%)	Bukit Raja	(5.7%)
Tanjong Karang	(33.5%)	Kepong	(1.3%)	Morib	(5.4%)
Kampong Bahru	(31.9%)	Serdang	(1.2%)	Sementa	(4.6%)
Semenyih	(30.6%)	Bukit Raja	(1.0%)	Kuala Selangor Pekan	(4.3%)
Kajang	(28.8%)	Kuala Kubu	(.8%)	Salak	(3.9%)
Ulu Bernam	(28.5%)	Semenyih	(.6%)	Serdang	(3.8%)

TABLE 36 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Bukit Nanas	(25.2%)	Kajang	(.3%)	Kajang	(3.8%)
Kuang	(24.9%)	Serendah	(.1%)	Penchala	(3.3%)
Bukit Raja	(24.4%)	Ulu Bernam	(- .4%)	Semenyih	(2.5%)
Kuala Selangor Pekan	(20.0%)	Kuala Selangor Pekan	(.4%)	Bukit Nanas	(.5%)
Telok Datch	(19.7%)	Telok Datch	(Unc.)	Telok Datch	(Unc.)
Jeram	(16.5%)	Dengkil	(.8%)	Kepong	(+ 7.0%)

a smaller proportion of SF supporters went to the polls than "normal" to protest the Alliance's handling of confrontation and the detention of SF cadres, a possibility reinforced by the fact that Kepong's voting percentage was the lowest in the state in 1964 (in 1959 it was thirteenth).

The Alliance, taking the state results as the point of reference, did rather well at the parliamentary level in 1969, winning nine seats (as in 1959) with 44 percent of the vote, compared to 44.3 percent ten years earlier. In 1959 the Alliance received under 50 percent of the vote in nine of the fourteen parliamentary constituencies and won four of these seats with 46.8, 46.4, 43.0, and 37.3 percent of the vote respectively. In 1969, by contrast, the Alliance vote fell below 50 percent in six races; it won one of these in a three-man race and lost the five others in straight contests. Yet in all but one of the seats won by the Alliance with a minority of the vote, the Alliance would have also been victorious in straight races. The exception was Bukit Bintang (All, 37.3; SP, 28.0; and two independent candidates, with 33.1 and 1.6 percent respectively) which the Alliance lost to the MPM in 1969, drawing under one-third of the vote.

The primary confrontation within the non-Malay opposition in the Selangor parliamentary elections in 1964 pitted the SF against the PAP -- the PPP nominated one candidate, and its statewide vote was under 1 percent. Contesting every parliamentary seat except for the heavily Malay Sabak Bernam constituency, the SF faced (inter alia) the PAP in five seats. The latter gained one seat with about one-third of the vote and in two others might conceivably have blocked SF victories.

There was only one multiparty race at the parliamentary level in Selangor in 1969. The Alliance defeated the PMIP and DAP in Kapar, a seat it had also won in '59 and '64 against challenges from the PMIP and the non-Malay opposition (the PPP in '59 and SF in '64). It is unlikely that the Alliance would have lost Kapar in a straight race in 1969, whether against the PMIP or DAP. Three other PMIP candidates stood in Selangor in '69; all were defeated by the Alliance in straight races in solidly Malay constituencies. There is thus no question of the PMIP cooperating, in intent or effect, with the non-Malay opposition.

Finally, it may be observed that in Selangor,

as in Perak, the non-Malay opposition demonstrated substantially greater appeal than the Alliance in 1969, if one considers average votes per constituency contested: the MPM gained an average vote of 58.3 percent in four seats; the DAP 52.4 percent in seven seats; and the Alliance 44 percent. Some, probably most, SP or former SP supporters voted for the MPM or DAP in 1969, but the figures on spoiled votes (1.2 percent in '59; 5.2 percent in '69) and voting percentages (73.6 percent in '59; 65.8 percent in '69) suggest, in line with the assumptions made throughout this chapter, that not all former SP voters shifted their vote in 1969.

The criterion used to identify high and low SP state constituencies applied to the parliamentary level yielded seven parliamentary seats in each category. Comparing the two groups leads to inconclusive results, although it can be tentatively suggested that SP supporters inclined to boycott preferred to express themselves by non-voting as opposed to spoiling ballots. The average increase in rejected votes was less (4.6 percent) in high than in low (5.7 percent) constituencies while the percentages voting displayed the opposite trend with a 7.7 percent decline in vote in high SP constitu-

encies against 5.3 percent in the others. The rank order comparisons reveal, surprisingly, higher correlations in the middle ranges than at the extremes (Tables 37 and 38).

Trengganu

Trengganu's past elections describe a more complicated mosaic than Kelantan's, the state geographically and ethnically most similar. In the 1959 election only one of Trengganu's twenty-four state constituencies witnessed a straight race. In most, four parties entered the fray: the Alliance, PMIP, Party Negara (PN), and the SP. In thirteen constituencies the outcome could conceivably have been a function of the number of candidates. Although presenting a less intricate pattern, the 1964 election still saw only four straight races and included six contests where a reduction in the number of candidates could have altered the results. By 1969, however, Trengganu could hardly be distinguished from Kelantan in the number of candidates per constituency: there were two multicandidate races, including one where the third candidate was an independent. A major reason for this change was that the PN, having devoted

TABLE 37

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: SELANGOR PARLIAMENT
1959 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Damansara	(61.5%)	Rawang	(+6.0%)	Setapak	(-12.4%)
Batu	(57.7%)	Setapak	(5.8%)	Bungsar	(8.8%)
Rawang	(57.0%)	Langat	(5.4%)	Bukit Binbitang	(8.8%)
Setapak	(44.4%)	Sepang	(4.8%)	Batu	(8.4%)
Klang	(42.7%)	Bukit Bintang	(4.4%)	Klang	(8.3%)
Langat	(42.6%)	Klang	(2.8%)	Langat	(6.4%)
Bungsar	(40.6%)	Batu	(2.5%)	Damansara	(6.1%)
Sepang	(32.4%)	Damansara	(2.2%)	Rawang	(5.1%)
Bukit Bintang	(28.0%)	Bungsar	(2.1%)	Sepang	(3.7%)

TABLE 38

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: SELANGOR PARLIAMENT
1964 ELECTION

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Batu	(45.3%)	Kuala Selangor	(+4.3%)	Setapak	(-11.0%)
Damansara	(41.1%)	Kuala Langat	(4.2%)	Langat	(9.6%)
Kuala Langat	(38.0%)	Setapak	(3.0%)	Klang	(9.0%)
Sepang	(36.5%)	Rawang	(2.8%)	Kuala Langat	(8.5%)
Klang	(36.1%)	Sepang	(1.8%)	Bungsar	(8.5%)
Bungsar	(33.2%)	Bukit Bintang	(1.8%)	Bukit Bintang	(8.4%)
Rawang	(32.5%)	Ulu Selangor	(.2%)	Batu	(7.3%)
Setapak	(32.3%)	Langat	(.1%)	Kapar	(7.0%)

TABLE 38 continued

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Ulu Selangor	(30.9%)	Kapar	(0.0%)	Rawang	(6.4%)
Langat	(29.3%)	Klang	(- .3%)	Sepang	(6.2%)
Kapar	(28.5%)	Damansara	(- .4%)	Ulu Selangor	(4.6%)
Kuala Selangor	(27.5%)	Bungsar	(.4%)	Damansara	(3.2%)
Bukit Bintang	(23.4%)	Batu	(.8%)	Kuala Selangor	(+2.3%)

most of its efforts to Trengganu in 1959 and having concentrated on that state exclusively in 1964, was no longer in existence by 1969.¹⁸ Then, too, the SF had nominated seventeen candidates in 1959 and eleven in 1964 (though winning not a single seat) so that its decision to boycott added, as it were, to the sheer nature of the confrontation between the Alliance and FMIP in 1969.

The FMIP obtained control of the Trengganu government by a decisive, if hardly overwhelming, majority in 1959. The FMIP won thirteen of the twenty-four state contests, the Alliance seven, and the PN four. The 1964 election brought a stunning reversal, however. Ten FMIP seats fell to the Alliance which, combined with the latter's seven seats and the PN's four, gave the Alliance twenty-one of the twenty-four state assembly seats and unquestioned ascendancy in the Trengganu assembly. In 1969, the Alliance lost much of the ground gained in 1964 and just managed to form the state government by a thirteen to eleven margin over the FMIP. Percentagewise the Alliance vote jumped twenty percent between 1959 and 1964 (from 35.2 to 55.2 percent) with about one quarter of the gain lost in 1969 when the Alliance's proportion of the

vote was a shade over 50 percent.

It is difficult to determine the degree to which the 1969 election in Trengganu, as in Kelantan, reflected an anti-establishment as distinct from anti-Alliance impulse. Analysis of the state constituencies leads to the conclusion that if the PMIP had been in power going into the election, the Alliance would probably have done relatively better. Percentagewise the Alliance lost votes in seventeen (in eight the seat as well) of the twenty-one seats under its control, gained ground in three, and received the same percentage as in 1964 in the remaining seat. On average the Alliance vote declined by 9.6 percent in these seats. The opposite trend was evident in PMIP seats. Here the Alliance made substantial gains in two of the three constituencies (winning both) and despite a loss of votes (percentagewise) in the third increased its vote an average of 8.4 percent in these seats.

All six Trengganu parliamentary races in 1969, in contradistinction to the two earlier elections, featured straight contests between the Alliance (UMNO) and the PMIP. In 1959 one SF and three independent candidates gained a negligible total of the vote. On the other hand, the single PN parlia-

mentary candidate, Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, the party's founder and best known personality, bested the Alliance candidate, 59.8 to 40.2 percent. Four years later in the same constituency, Kuala Trengganu Selatan, the PN candidate received 31.6 percent of the vote as the seat went to the Alliance. The SF nominated three candidates in the 1964 parliamentary level election, none of whom did well. Perhaps the point to stress is that, except for the PN victory in 1959, none of the thirteen third-party candidates could have affected the results in the constituencies they contested.

In the battle between the PMIP and the Alliance, the latter lost ground vis-a-vis its showing in the 1964 election without backsliding to its 1959 low point. In 1959 the Alliance won one (uncontested) parliamentary seat (the PMIP, four and PR, one); five in 1964 (the PMIP was returned with a narrow majority in the sixth seat); and four by slim margins in 1969. The percentage of the vote received by Alliance parliamentary candidates was, respectively, 37.4, 56.5, and 49.5 percent. With the SF contesting only four parliamentary seats in '59 and '64 elections and attracting an insig-

nificant vote, there was little point comparing "high" and "low" SF constituencies. The overall figures on the percentage voting and spoiled ballots (Table 39) does suggest that the SF's boycott appeal may have augmented the number of spoiled votes.

TABLE 39
PERCENTAGES OF SPOILED VOTES AND VOTING
BY ELECTION
TRENGGANU PARLIAMENT

	SPOILED VOTES	PERCENTAGE VOTING
1959 Election	1.3	70.3
1964 Election	4.3	77.4
1969 Election	5.0	75.1

CONCLUSIONS

An overview of the 1969 West Malaysian election must consider both its objective and subjective aspects. Objective refers to the election results per se -- the number of seats the various parties gained, the number of votes they received, the percentage of registered, eligible voters who cast ballots, and

the like. Such descriptive statements can usefully be distinguished from the thoughts, feelings, or perceptions of the results held by Malaysians and others, the subjective dimension. Of particular interest is the meaning of the election to the political parties in light of their expectations, the note on which Chapter 2 ends.

OBJECTIVE ASPECTS OF THE ELECTION RESULTS

An overall description of the election outcome is not tantamount to an aggregation of the results in individual states, although a summary accounting is germane to the present intent. The election naturally had a unique cast in each state so that in a sense aggregation is virtually nonsensical. Yet it does make sense to compare how, for example, the different parties fared nationwide or to attempt a general assessment of the three concerns considered throughout this chapter, viz., the impacts of the opposition election pact, the SP boycott, and the PMIP's behavior vis-a-vis the non-Malay opposition parties. Tables 40 and 41, for instance, show such a marked similarity between the

TABLE 40

PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTE RECEIVED BY PARTY IN STATE
ELECTIONS (PERCENTAGE PER CONSTITUENCY)

	1959 ELECTION	1964 ELECTION	1969 ELECTION*
ALL	55.5 (55.5)	57.6 (57.6)	45.7 (46.8)
PMIP	20.7 (29.4)	15.2 (29.1)	20.6 (35.6)
SF	9.7 (21.7)	16.3 (26.1)	
NEG	4.3 (14.9)	.4 (10.2)	
PPP	5.7 (30.8)	4.5 (35.0)	4.2 (57.4)
MP	.5 (32.1)		
IND	3.6 (15.1)	1.1 (9.6)	2.9 (15.7)
UDP		4.0 (15.3)	
PAP		.9 (13.9)	
PR			1.4 (17.0)
DAP			10.4 (52.8)
MFM			7.8 (52.8)
UMCO			0.1 (3.2)

*Figures for 1969 were calculated on a Malaysianwide basis. Thus the total vote in Table 40 is 93.1 percent with the 6.9 percent of the unaccounted for vote having gone to East Malaysian parties. The effect of this is to diminish slightly the vote received by each party vis-a-vis its performance in earlier elections. As the Alliance once again contested every West Malaysian state seat, for example, its percentage of the West Malaysian vote was 46.6 percent.

TABLE 41

PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES RECEIVED BY PARTY IN
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
(PERCENTAGE PER CONSTITUENCY)

	1959 ELECTION		1964 ELECTION		1969 ELECTION*	
ALL	51.8	(51.8)	58.5	(58.5)	44.9	(45.8)
PMIP	21.3	(36.4)	14.6	(29.1)	20.9	(37.2)
SF	12.9	(34.9)	16.1	(24.9)		
NEG	2.1	(22.2)	.4	(10.5)		
PPP	6.2	(32.2)	3.4	(34.4)	3.4	
MP	.9	(41.5)				
IND	4.8	(20.4)	.7	(12.9)	1.8	(15.3)
UDP			4.3	(15.3)		
PAP			2.0	(16.3)		
PR					1.1	(18.7)
DAP					11.9	(53.4)
MPM					7.5	(54.5)
UMCO					0.1	(2.9)

*See explanatory note at bottom of TABLE 40.

1959 and 1969 results that the latter can reasonably be interpreted as a return to "normalcy" after a "deviant" 1964 election.¹⁹ It is clear that in 1964 a number of short-lived factors augmented the Alliance's "normal" vote.

In 1964 the so-called confrontation with Indonesia made support of the government a mark of patriotism, certainly the Alliance sought to convey that message.²⁰ The formation of Malaysia insofar as that represented a diplomatic triumph for the government, coupled with the subsequent "external" intervention of the PAP into West Malaysian politics probably also redounded to the benefit of the Alliance.²¹ In terms of the distinction introduced in Chapter I, the 1964 election took on a national coloration while those in 1959 and 1969 had a communal cast. In other words, the 1959 election is the logical benchmark in analyzing the 1969 results. Malaysians, however, to move momentarily into the subjective realm, naturally tend to view the 1969 election in terms of the most recent (or 1964) one.

The major consequence of the tendency to perceive the 1969 election in light of the 1964 results was to exaggerate the Alliance's setback in the minds of observers, at least in the immediate

aftermath of the election. Thus, for example, the Alliance ended up with twenty-three fewer MPs than in 1964 but only eight less if the 1969 election is the reference point. Similarly, impressions of how the opposition fared in 1969 are shaped according to which of the earlier elections is considered.

With reference to the '64 election and resorting to an admittedly facile distinction between the Malay (PMIP, PH, MR, and PR) and non-Malay (SF, UDP, PPP, PAP, DAP, MPM, and UMCO) opposition, it appears that the Malay opposition was the major beneficiary of the Alliance losses between '64 and '69 while the non-Malay opposition's percentage of the vote actually declined somewhat.²² On the other hand, the opposite is the case if one compares the 1959 and 1969 elections. Moreover, as can be seen from Tables 42 and 43, the ratio of seats won to contested is about the same for the PMIP while it dramatically increased for the non-Malay opposition parties. It seems reasonable to assume that the DAP/PPP/MPM pact played a part in the concentration of effort which made possible the extraordinary improvement, or at least that the won/contested ration would have been less impressive without the electoral pact.

TABLE 42

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS WON TO SEATS CONTESTED IN STATE
ELECTIONS BY PARTY

	1959 ELECTION		1964 ELECTION		1969 ELECTION	
ALL	73.8	(208/282)	85.1	(240/282)	59.2	(167/282)
PMIP	21.0	(42/200)	15.8	(25/158)	21.6	(40/185)
EF	12.9	(16/124)	4.8	(8/167)		
NEG	5.1	(5/72)	0.0	(0/17)		
MP	0.0	(0/6)				
PPP	20.5	(8/39)	19.2	(5/26)	75.0	(12/16)
UDP			6.1	(4/66)		
PAP			0.0	(0/15)		
DAP					54.4	(31/57)
MPM					68.4	(26/38)
PR					7.8	(3/38)
UMCO					0.0	(0/12)
IND	7.5	(6/76)	0.0	(0/38)	8.6	(3/35)

TABLE 43

PERCENTAGE OF SEATS WON TO SEATS CONTESTED
IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY PARTY

1959 ELECTION			1964 ELECTION		1969 ELECTION	
ALL	71.2	(74/104)	85.6	(89/104)	63.5	(66/104)
PMIP	22.4	(13/58)	17.0	(9/53)	19.4	(12/62)
SP	21.1	(8/38)	3.2	(2/63)		
KEG	11.1	(1/9)	0.0	(0/4)		
MP	5.0	(1/2)				
PPP	21.1	(4/19)	22.2	(2/9)	66.7	(4/7)
UDP			14.8	(4/27)		
PAP			9.1	(1/11)		
DAP					54.2	(13/24)
KPM					57.1	(8/14)
PR					0.0	(0/6)
UMCO					0.0	(0/3)
IND	10.3	(3/29)	0.0	(0/8)	0.0	(0/4)

Effect of The Electoral Pact

To determine the effect of the electoral pact, one can begin by asking how the results of earlier elections may have differed had similar understandings been achieved. The 1955 election can be dealt with briefly. Only in Krian (Perak), the sole elected seat not won by the Alliance, could the outcome have changed in a two rather than multiparty contest.²³ In no other multi-candidate race could a reduction to two candidates have altered the results; that is, in no constituency other than Krian did the combined vote of the defeated opposition candidates equal or exceed the Alliance vote. "The Alliance candidates," noted the official election report, "obtained approximately 80 percent of the total votes cast, and in each of the fifty-one constituencies in which the Alliance was successful their candidate obtained more than twice as many votes as any of his rivals."²⁴

Of the 164 state constituencies with three or more candidates in 1959, a reduction to straight contests could have made a difference which party was returned in forty-nine.²⁵ A perfectly realized opposition pact could have cost the Alliance twenty-two seats -- in other words, twenty-two of the seats

won by the Alliance were gained with under 50 percent of the constituency -- and the opposition twenty-seven seats. Multicandidate races occurred in 45 of the 104 parliamentary constituencies in 1959. Ten parliamentary seats were won by the Alliance with under 50 percent of the vote and six by the opposition, including independents.

One hundred and fifty seven state seats were contested by three or more candidates in the 1964 election. The outcome in thirty-six of these could have been a function of the number of candidates. Of these thirty-six seats, the Alliance won twenty-six, the PMIP two, the SF five, and the UDP three. There were fifty-six multicandidate parliamentary races; in six seats won by the Alliance, two by the SF, and one each by the UDP and PAP the outcomes might have been altered in a two-man race.

It might be noted, parenthetically, that in three of the four opposition won seats an opposition candidate came in second. Thus it appears that the opposition's failure to forge a common front probably (rigorous measurement seemingly unattainable) added somewhat to the Alliance's margin of victory in the 1959 and 1964 elections. But what differences can be discerned vis-a-vis these elections and the

1969 election, when a partial or "mini" opposition pact obtained?

Although far from eliminated in 1969, multi-candidate contests sharply declined at the state level to 98 (from 164 in 1959 and 157 in 1964), most of which were attributable to the PMIP and PR. In twenty-three constituencies non-affiliated or independent candidates precluded straight contests and in six constituencies, all in Negri Sembilan, a small splinter party -- the United Malaysian Chinese Organization (UMCO) -- accounted for a third candidate. Finally, in Tanjong (Penang) the pact appears to have broken down in that both the PPP and MPM challenged the Alliance for the seat.

Applying the assumptions used throughout this chapter, if every seat saw a straight race between the Alliance and one opposition candidate the results could have been reversed, as it were, in twenty-five Alliance -- and sixteen opposition -- won seats (seven by the DAP, three by the MPM, two each by the PMIP, and PR, and one by an independent candidate). Twenty-two parliamentary constituencies were contested by three or more candidates; in eight -- six Alliance, one MPM, and one PPP -- the number of candidates could conceivably have affected the results.

A comparison of the three elections in terms of the foregoing analysis bespeaks, at best, a negligible contribution by the opposition electoral pact to the ground lost by the Alliance in 1969. Assuming a comprehensive, totally realized opposition understanding so that in every state constituency the electorate faced a choice between the Alliance and a single opposition candidate and, furthermore, that all of the seats won by the Alliance with under 50 percent of the vote fell to the opposition and vice-versa, the Alliance would have won nine less seats. The same calculation with respect to the 1959 and 1964 elections shows a gain of five seats in the former and a loss of sixteen in the latter. The parliamentary equivalencies were Alliance gains of four ('59), two ('64), and four ('69) seats respectively.

Yet one cannot conclude from the foregoing that the parties to the electoral pact derived no benefits from their agreement. Certainly a melee among the DAP, PPP, and MPM would have made the opposition's gains seem less decisive and the Alliance setback less momentous. Be that as it may, competition among the parties to the election pact had been far less responsible for splitting the opposition vote in past

elections than the SF so that the latter's boycott was possibly of greater weight.

The Labor Party Boycott

It has been suggested in this chapter that changes in spoiled votes and voting could shed light on the effectiveness of the SF's boycott. With regard to the proportions voting, there is a slight movement in the expected direction. The percentage of registered voters who cast ballots in parliamentary elections was 73.3 percent in 1959, 78.9 percent in 1964, and 72.9 in 1969; in elections to the state assemblies the totals were, respectively, 73.1, 78.9, and 74 percent. It is immediately obvious that these statistics can be interpreted as reflecting a return to "normality" after the "deviant" 1964 election. There is, nonetheless, the understandable inclination to assume that the SF boycott must have made some difference. In the words of the 1969 election report, "[t]he lower percentage [between the '64 and '69 elections] may partly be due to the campaign calling for a boycott of the elections and also to the build-up of tension before polling day which culminated in the May 13 incident."²⁶ As for the percentage of spoiled

votes, the parliamentary figures were 4.9 percent in 1965 as against 4.2 percent in 1964 and 2.5 percent in 1959; the state elections figures were 6.5 (1969), 4.8 (1964), and 1.1 (1959) percent respectively.

The portion of changes in spoiled votes and voting percentages resulting from the SF boycott appeal is not subject to definitive determination. The state-by-state analysis yielded what is best described as mixed results. The same is true across states. Tables 44 through 49 indicate relationships in some cases and not in others. Perhaps, assuming that the increase in rejected votes did not reflect exogenous forces, a hard core of SF supporters in each constituency spoiled their ballots. In any case, the major point to be made is that while some voters surely spoiled their ballots as a mark of allegiance to the SF, they were nowhere numerous enough to have a significant impact on the election.²⁷

The PMIP's Role

Both in the number of candidates nominated and the percentage of vote received, the PMIP in 1969 seemed to have reverted to its 1959 showing. In other words, the aggregate statistics do not reveal

TABLE 44

PERCENTAGE OF REJECTED (OR SPOILED) VOTES

	1959 ELECTION		1964 ELECTION		1969 ELECTION	
	STATE PARL.		STATE PARL.		STATE PARL.	
Kedah	4.0	1.3	5.5	4.3	6.3	3.8
Johore	2.5	1.2	4.8	4.4	7.4	6.0
Kelantan	1.9	.8	4.5	4.1	5.1	3.1
Malacca	1.8	.9	3.4	3.0	5.0	4.8
Negri Sembilan	2.3	1.0	4.3	4.6	5.5	6.6
Pahang	2.4	1.0	6.2	4.9	7.2	5.8
Penang	1.9	1.0	3.1	2.8	5.4	5.9
Perak	2.2	1.2	4.9	4.2	6.9	4.9
Perlis	2.1	.7	5.4	4.1	6.1	3.5
Selangor	2.5	1.1	5.4	4.8	7.3	5.6
Trengganu	3.6	1.3	5.1	4.3	7.4	5.0
TOTAL	1.1	2.5	4.8	4.2	6.5	4.9

TABLE 45

PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES CAST

	1959 ELECTION		1964 ELECTION		1969 ELECTION	
	STATE PARL.		STATE PARL.		STATE PARL.	
Johore	76.0	77.1	80.6	80.9	72.4	72.6
Kedah	75.7	74.0	76.6	76.4	75.4	75.6
Kelantan	76.3	71.2	80.1	80.1	74.5	74.6
Malacca	78.5	80.4	84.3	84.2	77.2	74.7
Negri Sembilan	79.9	76.8	80.1	80.0	75.0	74.4
Pahang	78.1	72.7	78.0	72.7	71.4	71.0
Penang	74.3	73.2	83.5	83.5	77.6	77.5
Perak	68.9	69.9	79.5	79.5	73.0	73.0
Perlis	81.4	77.8	81.8	81.6	80.3	80.2
Selangor	71.1	73.6	73.3	73.3	65.9	65.8
Trengganu	71.3	70.3	77.4	77.4	75.1	75.1
TOTAL	74.0	73.3	78.9	78.9		

TABLE 46

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: 1959 STATE ELECTIONS

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Penang	29.4%	Johore	+4.9%	Pahang	-6.7%
Negri Sembilan	17.9%	Selangor	4.8%	Selangor	5.2%
Selangor	17.7%	Pahang	4.8%	Negri Sembilan	4.9%
Malacca	11.4%	Perak	4.7%	Johore	3.6%
Johore	9.8%	Perlis	4.0%	Kelantan	1.8%
Trengganu	8.1%	Trengganu	3.8%	Malacca	1.3%
Pahang	7.6%	Penang	3.5%	Perlis	1.1%
Perak	3.9%	Malacca	3.2%	Kedah	.3%
Kedah	3.1%	Negri Sembilan	3.2%	Penang	+2.3%
Kelantan	2.3%	Kelantan	3.2%	Trengganu	3.8%
Perlis	1.3%	Kedah	2.3%	Perak	4.1%

TABLE 47

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: 1959 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '59 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Penang	38.2%	Selangor	-7.8%	Negri Sembilan	+5.6%
Selangor	30.4%	Malacca	5.7%	Penang	4.9%
Pahang	21.4%	Johore	4.5%	Pahang	4.8%
Johore	14.2%	Negri Sembilan	2.4%	Selangor	4.5%
Malacca	11.5%	Pahang	1.7%	Malacca	3.9%
Negri Sembilan	10.9%	Kedah	1.6%	Johore	3.8%
Kedah	7.2%	Perlis	+2.4%	Perak	3.7%
Perak	2.9%	Perak	3.1%	Trengganu	3.7%
Trengganu	.9%	Kelantan	3.4%	Perlis	2.8%
Kelantan	--	Penang	4.3%	Kedah	2.5%
Perlis	--	Trengganu	4.8%	Kelantan	2.3%

TABLE 48

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: 1964 STATE ELECTIONS

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Selangor	33.5%	Johore	+2.6%	Johore	-8.2%
Penang	32.1%	Penang	2.3%	Selangor	7.4%
Malacca	26.8%	Trengganu	2.3%	Malacca	7.1%
Johore	23.7%	Perak	2.0%	Pahang	6.6%
Negri Sembilan	20.7%	Selangor	1.9%	Perak	6.5%
Pahang	18.6%	Malacca	1.6%	Penang	5.9%
Perak	7.3%	Negri Sembilan	1.2%	Kelantan	5.6%
Kedah	5.0%	Pahang	1.0%	Negri Sembilan	5.1%
Trengganu	3.7%	Kedah	.8%	Trengganu	2.3%
Perlis	1.5%	Perlis	.7%	Perlis	1.5%
Kelantan	--	Kelantan	.6%	Kedah	1.2%

TABLE 49

RANK ORDERINGS OF SF VOTE, SPOILED VOTES, AND PERCENTAGE
VOTING: 1964 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

SF VOTE AS PERCENT- AGE OF VALID VOTE		CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF SPOILED VOTES BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS		CHANGE IN PERCENT- AGE VOTING BET. '64 AND '69 ELECTIONS	
Selangor	31.8%	Penang	+3.1%	Malacca	-9.5%
Penang	31.6%	Negri Sembilan	2.0%	Johore	8.3%
Malacca	26.8%	Malacca	1.8%	Selangor	7.5%
Negri Sembilan	22.8%	Johore	1.6%	Perak	6.5%
Johore	22.2%	Pahang	.9%	Penang	6.0%
Pahang	18.2%	Selangor	.8%	Negri Sembilan	5.6%
Perak	8.1%	Perak	.7%	Kelantan	5.5%
Kedah	4.8%	Trengganu	.7%	Trengganu	2.3%
Trengganu	4.6%	Kedah	-.5%	Pahang	1.7%
Kelantan	.2%	Perlis	.6%	Perlis	1.4%
Perlis	--	Kelantan	1.0%	Kedah	.8%

the kind of unusual activity on the part of the PMIP in 1969 to be expected had the Muslim party aimed at what has been termed a spoiler role. A closer look, however, does lend somewhat greater credibility to the Alliance charge of collusion between the PMIP and non-Malay opposition, especially in Perak: in eight state constituencies (three in Perak) with a majority of non-Malay registered voters and five parliamentary constituencies (four in Perak), the PMIP entered the electoral lists for the first time in 1969. It should immediately be added that in only one of the parliamentary constituencies could an Alliance loss be attributed to the PMIP.

SUBJECTIVE ASPECTS OF THE ELECTION RESULTS

The objective dimensions of the Alliance setback in the 1969 election is open to interpretation. It was almost universally greater than anticipated, however, and thus in subjective terms -- conceived as the relationship between expectations and outcomes -- the Alliance received a major blow. Most Alliance leaders had expected the results to fall between the floor of '59 and ceiling of '64 but rather nearer the latter. As for the opposition, it had hoped for mod-

est, albeit visible, inroads into Alliance support, for an opening wedge to be widened by subsequent elections. A number of opposition leaders were, indeed, taken back by their "success," confiding uncertainty whether they had the experienced manpower to form governments in Selangor and Perak which, for a brief period, seemed in the realm of possibility.

The author's impression was that the sense that their leadership had been repudiated at the polls engendered anxiety, almost panic, in Alliance circles. Malaysia had never before experienced the remotest possibility that a party other than the Alliance could come to power. Secure in its two-third parliamentary majority, the Alliance could and did legally amend the Constitution when it deemed that in its and the nation's interest, the two tending to be perceived as identical. Indeed, the desirability of ending the Alliance's two-third majority was an effective opposition rallying point during the campaign. While opposition leaders privately thought that aspiration unlikely, it appeared to have been achieved in the immediate aftermath of the West Malaysian election. At the state level, the Alliance faced serious challenges among

which the Alliance's leaders perceived the election

West coast states for the first time. The 1969 election, in short, compelled the Alliance to confront the vicissitudes and uncertainties of democratic politics as never before.

The anxiety felt by Alliance leaders at the election result had additional roots than the unaccustomed sense of insecure tenure. They could no longer take for granted in quite the same way as before the election the "rightness" of the party's policies or its mandate to pursue them. But this is not to suggest a wholesale loss of nerve by Alliance officials or the attempt on their part to rethink fundamentals; the Alliance reasserted an effective monopoly of power, as described in the following chapters, too forcefully and quickly for that to be necessary. And as time passed without radical changes in political leadership and the shock of the election result and post-election violence faded the subjective reaction of the Alliance leadership and others gave way to the appreciation that, objectively, the Alliance unquestionably remained the strongest party in the country. Certainly the results, once digested, provided ample scope for rationalization, if not confidence. Moreover, the author's impression is that only a distinct minority of Alliance leaders perceived the election

verdict as linked to genuine popular dissatisfaction, thus needing such reassurance.

To a considerable extent, the Alliance attributed the gains registered by the opposition to sources external to the party and of varying degrees of reprehensibility. These included charges that the SP intimidated voters into complying with its boycott call, of an "unholy" Alliance between the PMIP and non-Malay opposition parties, and of the opposition's unprincipled exploitation of communal sentiments. The last conviction is the crux of the Alliance reaction to the election. Rather than viewing the setback as an expression of discontent with its rule, that is, Alliance officials saw it as demonstrating the drawbacks, even danger, of unbridled democracy in new states in general and in Malaysia's plural society in particular, a perception moulded not only by political interest but also by the backgrounds of the Alliance elite, the character of its relationships with the respective communities, and historical experiences reaching back in to pre-World War II times.

In Alliance eye's, opposition gains indicated the inability of the voters to resist communal blandishments. The election demonstrated that the electorate was not ready to exercise the franchise maturely.

The self-serving nature of this outlook is obvious, yet it also reflected the conviction that a vote for the Alliance was a vote for responsible, moderate rule; that impairment of the right or ability of the Alliance to govern spelled likely disaster (at the extreme, communal civil war), which contributed to what struck many observers as an over-reaction by the Alliance to the results of the election.

The Alliance believed (genuinely, in the author's judgment) that the pattern of inter communal bargaining it had evolved over the years was the sine qua non of peace and order in Malaysia. To the Alliance, all of the opposition parties, including those ostensibly noncommunal, were solidly rooted in either the Malay or non-Malay communities. Increases in their strength would intensify communal polarization both at the elite and mass levels. For example, the greater pressure on the Alliance to defend publicly its policies entailed by a larger opposition contingent in parliament would, the Alliance believed, scarcely avoid the exacerbation of communal sentiment. In addition to the obvious reason for this to happen -- that in the Malaysian context virtually no public question is devoid of communal over-

tones -- the Alliance felt that as there were, in effect, no substantive issues to debate in parliament the vacuum would be filled with demagoguery and rabble-rousing.

One felt that to the Alliance, both Malaysia's objectives -- economic development, narrowing the gap between the Malay and non-Malay communities, and political stability -- and the means for realizing them -- government promoted efforts to provide Malays with the wherewithal to improve their lot in a basically market system domestically and openness to foreign investment, coupled with a pro-Western orientation externally -- represented the only realistic course available. A number of conclusions followed from this assumption of givenness. The most important in the present context was the conviction that Malaysians best served the country's interest by voting for and supporting the Alliance. As the Alliance saw it, insofar as an opposition party deviated from the foregoing objectives or approaches, it was at best unrealistic and at worst a potential threat to Malaysia's well-being; insofar as an opposition party appeared in basic agreement with the Alliance, it lacked the requisite experience or inter-communal following to govern effectively.

Politics as a mechanism for determining the ends of public policy and the relationship between government and society was thus, from the Alliance standpoint, unnecessary, and potentially destructive. The fundamental questions concerning the goals and role of government had become or were always "givens." To reopen debate on them would divert attention from the real business of administration required for their realization and might even undermine the political stability on which effective implementation hinged. Past elections had been useful to the Alliance as ritual or reaffirmation of the party's stewardship. Representative government, under such circumstances, was consonant with the administrative state inherited from the British and perpetuated by the Alliance. The 1969 election endangered this compatibility between the electoral process and the administrative state by raising the prospect that elections and representative institutions could work to transform no less than buttress a status quo that had acquired a strong normative cast; the election threatened to politicize Malaysian politics.

Up to the 1969 election politics in Malaysia had been essentially an intra-Alliance phenomenon

or an aspect of the administrative process; the 1969 election raised the prospects of politics as an exogenous factor that might pose a threat to the Alliance structure and the administrative state over which it presided. The Alliance could not accept the externalization or autonomy of politics in a spirit of philosophical resignation: the continuance of its undisputed dominion took precedence over existant political forms, specifically free elections and open parliamentary debate. And in the absence of indigenous traditions of democracy, a supportive political culture, powerful counter elites or functional groups with a vested interest in and commitment to the political status quo, or significant external pressure, the attitude of the Alliance leadership took on a significance it might not have had in comparable situations elsewhere. Again, however, these judgments on the Alliance's attitude should not be taken as implying its thoroughgoing, cynical clinging to power.

In the author's opinion, for reasons adumbrated above, the Alliance believed it was more in Malaysia's interest that it (that is, the Alliance) continue to exercise effective control than that parliamentary democracy be unimpaired. While parochial

and broader interests can be analytically distinguished, these were assuredly mingled inextricably in the minds of the actors. The last few pages have focused on the nobler facet of the Alliance's anxiety at the election result -- the conviction that continued political stability, peaceful communal relations, and economic development hinged on the continued security of its tenure in office. Party leaders, on the other hand, had good reason to brood over the import of the election for their own futures and the viability of the Alliance organization.

A major criticism of the established Alliance leadership by restive elements in the party was the former's low level of educational attainment or professional training.²⁸ An aspect of the indictment was the assumption that without marketable skills or qualifications, the main preoccupation of a politician would be to maintain power. In the context of the present discussion it was held that a large proportion of Alliance officials could not readily earn a livelihood should they find themselves out of a job. It is not, of course, that in having acquired a vested interest in their positions, Alliance leaders were different from politicians

elsewhere, but rather that in Malaysia the reluctance to surrender office was, comparatively, intensive and extensive.

A related Alliance worry centered on the significant contribution of patronage in recruiting new party members and holding the loyalty of older ones. More than in ideologically based parties or perhaps the Alliance itself during the transition from colonialism, the adage "nothing succeeds like success" was a particularly apt description of the Alliance's situation. Alliance leaders had good reason to fear that the 1969 results, taken as an indication that the Alliance was loosing its grip on power, could set in motion an exodus from the party. The election could and did appear to some as the beginning of the end of the Alliance's domination of Malaysian politics.

On the whole, the election provided the opposition with ground for rejoicing rather than despair, and engendered confidence in rather than anxiety about the future. Having kept its control of Kelantan and gained support in Trengganu, Kedah, and Pahang, the PMIP gave every appearance of being perceived as a viable alternative by Malays disenchanted with the Alliance or uncertain about its

future. The case could indeed be made in analyzing the 1969 election results that UMNO lost more support vis-a-vis the PMIP than the MCA did to the non-Malay opposition parties.²⁹ At a maximum, the PMIP's leaders were encouraged to envisage their party's ultimately gaining control of the entire East Coast. The PPP, by contrast, never had hope of becoming a national or even regional force. The 1969 election, however, bolstered its standing in Perak and even, for a short time, held out the prospect that it might become the dominant component in a coalition government in the state.

The MPM substantially benefited from the division of labor attendant on the electoral pact. A new party, the MPM gained unchallenged control in Penang which afforded it a base (discounted considerably by Penang's racial, economic, and geographic uniqueness) to demonstrate that it had the competence to provide a tenable alternative to the Alliance nationally. Least satisfied, among the opposition, was the DAP. While its appeal was, on any measure, no less than the MPM, the votes it received did not translate into a viable platform. There was the feeling in the DAP that the MPM, a relative newcomer, had cashed in on the anti-Alliance

sentiment which had largely been the fruit of DAP effort. Still, the DAP emerged from the election with the conviction, shared by the rest of the opposition, that the Alliance's vulnerability was at an all-time high and that the 1969 election might represent the beginning of the end of Alliance rule. Such hopes were soon dashed, however. The eruption of serious racial violence in Kuala Lumpur set into motion a train of events which left the opposition further from power than it had been before the election.

CHAPTER 3

THE VIOLENCE

"May 13, 1969 will go down in our history as a day of national tragedy . . . the very foundation of this Nation was shaken by racial disturbances whose violence far surpassed any we had known," thus Tun Abdul Razak, the present Prime Minister of Malaysia.¹ The Prime Minister at the time, Tengku Abdul Rahman, looking out over Kuala Lumpur from the balcony of his residence during the early hours of May 14 described his thoughts in no less apocalyptic, though characteristically more personalistic, terms. "Kuala Lumpur was a city on fire; I could clearly see the conflagrations . . . and it was a sight that I never thought I would see in my lifetime. In fact all my work to make Malaysia a happy and peaceful country thought (sic) these years, and also my dreams of being the happiest P.M. in the world were going up in flames."² These fears, proved exaggerated in retrospect, seemed justified for three reasons: the intensity of the disturbance, its eruption in the nation's capital, and the apparent breakdown of the Alliance's operational code.

In terms of the numbers killed and wounded and the value of property destroyed, May 13 was the single most costly incident of racial violence in Malaysian history. Informed observers believed that the actual number of fatalities was perhaps ten times as great as the official toll of 263 deaths.³ Pictures of overturned automobiles and visits to burned out buildings suggested considerable property damage. While no attempt was made to measure systematically the qualitative effects of the disturbances, for example, increased pessimism about the future or the bolstering of unfavorable racial stereotypes, pronouncements by public figures, subsequent developments, and interview material suggest that these were proportional to the quantifiable costs; that is, that they affected more Malaysians more profoundly than earlier outbreaks of communal violence.

The May 13 disturbances were unprecedented, in large part, for having occurred in a populated urban area. Their occurrence in Kuala Lumpur heightened the shock even more both because of the modern role of a primate city in a new state and because of traditional Southeast Asian notions of politics. Kuala Lumpur is the political, adminis-

trative, financial, and intellectual center of Malaysia insofar as these activities are expressed in a modern idiom and carried on in the nation-state context. It is at once the brains and heart of Malaysia so that any seizure is ineluctably perceived as carrying the prospect of destruction of the body politic. Racial violence of equal magnitude in rural areas (which may be analogized as limbs) or provincial capitals (nerve centers) would be much less threatening: these can be isolated and overcome by the superior resources available to the center. At the worst, wounds can be borne, nerves damaged, even limbs amputated, without the body sustaining a mortal injury. The eruption of violence in Kuala Lumpur, in short, rendered visions of total political collapse imaginable. Traditional in the sense of historical notions of politics pointed in the same direction.

In each of the great traditions which had impinged on or are represented in Malaysia the political realm cannot be comprehended with reference to the clashes of materialistic forces exclusively. The fortunes of the state was not merely a secular concern but had sacred overtones to those initiated

into the symbolic lexicon of the appropriate cosmologies. Traces surely remained of the early Indic influence in (what is now) Malaysia and, given the attendant view of the state or center of the kingdom as a minaturization of the cosmos,⁴ it can be hypothesized that at some level of consciousness the prospect of anarchy in Kuala Lumpur conjured up images of inevitable chaos in the society at large. To be sure, Malaysians outside of traditional culture(s) may have harbored similar fears. They hypothesized difference is that a "modern man" would have viewed the breakdown of law and order as a product of understandable forces amenable to human will rather than indicative of a transcendental displeasure evoking fatalistic acquiescence.

Islam overlaid and virtually obliterated Indic influences in Malaysia.⁵ A Malay, for example, is legally defined as a person who speaks the Malay language, follows Malay adat or customs, and is a Muslim. A major thrust of Islam was legalistic: the prophet's teachings as expressed in the Koran and hadith furnished rules for ordering the life of the umat or community.⁶ The Islamic view of politics differed fundamentally from the mystico-

magical Indic worldview. As in the mainstream of Western political thought, at least since the divine right of kings lost its legitimizing force, Muslims conceptualize the political realm empirically.⁷ The point in drawing this comparison is that nothing in the Islamic experience is remotely akin to the competition between church and state which loomed so large in Western history. A hallowed achievement in much of the Christian world, the separation of church and state is virtually a meaningless concept in Islamic thought. There is, in effect, no church in the Western sense; only the community of believers with the state as one representation of its collective will.

If one can assume that the Malay view of the May 13 crisis reflected to some degree an Islamically moulded frame of reference or perceptual set, a myriad of intervening socioeconomic, psychological, and situational factors would affect how powerful the Islamic orientation was in particular individuals. One basic distinction within the Malay community, that between UMNO and PI (sometime after the election the PMIP changed its name to Party Islam, PI) supporters, can serve as a summary statement for a number of socioeconomic and psychological dimensions. Most im-

portantly, the consensus is that the typical UMNO supporter's religiosity is less thoroughgoing. Nonetheless the Alliance setback and the possible overthrow of the existant political arrangements affected "strong" and "weak" Muslims alike in that the Islamic trappings of power furnished psychic satisfaction to Malays and was symbolic reassurance of their political supremacy.

The Chinese response to May 13, it may be assumed, also reflected cultural conditioning. The Chinese are vaunted for practicality or "this worldliness" and their view of the state, by all accounts, is akin to the "watchman state" propagated by nineteenth century liberalism; that is, the proper province of the state is to see to law and order, the provision of an environment in which individuals can feel secure in their person and enjoy the fruits of their labor.⁸ Stability, tranquility, and predictability furnished the desiderata by which to measure governments. Strength is virtue while harmonious group and interpersonal relations depend on external sanctions. Chinese reactions to May 13 -- personal concerns for safety and short-term tactical decisions aside -- thus should be seen in the context of the premium attached by Chinese to the key role of government in the pre-

servation of peace and order combined with an abhorrence at displays of weakness. Throughout China's long history periods of disorder and turmoil were taken as signifying the heavenly withdrawal of support for and approval of the dynasty in power; by itself instability brought the mandate of heaven complex into play, thus undermining the existing regime's legitimacy.

Less abstractly, May 13 seemed to portend the demise of the Alliance operation code or pattern of governance, the only one with which Malaysians had familiarity as pointed out in Chapter 2. Whether Malaysia's plural society was primarily a function of imperial Britain's policy of divide and rule as nationalist critics were wont to maintain or less machiavellian motives and circumstances, preventing racial antipathies from finding destructive expression was per force a major preoccupation once the overarching colonial authority was withdrawn. The quest and hope of the Alliance government, as would have been the case with any ruling elite, was to purchase or be granted enough time to build institutions and inculcate attitudes which could keep racial tensions below the kindling point of violence.

In working toward the foregoing (among others) objective the Alliance had evolved a distinctive

mode of decision making. Demands emanating from the memberships of the constituent Alliance parties of sufficient intensity or eventfulness which were not satisfactorily responded to at local levels were moderated by the party's top leadership, among whom agreement was facilitated by long association, a shared commitment to compromise, and, above all, acceptance of common "rules of the game."⁹ Typically, the most trying point in the decision making process was persuading the respective rank and file to accept the decisions reached by their leaders because the bulk of each community, in contrast to the ruling elite, had an unsatisfactory standard of living, and lacked supra-communal concerns and commitments, a common language (albeit Malay served as a *lingua franca*), or compatible life styles.

The Alliance *modus operandi* had gained wide acceptance not only directly through the party's electoral successes but also by virtue of its effectiveness as indicated by Malaysia's political stability despite several serious crises, steady if not spectacular economic growth relative to other new states, and, perhaps most importantly, the absence of major racial disturbances. Each of these achievements became problematic in May 1969 -- the Alliance experienced a severe electoral setback, the contin-

uance of political stability and economic progress was uncertain, and the feared racial Armageddon seemed at hand. In short, the Alliance's legitimacy reached what must have been its low point in the days following the outbreak of the violence.

Having suggested a number of reasons why the May 13 tragedy appeared, at the time, to signify a watershed in modern Malaysian history, the discussion can move on to describe the actual train of events as best as they can be reconstructed by the present author. The major facts do not appear in dispute. On May 12, the electoral verdict known in broad outline, the two major, primarily urban-based and non-Malay supported opposition parties, the DAP and MPK, held "victory" processions in Kuala Lumpur.¹⁰ Some of the marchers, exuberant with success, taunted Malay bystanders in terms calculated to arouse the latter's fears of being thrust aside in what they considered their country by more aggressive immigrant races. Local UMNO officials, responding to pressure from their constituents, organized a counter procession for the early evening of May 13.

The residence of the Selangor Menteri Besar in Kampong Bharu -- a large, originally colonial-sponsored Malay settlement in the predominantly Chinese

capital -- was chosen as the starting point of the UMNO procession.¹¹ Tensions were high among the people milling about listening to speeches while waiting for the march to begin and when news reached the crowd, about an hour before the scheduled start of the procession, "that Malay would-be participants . . . had been attacked . . . by Chinese groups . . . en route to Kampong Bharu" a "violent anti-Chinese reaction" ensued which led to the murder of several Chinese in the vicinity of the Menteri Besar's residence.¹² The violence spread quickly through the city, fed by the tensions and rumors rife in Kuala Lumpur after the election. Caught off guard by the timing and ferocity of the incidents, security forces could not establish law and order for several days.

Most observers and analysts would probably accept the general sequence of events and simple causal, action-response developments as sketched above, or at least agree on the possibility of achieving agreement as to what, in fact, happened. The far more difficult, important, and contentious question is why it happened. The major problem is that the appropriate bodies of knowledge required for such an understanding -- psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, even game or strategic the-

ory -- have expanded so rapidly that one person cannot hope to acquire the requisite mastery. Even were that possible no social science has developed the "true," universally accepted theory of ethnic violence; instead one finds a variety of competing, mostly short-lived paradigms.¹³ Another limitation is the requirement to apply this partially known, provisional knowledge to the particular circumstances of May 13 where much information is lacking, cannot be determined, or must be inferred. Finally, the contentiousness referred to above stems not only from the complexity of the problem and its policy dimensions but also the necessity to make value laden judgments and implicitly apportion blame. These caveats explicit, a useful beginning point is to describe a number of earlier incidents of racial violence in Malaysia so as to assess what, if anything, these had in common with each other and May 13.

EARLIER INCIDENTS OF RACIAL VIOLENCE

Racial Violence in the Aftermath of World War II

Modern Malaysian history began to the accom-

paniment of racial violence as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) triumphantly emerged from their jungle strongholds in the one month interregnum between the Japanese surrender and the reestablishment of British control in the form of the British Military Administration.¹⁴ The assessment of the objectives of these Communist influenced, predominantly Chinese, guerrillas vary.¹⁵ Some analysts contend that the MPAJA's activities were externally orchestrated in tandem with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and aimed at the seizure of power. At the opposite pole is the argument that the MPAJA simply reacted to the exigencies of the situation. In any case, the guerrillas evened old scores, trying and executing known or reputed collaborators, particularly in Johore, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, and Perak, the states in which the MPAJA was strongest.¹⁶ Many of those killed were Malays who had continued in their administrative posts after the Japanese occupation, in some instances gaining promotions with the death, detention, or evacuation of their British superiors.

Japanese occupation policy was bound to exacerbate communal tension. The Japanese and Chinese were natural antagonists in Malaya given the Japanese invasion of China. It can be assumed, on the

other hand, that among the more politicized Malays there was the tendency noted with respect to other indigenous Southeast Asian peoples to welcome, at least initially, the Japanese as Asian liberators from European colonialism, though the relatively retarded development of Malay nationalism, beneficent character of the colonial regime, and symbiotic relationship between the Malay elite and British colonial establishment would have militated against an enthusiastic reception being accorded the Japanese.¹⁷ In any case, few Malays ever appeared to have gone underground or into less dangerous forms of opposition even after it became clear that, far from being liberators, the Japanese were no less self-serving and were much more brutal than the British before them. Possibly the Malay community received better treatment than neighboring peoples or the economic conditions in Malaya were less onerous or opposition more easily mounted in the island nations of Indonesia and the Philippines. The fact is that with the Japanese collapse, Malays who had worked with the Japanese were obvious targets for their countrymen who had risked all in the jungles, from whatever mix of motives.¹⁸

If revenge was the major motive for the violence following the Japanese surrender, it took on a racial

coloration for the reasons just suggested. Thus in the Jelebu district of Negri Sembilan the acting Malay chief was paraded by MPAJA elements through the main street of the district town with his hands tied behind his back, an act interpreted by the chief's subjects as Chinese contempt for Malay political rights.¹⁹ Instances of violence initiated by Malays against Chinese were also recorded. In one clash in the Batu Pahat area of Johore thirty Chinese were murdered and their houses burned and looted. The account immediately subsequent to the incident placed the blame on a band of Malays belonging to a group originally organized by the Japanese to incite anti-Chinese feeling which had adopted the slogan "Malaya for Malays."²⁰ A later explanation, however, maintained that the Malays had attacked MPAJA supporters who were attempting to assume control of the Batu Pahat area.²¹

The two incidents mentioned along with the other clashes in the months following the Japanese surrender can only be understood in the context of the uncertainty (verging on chaos) at the time. Because of shortages of food and other goods looting, smuggling, and black markets were rampant. The police force was utterly demoralized while "a crime-wave of unprecedented dimensions swept the country."²² Hated

by the Chinese of having done Japanese bidding, accused of corruption, the ranks of the police were depleted by desertions. Malaysians, in other words, turned to any source available for protection and security. For Chinese opposed to the MPAJA or MCP, this meant either the Kuomintang (KMT) or secret societies.²³ Lacking a similar tradition of secret societies, and less subject to external forces, the Malays sought security in localized groupings some initially promoted by the Japanese, others representing nascent political organizations, and still others ad hoc reactions to actual or perceived threats.

The Maria Hertogh Riots

In a sense the Maria Hertogh riots were, like the scattered violence of the immediate post-War period, also rooted in the Japanese occupation.²⁴ Among the Europeans who fled Singapore on the eve of the Japanese invasion was a Dutch woman who left her young daughter behind in the care of a Malay family. The girl, Maria, was raised as a Malay and at fourteen married a Malay school teacher in his thirties, an arrangement consonant with Malay

by Sultan Mosque which became "the focal point" of the quickly spread rioting.²⁷ "Quite the worst feature," editorialized the Straits Times about the disturbances, "was the way in which the rioters gained in boldness as the day and evening wore on. Late last night one of the most dangerous roads in the city was Orchard Road and nowhere was it more dangerous than near a crossing where the police had concentrated in some force."²⁸ The violence tapered off as rapidly as it had peaked. On December 11, 199 incidents were reported which resulted in 9 deaths, 261 persons injured, and 51 vehicles burned.²⁹ The next day the number of incidents declined to sixty (and the number killed to two) and by noon of the thirteenth had virtually ended.³⁰ Of the 131 people injured by rioters, 86 were Europeans and 32 Eurasians; 9 individuals were killed; 7 Europeans and 2 Eurasians. Most of those injured were driving cars; their vehicles had been stopped by roadblocks and they were dragged out and beaten.

The Maria Hertogh affair was the only episode of racial violence in Malaya to be investigated by an official Inquiry Commission. Perhaps the major conclusion of the Commission's detailed reconstruc-

tion of the development of the disturbances was the ineffectiveness of the rank and file Malay police and the poor judgment of their British superiors. The Malay police either sympathetic to the violent reaction to the Nadra (Maria's Malay name) decision or unwilling to act in concert with European officials against other Malays refused to obey the orders of their superiors. Contributing to the ineffectiveness of the police force, according to the Commission's Report, was its inadequate training which, combined with dissatisfaction at their conditions of service, had lowered morale. As for the British officers, they were held culpable by the Commission report for underestimating the gravity of the situation generally and, in particular, for continuing to rely on Malay police despite several instances of insubordination.

The official inquiry made much of the fact that during the early stages of the disturbances, when it was limited to the restive crowd in front of the Supreme Court, the Gurkha police, vaunted for toughness, discipline, and loyalty, received orders to withdraw from the area. In the view of the Commission, if the Gurkhas had been ordered

instead to move against the demonstrators, the trouble would have been nipped in the bud and gone down in history as a minor event instead of escalating into a significant disruption. As it was, however, the Gurkha withdrawal was taken by the displeased Malays as an indication of weakness; indeed, the Gurkha's were taunted for being afraid. The inquiry also revealed that the acting Commissioner of Police had turned down two offers of military assistance before agreeing to call in the military to take action against the rioters. Once brought into the fray the soldiers restored peace and order with a slight demonstration of force -- indirect proof, perhaps, of an unnecessary loss of life.

The investigation turned up no evidence that the riots were fomented for political ends. No reason was found, that is, to doubt that the violence was set in motion by Malays irate at the Court decision. A number of Malay political groupings, however, did express displeasure at the Court refusal to allow Maria to remain with her husband. It has even been suggested that the Maria Hertog case represented a watershed of sorts in Malay politics from a secular, leftist orientation to

an emphasis on Islam and Malay nationalism.³¹ UMNO, already the dominant Malay political party, managed to avoid taking a stand, although under considerable pressure to do so.³² Dato Onn, whose conviction that UMNO should become a multiracial party would shortly push him to the periphery of Malayan political life, was still the most influential UMNO leader and it was his conviction that the matter should not be considered a political issue but left to the courts to resolve. Indeed, after the riots Onn condemned those Malays who were implicated and UMNO took no initiative in the moves in the Malay community to have the sentences of those convicted of rioting and murder commuted.³³ In addition to the political aspects of the incident, the Commission also said that once the rioting began criminal elements, taking advantage of the confusion, added to the unrest.

The 1964 Singapore Riots

Like the May 1969 disturbances in Kuala Lumpur, the August 1964 racial riots in Singapore broke out during a period of heightened political activity.³⁴

The general Malaysian election in April was the first (and as it turned out the last) Malaysian election in which Singapore participated. It appears that the Alliance leadership believed that the PAP, in leading Singapore into Malaysia, had agreed not to contest in the latter's elections.³⁵ Thus the PAP's nomination of a handful of candidates in the urban areas of Malaysia smacked of duplicity to the Alliance despite the PAP's insistence that it desired to protect the Alliance by providing the Chinese voter with an alternative to the Communist infiltrated Labor Party which, according to the PAP, had far more appeal for the Chinese masses than the MCA. While the PAP's electoral showing was an almost unmitigated disaster (it won one of eleven parliamentary seats and none of fifteen state seats) it set the stage for the Alliance to challenge the PAP on the latter's home ground. With UMNO maintaining that the Singapore Malays should receive, as the Malays in Malaya, special privileges and the PAP adamantly denying the desirability of preferred treatment based on race the debate between the two parties became increasingly acrimonious.

Concerned about the effect of UMNO propaganda, the PAP invited the leaders of hundreds of Singapore Malay organizations to meet with the Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, on July 19 to air their grievances.³⁶ Any prospect that the meeting might have calmed the situation was dashed by a similarly constituted gathering called by the UMNO shortly before the PAP meeting which became a forum for attacks on the PAP's treatment of Malays. And several days after the two rallies, on July 21, the ill feeling erupted into violence. The occasion for the initial outbreak was a procession in commemoration of the Prophet Mohammed's birthday. There are two versions as to how the trouble started.³⁷ The PAP account was that a group of Malay stragglers attacked members of the Federal Reserve Unit who had asked them to catch up with the main line of march. According to UMNO, the violence started when peaceful Malay marchers had a bottle thrown at them by a Chinese bystander.

If, in essence, Malays blamed the Chinese for precipitating the 1964 Singapore racial violence and vice versa, agreement could be had on

two points. Those directly involved, at least at the outset, were "hooligans" spoiling for trouble. A second incontrovertible fact is that fighting spread rapidly and widely after the initial incident about 5:00 p.m. in Kalang. At 6:00 p.m. the officer in charge of the police operation described the incidents as "localized" in the Geylang area.³⁸ One half an hour afterward there were scattered reports of trouble in the city proper, including a clash in the Boon Tat Street area of Chinatown. At 7:00 a clash was reported in the Tanjong Pagar area; and at 8:30 a U. S. Consulate car traveling toward the city from the airport was stoned. By 12:20 a.m., official figures listed the number of casualties as four dead and seventy-eight injured. Ultimately, twenty-two deaths were attributed to the riots. Heightened racial sensitivity existed for some time and, indeed, thirteen of the deaths occurred almost a month later in September in the wake of the murder of a Chinese trishaw rider, possibly by Chinese gangsters in the pay of Indonesian saboteurs.³⁹

The 1967 Penang Riots

The 1967 Penang riots were an offshoot of the British devaluation of the pound.⁴⁰ The Malaysian government, in the midst of converting to a currency not pegged to sterling, responded by devaluating only the so-called old currency so that money in circulation with equal face value might not have the same actual value. The resulting uncertainty caused confusion and consternation throughout the country. In Penang, however, the reaction to the devaluation eventuated in a series of anti-government demonstrations not only because the state was an opposition stronghold but also because as an important trade and tourist center, it was especially affected by the government move.

To protest the devaluation a hartal or strike was organized in Penang aimed at closing the city's markets. This action quickly took on a racial character. For a number of reasons, the Chinese were more disposed to honor the hartal than Malay shopkeepers. Wealthier on the whole, more oriented toward saving, and mistrustful of banks, the Chinese community surely lost more by the devaluation. Chinese small businessmen were on the average,

it can be further assumed, in a better position to close shop for a few days because they had more capital or savings than their Malay counterparts. It may also have been that the Chinese were subjected to greater pressure than the Malays to participate in the hartel if, as the government claimed, the Labor Party provided the inspiration for the hartel since its support came overwhelmingly from the urban Chinese working class. The latter also furnished the major constituency for or were more vulnerable to intimidation from the Communist Party and secret societies, both of which may have been implicated in the disturbances. Above and beyond the apportioning of blame, the devaluation would generally have been perceived as a decision by a Malay government that jeopardized Chinese economic interests.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the call for a hartel led to disturbances of a racial nature with Malay shopkeepers refusing to participate in and resisting a Chinese initiated and supported strike. Government insistence that the unrest was in no sense communal, lost even more credibility with opposition charges that the Malay soldiers

called in to restore order dealt much more harshly with rioting and looting Chinese than with corresponding behavior by Malays.⁴¹

RACIAL VIOLENCE IN MALAYSIA: SOME GENERAL THOUGHTS

An inquiry into the character of racial violence in Malaysia can be framed in terms of the question who does what to whom, where, and under what circumstances. There is no expectation of providing definitive answers to these questions, even assuming this is possible given the subject's complexity and the gaps in information; rather, the aim is the sort of provisional ruminating which can be expected to yield provisional hypotheses and suggest research areas.

To start with the "who," a very small proportion of Malaysians have been directly involved in racial violence; probably no more than one in a thousand and perhaps as few as one in ten thousand. Such figures are, of course, no more than informed estimates. Nor are they meant to suggest a random sample; on the contrary, it is the author's convic-

tion that the rioters were untypical, that one could construct a profile of a potential participant in racial violence. Thus in each of the brief case studies (as in other racial instances of any magnitude for which the author has some information) the claim is made that criminal elements were implicated.

In most cases, "gangsters" or "thugs," the two terms most often used by Malaysians, did not initiate disturbances but tended to exacerbate their scope and intensity once they had erupted. One possible exception was the 1964 Singapore riots. According to one account of what transpired, as noted earlier, these were sparked by bottle-throwing Chinese. It should be added, perhaps gratuitously, that while throwing bottles at peaceful marchers is, by definition, criminal activity the persons so engaged need not be criminals. One can easily imagine, a normally law-abiding citizen acting criminally in the atmosphere of intense politicizing obtaining in Singapore at the time. It is necessary, in other words, to define our terms more carefully.

Criminal activity in Malaysia is associated more with the Chinese than the other communities.

The long history of Chinese secret societies aside, many members of the Malaysian political stratum, including Chinese, assert that the Chinese who immigrated to Malaysia were overwhelmingly from the lower classes; that is, given to uncouth, uncultured, and uncivilized behavior.^{41a} In one sense, as already noted, rioters are by definition engaged in criminal behavior, certainly as far as the government is concerned since the latter's monopoly of the use of force both flows from and contributes to its legitimacy. But the recurrent claims of criminal involvement in racial violence is rather different, viz., that individuals who made their living illegally, who were professional criminals, formed a major contingent in communal disturbances.

The information available to the author on the role played by gangsters in the five episodes described in this chapter suggests two generalizations. 1) Criminal elements will take advantage of any breakdown in normal conditions, and in the process of pursuing their self-interest further exacerbate the situation. 2) Thugs or secret society members may come to play or be perceived as playing a sort of Robin Hood role in which they

use their experience with and willingness to engage in violence to protect and defend others. As pointed out, the unsettled post-War interregnum period witnessed a resurgence of secret society strength. During the 1969 disturbances, to many Chinese in Kuala Lumpur the secret societies performed heroically in protecting their community against Malays on the rampage.

In speculating about the "types" involved in or prone to take advantage of racial disturbances, the figure most analogous to the Chinese secret society member among the Malays is the religious "fanatic." While reference to religious fanaticism recur in descriptions of racial violence in Malaysia, operationally two different things seem to be meant. One usage seems to refer to the style, to the way in which violence is expressed; involving, for example, chanting of the Koran while acting violently or justifying such behavior as a divinely sanctioned holy war or jihad.⁴² Religious fanaticism may, secondly, refer to the reason or motive for engaging in violence. Their "Islamicness," as it were, is an integral part of the Malay sense of identity, and considerable weight is placed in Malaysia on the psychology of the Malays as a con-

stituent factor in communal violence.

It is widely believed by the political stratum that Malays are generally insecure, and fear relegation to an inferior position by the more aggressive Chinese. A corollary conviction, among all communities, is that Malays, in effect, must be treated gingerly by non-Malays, for they will tolerate considerable ill-treatment and frustration but beyond a certain threshold point will lash out in rage and anger. Thus one finds those who argue that even where violence was initiated by the Malay community, responsibility can nonetheless be laid at the door of non-Malays. The May 1969 riots provided a good example of this attitude. However else they may differ, all interpretations acknowledge that an important catalytic agent in the Kuala Lumpur disturbances was the taunting of Malays during the opposition processions after the Alliance electoral setback in ways calculated to evoke Malay fears of annihilation as a people.

Perceptions of the Malay mode of violence can be summarized by the term "amuk," one of the few Malay loan words in the English language. In itself the existence of the word points to a distinctive behavioral tendency in Malay culture; without at-

tempting to speculate on the roots of that tendency, descriptions of amuk are found in literary works and have been documented by anthropologists.⁴³ Although amuk is used here in a collective sense, that is a loose usage since the term refers to the action of individuals. An amuk is, in effect, a person who goes mad and attempts to kill those around him. Something snaps, so to speak, and turns a mild, if not rather jaunty individual, into a veritable homicidal maniac with superhuman strength, who usually cannot be restrained short of death. Indeed, those who feel that an amuk has some control of his rational faculties maintain that he knows and desires that his violent outburst will end with his death; amuk, from this perspective, is a form of suicide -- an individual psychoculturally unable to take his own life compels another to kill him. The point of this oversimplified, lay account is that the amuk phenomenon heavily influences Malaysian perceptions of racial violence in their country and perhaps its experiential aspects as well.

If the May 1969 violence stands as an almost classic case of the kind of situation in which Malays will be provoked into violence, Malaysian perceptions of the prototypical situation in which the Chinese

would act thus was the immediate post-War violence. To Malay opinion, the revenge wreaked by the guerrillas was at once a confirmation and indication of how the Chinese would act if they were in the position to do so. Deemed to be tough-minded realists who divided mankind into winners and losers, it was assumed that when they came out on top, so to speak, the Chinese had no sense of noblesse oblige toward the less successful just as they expected no quarter if numbered among the latter. Unlike the stereotype of Malays as unpredictable and governed by emotion, the Chinese are pictured as models of cool calculation, materialists without illusions.

To rephrase the foregoing in psychoanalytic terminology, if the id looms large in the Malay psyche the superego seems to dominate the Chinese personality. Indubitably the orientations of the two races toward violence point in such a direction. Malay self-indulgence or, less value-ladenly, present time orientation implies a relatively low level of frustration tolerance and a greater disposition than the non-Malays to lash out in primeval, id-centered rage. By contrast, the Chinese convey the impression of greater inhibiteness although, unlike Western man, this modal characterological trait is

moulded by a shame rather than guilt culture. Chinese tend to turn violent feelings against themselves rather than against others. While suicide among Malays is virtually unheard of, suicides by Chinese is featured regularly in the Malaysian press, often for the most trivial reasons. Statistics on suicide in Malaysia bears out the impression that it is partially culturally or racially determined.⁴⁴

Sociocultural Determinants of Racial Violence

Having speculated on some of the psychological dimensions of communal violence in Malaysia, one might move to a consideration of the pertinent sociocultural factors. Racial violence appears to be predominantly a male activity, although whether sex is an independent variable or an intervening one -- an attribute, for instance, of criminality or religious fanaticism -- cannot be determined from the information available to the author. It is probable that the variable of sex is mediated by race, however. One has grave difficulty in imagining Malay women participating in violence, given their penchant for decorum and gentility.

Women warriors do not figure prominently in Malay mythology or history. Nor does the extant anthropological research contradict the conclusion that Malay women are not disposed toward violence. One is struck, on the other hand, by the number of young Chinese girls involved in violent political demonstrations or arrested for subversive activity. Whether or not this is an indicator of a greater willingness on the part of Chinese females to become participants in racial violence, the (hypothesized) difference is of interest.

Sex-based role distinctions appear less clear-cut among Chinese than Malays. Despite the patriarchal organization of Chinese society considerable equality between the sexes, at least in Malaysia, seems to prevail: shrewdness and toughness are valued in either sex. While a Malay woman may, of course, possess and use such qualities in the wider society as well in the family circle, she would probably experience more social disapproval and role confusion than a Chinese woman who behaved in the same manner. Thus we assume or, more accurately, hypothesize that the bulk of those who have participated in racial violence have been males with a smattering of Chinese females who would find more

cultural reinforcement, if psychologically disposed toward violence, than their Malay sisters.

One would expect to find age also correlated with involvement in racial violence. Younger people, probably in all cultures, are less prone to moderation and more likely to be carried away by their emotions. They may also more readily engage in violence because of the turmoil associated with the transition from childhood to adult status or possibly out of adolescent bravura or a sense of physical omnipotence. In addition the influx of modern ideas has no doubt helped to undermine the authority of the older generation. After the May violence, for example, one heard stories from embers of all communities on the inability of older persons to restrain younger hotheads bent on violence.

A third characteristic of past and potential rioters and perpetrators of racial violence is assumed to be socioeconomic class. Simply put, the hypothesis is that the lower an individual's socioeconomic class as measured by standard indicators such as educational level, profession, and income, the greater the possibility of that individual participating in racial violence; or, to put the hypothesis differently, people from lower socioeconomic classes will be

overrepresented in the universe of participants in racial violence. Several suppositions underlay this hypothesis. People from lower socioeconomic stratum are more likely to have spent their formative years in a milieu in which violence was a common occurrence, making them less inhibited in its exercise. Complimenting their distinctive socialization, individuals low in socioeconomic status have greater motivation to resort to violence in the sense that they have less to loose than others and more reason to be pessimistic about the future. Other more problematic reasons may also be adduced for a relationship between violence and socioeconomic level; for example, it has been argued that an uneducated person is more likely to turn to violence because of frustration at the inability to communicate in other ways.⁴⁵

Another question of interest in considering "who" becomes involved in racial violence, whether those involved come from outside or are resident in the area, overlaps with the "where" component of the question raised at the beginning of this section of Chapter 3. It is clear -- and not only from Malaysian experience -- that there are areas with a propensity toward or tradition of violence.⁴⁶ In

Malaysia (limiting the discussion to communal violence) the district of Bukit Mertajam in Penang falls into such a category. An obvious characteristic of Bukit Mertajam or other violence prone areas is that Malays and non-Malays are interspersed, occupy contiguous territory, or are only a short distance apart. An altercation between Kelantanese Malays and Selangor Chinese is exceedingly unlikely except in the ultimate and unlikely contingency of civil war.

Interracial violence is virtually precluded in homogenous areas, say 80 percent or more of one race within a twenty mile radius. Kelantan can serve as an example. For Chinese to initiate violence against their Malay neighbors would be suicidal while Malays have little reason to fear the numerically insignificant Chinese. Moreover, Malay dominance has generated interactive patterns which militate against Kelantan Malays taking revenge on local non-Malays in response to incidents elsewhere in the country.⁴⁷ The non-Malays resident in the state have assimilated to Malay culture far more than Chinese settled in the West Coast with the exception of the unique Straits or Baba Chinese who, in effect, as early settlers formed enclaves in Malay

populations.⁴⁸

Most of the Chinese in Kelantan speak the Kelantanese dialect of Malay, adjusted their dress and diet, and in countless ways gained Malay acceptance. If not thought of as Malay, as orang Kelantan, they were perceived as sufficiently distinctive from Chinese elsewhere to be relatively safe from reprisals. This assumption, that Malays from outside of Kelantan would more readily engage in violence against Kelantanese Chinese, raises a more general question: whether the participants in racial violence were residents of the locality involved or outsiders. There is no way on the basis of the author's information to provide a definitive answer, but, on the assumption that the crux of the matter is the respective mix in different episodes, a review of the earlier case studies from this perspective may be useful.

The interregnum violence centered in Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Johore, those states with large Chinese populations and, correspondingly, active MPAJA movements.⁴⁹ It is probable that most guerrillas hailed from the areas in which they operated since they depended on sympathetic noncom-

batants for food and intelligence. One would surmise further that with the Allied victory they would emerge from the jungle to their former homes. Then, too, Communist tactics would have dictated that cadres and supporters return to organize in areas where they were known. Thus it can at once be concluded and hypothesized that most Chinese who took part in the interregnum violence did so in their place of prior residence. Nor to the author's knowledge were there instances of Malays traveling elsewhere to initiate violence or to join ongoing disturbances.⁵⁰ They either reacted to direct threats or launched strikes, perhaps preemptive, against nearby Chinese.

The Maria Hertogh riots had two loci: the area in front of the Supreme Court building and the Geylang Mosque. Many of the Malays outside of the Supreme Court must have been attracted by the wide publicity the case received. Others may have accompanied friends or have been drawn to the scene out of curiosity; still others may have been part of organized contingents. After the melee at the court house, many of those who had gathered there regrouped at the nearby mosque, their numbers doubtlessly supplemented by others who had learned

of the Court decision and riotous aftermath. Up to this point in the development of the incident, in other words, propinquity and interest helped select, as it were, those involved. Thereafter, as the rioters ranged widely seeking Europeans on whom to vent their fury, there was an increasing involvement of criminal elements encouraged by the breakdown of law and order.

The 1964 Singapore disturbances erupted at various points along the line of march of the procession in honor of the Prophet's birthday. But based on newspaper reports the sites of the staccato eruptions tended to be poor Chinese areas. There is no way to determine the proportion of the bystanders involved in the fighting who lived in the vicinity of the parade and how many came from other neighborhoods, perhaps with the intention of starting trouble. In any case, once the disturbance began, wherever Malay and Chinese came into contact became a potential troublespot.

Except for several minor incidents in neighboring Kedah, the 1967 Penang disturbances did not spread beyond the island. Within these geographical parameters, however, those involved in the violence were probably fairly mobile since the unrest

was far from spontaneous. Thus the case studies, as might have been anticipated, suggest a variety of possible mixes between outsiders and local residents as participants in racial conflict. But what of the May 1969 outbreak where the experience of individuals caught up in the violence as well as published viewpoints can be drawn upon?

The initial Malay gathering in response to the opposition's "victory" procession in Kuala Lumpur took place in the courtyard of the Selangor Menteri Besar's residence and was organized by local UMNO branches. A majority of those at the rally were probably Malays from the area. Not surprisingly, given the intensity and magnitude of the disturbances, Kampong Bharu, the oldest of several Malay enclaves in Kuala Lumpur and a symbol of Malay identity in the capital, was a particularly tense area. Here there is evidence, inferential at best, that the most recent immigrants to Kampong Bharu most aggressively joined in the disturbances. Malaysians from all ethnic groups attributed much of the violence to "hooligans," a term distinguishable from gangsters, and virtually synonymous with unemployed youth. The latter was, indeed, increas-

ingly a problem with the opportunities for gainful employment unable to keep up with the influx of young Malays into Kuala Lumpur generally and Kampong Bharu in particular.⁵¹ However, if Kampong Bharu (along with other homogenous neighborhoods, both Malay and Chinese) was, in effect, a recruiting ground for rioters, the violence appeared to be concentrated in those sections of Kuala Lumpur where Malay and non-Malay neighborhoods melded into one another.⁵²

Complicating efforts to determine the extent to which "outsiders" as opposed to local residents were involved in the instances of violence discussed in this chapter was the tendency of these to spread rapidly from their initial locale(s). In each case, except for the post-War disturbances where a number of episodes occurred more or less simultaneously, observers and commentators expressed amazement at the rapidity with which the violence multiplied or expanded. Partly, of course, the time/dispersion ratio is an artifact of the geography of the situation. A major outbreak in Malaysia or Singapore would be a localized incident in a large country like the United States or China.

Small countries are more vulnerable to disturbance because these cannot be as easily absorbed or isolated. However, the factor of size cuts both ways in that constituted authority in a small country is better able generally to control challenges to law and order. To take an almost ludicrous example, the Chinese Communist experience of the long march and establishment in North China of an alternative government to the nationalist regime would not have been possible in Singapore. Even in much larger Malaysia, where the jungle terrain facilitated the establishment of base areas controlled by an anti-government movement, the remnants of the Communist forces after the end of the emergency could not maintain a meaningful presence in the country but had to retreat to southern Thailand with forays into the border area. In the event, Malaysia's relatively small land area is one variable to be taken into account in attempts to understand the dynamic or process of racial violence in that country.

An obvious prerequisite for the spread of violence is information about the initial event. The most common scenario in Malaysia has neither been the more or less simultaneous outcrop of mul-

multiple disturbances which, at the extreme, would be tantamount to a civil war or revolution nor a number of concurrent challenges to the national government as Burma has undergone but a single outbreak, which sparked subsequent incidents. While the secondary incidents could not have occurred solely as a response to the initial outburst -- the climate of opinion operative in the triggering incident would obtain in all cases -- neither could the succeeding incidents have happened without the initial act of violence which broke what John Stuart Mill called the existing state of society and set in motion a new pattern. Violence breeds violence.

The key link between the triggering and subsequent incidents is communication, both formal and informal. Formal communication refers to the established mass media of radio, television, and the press which in Malaysia are virtually organs of the state. Their messages tend to reach the most literate segments of the population directly, while in the rural areas these will be filtered through local opinion leaders. Informal communication refers to information conveyed orally, usually on a person-to-person basis. Almost every

Malaysian would thus belong to a number of communication networks, for if reading, listening, or viewing requires initiative on part of the recipient of the communication (a certain amount of effort is necessary to plug into the mass media), in an informal communication network the message will, as it were, seek its recipient. Information conveyed by the informal channels of communication is an artifact, if not aspect, of the social system. Its immediacy, moreover, probably lends information conveyed informally greater saliency and impact than the rather distant information transmitted in standardized symbols by the mass media.

During times of unrest such as May 13 the formal communication system's "normal" function of providing information is supplemented, if not superseded by the objective of ending the violence and restoring law and order. The information distributed by the informal communication system is usually of a conflicting sort to that disseminated by the mass media, especially in crises. Partly for this reason cynicism about formal communications is extensive in Malaysia. It is, of course, understandable that the media's reportage function in times of crisis is influenced by the govern-

ment's overriding concern to end the unrest. How these possibly conflicting objectives will be perceived is primarily a function of attitudes toward the government. Malaysians who believe the government is above the fray, an impartial champion of law and order, will have a more favorable view of the media's objectivity than those convinced that the government is partial or itself implicated in the unrest.

The dominant view in the formal communication system or mass media is that the standard currency of exchange in the informal system is rumor. In the wake of racial violence rumor mongering is invariably castigated by the media and the purveying of rumors made a criminal offense. It can be assumed that information does in fact undergo considerable distortion in passage through the informal communication network, if for no other reason than that only a small proportion of the people in the network can possibly be reporting events observed personally. On the other hand, the impression conveyed by the mass media that communications from other sources were wild, exaggerated tales spread by evil and subversive elements dedicated to the country's destruction was a good deal overdrawn.

It is the kernels of truth in the information carried by the informal network which at once makes it credible and poses a threat to the mass media's monopoly of information. For a rumor to be accepted, it must connect at some level with popular experience and expectation. The very fact that many rumors are not ridiculous on their face results, inter alia, in a situation in which the mass media in attempting to discredit totally the informal communication network undermines its own credibility. In short, the pattern of interactions between the formal and informal communication systems is such that the former may unwittingly increase the credibility of and reliance on the latter.

In Malaysia details of communal violence has only come well after the event or in under-the-counter foreign publications; the mass media's initial coverage of disturbances tends toward exhortations to the population to keep calm. ⁵³ With the resultant vacuum of hard information, individuals are forced into a greater reliance on the informal network than would otherwise obtain. At least three factors contribute to the failure of the mass media adequately to perform its information function. 1) Under any circumstances

confusion as to what was, in fact, happening would make some lag in accurate reporting inescapable.

2) With radio and t.v. publicly owned and directed on the British model, and newspapers licensed annually, the media would understandably proceed cautiously, especially in an area as controversial as communal violence. 3) Relatedly, and largely responsible for the caution noted in the second point, the Alliance approach was to underplay, if not suppress, public discussion.

While the Alliance treatment of racial violence was consonant with its elitist, relatively closed decision making style, this is not to say that the party's leadership felt that its management of crises was determined and did not represent a conscious policy. According to Alliance spokesmen, public discussion of racial clashes or even animosity simply increased public anxiety and added to the problem. Opposition figures argued, at the extreme, the exact opposite, to wit, that the airing of racial problems is more a catharsis than a danger; that accurate description of violent incidents allays rather than increases anxiety. To the Alliance these were at best foolhardy and at worst dangerous notions which elevated partisan advantage

above the national interest. The opposition retorted, at least with respect to the May 1969 disturbances, that the real reason the government refused to permit open discussion was the realization that its policies could not bear public scrutiny. As to the more limited question of the violence itself, it was maintained that, in effect, the government played a partisan role even to the point of instigating the disturbances.

WHAT HAPPENED ON MAY 13?

Limiting discussion to the May 13 disturbance, two contrary "ideal type" explanations found currency in Malaysia. There was, first of all, what might be called the official line disseminated by the Alliance. It was the more important explanation in that it furnished the ideational underpinning for the government's reaction to May 13 and of official thinking on measures to prevent any repetition.

At the outset, the government placed the blame for the May 13 disturbances primarily on

secret society elements, "bad hats," and subversives, who found tacit allies in irresponsible -- mostly foreign -- journalists.⁵⁴ This explanation, of course, had the advantage, both with respect to the Alliance's self-image and its position vis-a-vis the opposition, of not calling the ruling regime's policies into question. It is also reassuring in that it minimizes the problem of inter-ethnic violence by conceiving of it as an aberration, almost exogenous happening, attributable to the sort of anti-social elements found in all countries, rather than a phenomenon intrinsic to the history and racial complexion of Malaysia.

In time, the "anti-social element" official line was supplanted by what might be called a socioeconomic explanation.⁵⁵ Government spokesmen now emphasized that the May 13 violence was triggered by Malays who felt so threatened by the opposition (read non-Malay) reactions to the election results as to strike out in fear and anger. Culpability lay less with them than with those non-Malays who, glaringly insensitive to Malay psychology, provoked them. In terms of this argu-

ment, the major strategy for preventing a recurrence of racial violence was to assure that the Malays were so secure that they would never again feel threatened to the point of resorting to violence, primarily by "entrenching," reaffirming, and making explicit the immutability of the Constitutionally granted "special privileges" of the Malay community.⁵⁶

The second school of thought concerning the roots of May 13 can be labeled the opposition line, although this is an even greater oversimplification than referring to an official line given the greater fragmentation of the opposition. Still, there is sufficient points of agreement to justify the characterization. By and large, the opposition deemphasized the "anti-social element" argument. In the first place that categorization included, in Alliance eyes, a number of opposition politicians. More importantly, it was in the direct interest of the opposition to relate breakdowns in law and order to the policies of the party in power rather than seeing these as aberrations. Just as the Alliance leadership found reassurance in minimizing the seriousness or rootedness of racial disturbances, so the opposition could bolster its confidence by emphasizing these, because continued Alliance

rule thus appeared contrary to the national interest.

The opposition acknowledged, or rather agreed, that Malay grievances lay at the heart of the May disturbances. But this dissatisfaction was traced to and taken as evidence of the failure of Alliance policy of preferential treatment as the means of upgrading the standard of living of the Malay community. All of the opposition parties adopted this argument with different shadings; for example, the PI did not oppose the principle itself as the DAP did but contended that the Alliance honored it more in the breach than in the observance and that far too many concessions were made to non-Malays. The LP argued that the very organization of the Alliance encouraged and perpetuated racial identification and hence division.

There was, according to opposition thinking, official government involvement in the May 13 disturbances, albeit disagreement about its extent and character. This conviction was partly a "logical" inference from the course of events. The fact that parliamentary democracy was suspended immediately after it appeared that, for the first time, the opposition would have significant political

representation understandably engendered the suspicion that rather than taking its chances in the political arena, the Alliance engineered a situation where it could rule by decree. One contention was that the UMNO sponsored demonstration on May 13 was "allowed" to take a violent turn. According to others in the political stratum, the aim of the UMNO leadership was a "controlled" demonstration of Malay strength but the forces set in motion could not be contained and escalated to an unintended magnitude. In any case, the fact that the May violence redounded to the Alliance's benefit politically, provided grist for the opposition's mill.

An extremely sensitive aspect of the perceptions of the May violence was the role of the police and armed forces. In the Chinese community there was the widespread belief that Malay soldiers called on to help suppress rioters ignored and even fraternized with those of their own race while singling out Chinese for cruel treatment. Opposition criticisms of the armed forces went far beyond an alleged failure to act impartially, however. Soldiers were said to have fired indiscriminately at non-Malays and to have joined forces with civilians in attack-

ing Chinese. Many non-Malays felt that the uneven treatment meted out by Malay troops went beyond personal feelings of racial animosity -- that the army, or units of it, had orders either from politicians or officers to teach the non-Malays a lesson.

WHAT MIGHT BE DONE?

In shifting with great trepidation, to a prescriptive stance, the attempt is to adopt the vantage point of the government which, inter alia, leads to less concern with individual liberties than if an opposition perspective were adopted or personal values emphasized.

An obvious prescription is the incarceration of known criminals at the outbreak of racial violence, if not as a preemptive or preventive step at the first hint of trouble or when in the government's judgment violence is imminent. What makes such action "obvious" is that both past experience and logic suggest that criminal elements will take advantage of any breakdown in law and order. It should, moreover, be possible to keep track of the

whereabouts of most prospective troublemakers.

A second suggestion is the need for an immediate and firm response by the authorities at the first signs of disorder.⁵⁷ Procrastination or indecisive action seems not to assuage violence but to encourage it. It would seem that the potential participant in violence is best dissuaded from acting thus by a high probability of a severe sanction should he do so. Threats will increasingly lose their efficacy, however, as the point is reached where the situation has built up its own momentum and begins, so to speak, to feed on itself with each incident generating another until the climate of opinion renders inoperative the usual expectations with respect to intercommunal relations.

A third, closely connected recommendation, is that the authorities move quickly to cordon the area where an outbreak initially occurs. The infection must be isolated before it can spread. Once it does, security forces cannot be sufficiently concentrated to assure their effectiveness. This prescription, as with the others, is premised on the impartiality and capability of the armed manpower available to the government.

The capacity of the police, militia, army, and the like to move quickly and effectively can be en-

hanced by more careful recruitment, improved training, higher salaries, and better working conditions. Measures aimed at upgrading effectiveness should help raise morale and responsibility. Still, with the saliency of race the major obstacle to impartial enforcement of the law, perhaps the strongest guarantor of impartiality would be a genuinely multi-racial security force. Such a force, virtually unthinkable because of political considerations, might assure that Malay troops, police, and so on, would provide a check against their Chinese compatriots acting unjustly toward Malay civilians while the Chinese under arms would furnish some guarantee that the Malays would not allow anti-Chinese sentiment to determine their behavior. Hopefully, such a checks and balance system would become less and less necessary as a sense of professionalism and esprit de corps transcending communal identifications developed.

The prescriptive measures thus far proffered concern situations in which interethnic violence has broken out or is imminent. Undiscussed is what might be done with respect to underlying causes. An objective which may be dismissed at the outset is the elimination, in the short-term, of the ignor-

ance, suspicion, and stereotyping which nourish racial antipathy. However desirable, to end the aversion of Malays toward Chinese and vice versa is an unrealistic hope in the foreseeable future and should be treated as a given rather than an object of policy. Efforts must therefore be directed at preventing communal antagonisms from finding violent expression and minimizing the scope and intensity of outbreaks that do occur. The Malaysian government should not strive to achieve an earthly utopia of peace and goodwill but to avoid the worst pitfalls of an imperfect world.

While considering complete harmony between Malays and non-Malays, a chimera, government leaders must nonetheless strive in word and deed to reduce racial hostility. They should continue to expend time and energy exhorting good will and harmony -- despite the likelihood that their efforts have at best a minimal effect -- because silence might be taken as sanctioning prejudice. In other words, if public pronouncements have little or no prospect of changing deeply rooted attitudes, to cease pleas for racial understanding (omitted from the present discussion are situations where the elite might work to engender racial prejudice or to exploit

these for its own ends) would be conspicuous and might be perceived as lending official respectability to racial antipathies, and the feeling that these could be acted on with impunity.⁵⁸

Alliance policy before and after May 13 can be interpreted as having the lessening of communalism as its major long-run objective whether at the most general level of economic growth and political stability or at an intermediate level of uplifting the Malay community without doing grave damage to the non-Malays. In the short-run, however, and as one descends to particular policies (such as the introduction of Malay as the sole medium of instruction in schools), projects (for example, the Jengka Triangle or Muda Irrigation Scheme), and institutions (FLDA, FAMA, MARA, and the like), the potential for the exacerbation of racial antagonisms increases.

In general, a positive relationship between modernization, economic growth, a more equitable distribution of wealth, and other fundamental transformations on the one hand and the alleviation of those conditions assumed to cause racial conflict on the other is an article of faith, not a proven proposition. Certainly a one-to-one relationship

does not exist and it remains to be seen whether there is any at all or, indeed, whether rapid change in directions generally considered desirable does not exacerbate societal tensions and violence in general and communal conflict in particular. Similar caveats may be made with respect to the Alliance conviction that a -- perhaps the -- root cause of May 13 was the socioeconomic gap between the Malay and non-Malay communities and its corollary that to avoid any recurrence the gap had to be narrowed.

An economic explanation of racial violence in Malaysia has an appealing straightforwardness. It has, too, the beguiling quality of providing a clear direction to and rationale for policy. For the Alliance government it had the additional attraction of counseling more of the same and of lending greater urgency to efforts to uplift the Malay community, the course dictated by political necessity in any case. Economic grievances must, to be sure, have played some role in racial violence in Malaysia, including the May 13 outbreak, but it was not the sole or probably even a major ingredient. While the relative economic positions of the Malay and non-Malay communities has been, roughly, a con-

stant during the post-War period, interethnic violence was episodic, a variable, so that non-economic factors are needed to explain why it is that violence erupted at particular points in time.

As just observed, an economic interpretation of racial violence in Malaysia suggested itself to the Alliance because it was consonant with the dominant or at least establishment analysis of Malaysian society, its needs and problems, while satisfying the Alliance's political interests vis-a-vis the Malay community. Also, the pertinent non-economic factors were far harder to conceptualize. One was reminded of Chesterton's story of the man late at night looking for a lost object under a street lamp not because he had dropped it in the area but because that was where the light was. An economic explanation, that is, was most readily understandable or "logical." In any case, although this Chapter has tentatively suggested a number of the non-economic factors operative in May 13 or deserving investigation, an essentially economic interpretation underlay official reaction to the violence, the subject of Chapters 4 and 5.

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